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CHAPTER 10
THE REIGNS OF KUANG-TSUNG (1189–1194)
AND NING-TSUNG (1194–1224)
Richard L. Davis
Southern Sung prosperity struck turbulent waters in the late twelfth century.
During his twenty-six-year reign, Hsiao-tsung (r. 1162–89) was a consci-
entious and strong ruler, yet when his adopted father, the retired emperor
Kao-tsung, died in 1187, Hsiao-tsung had a very difficult time coping with
the loss. Although suspending court was normal under the circumstances,
when Hsiao-tsung did not resume audiences for over a month, pressure on
him from officials mounted. Hsiao-tsung returned, but reportedly was able to
walk only with the aid of a cane, a sign of his physical and emotional frailty.
Once the epitome of political activism, Hsiao-tsung now turned to the heir
apparent to assist him in managing state affairs.1
The heir, Chao Tun (1147–1200), found himself cast in the role of auxiliary
emperor. Chief ministers were instructed to consult Chao Tun every two days,
and his presence was expected at court audiences. This arrangement troubled
officials from the outset. Reader-in-waiting Yang Wan-li (1127–1206) took
the arrangement to imply the existence of two rulers and warned of potential
instability. Ignoring the warning, Hsiao-tsung spurned Chao Tun’s own offer
to take a diminished role at court.2 Hsiao-tsung also insisted on performing
to their fullest mourning rites for Kao-tsung. Most previous Sung emperors
had accepted a less rigorous mourning regime, and officials proposed as much
for Hsiao-tsung. The emperor would hear nothing of it, and ordered audiences
to be held in the inner palace. Hsiao-tsung never seemed to appreciate the
officials’ dilemma of seeking to serve two political authorities without the
1 On the last years of Hsiao-tsung, see chapter 9 of this volume. Also see Miyazaki Ichisada, “Hsiao-tsung,”
in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 400–1; Liu Li-yen (Lau Nap-yin), “Nan
Sung cheng-chih ch’u-t’an: Kao-tsung yin-ying hsia ti Hsiao-tsung,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi (Taipei,
1989) 19, pp. 203–56; see chu¨an 35–6 in T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking,
1977); Pi Yu¨an, Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1958)] [Te-yu¨-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792;
Peking, 1958), chu¨an 151; Sung-shih ch’u¨an-wen Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (early 14th c.; Taipei, 1969), chu¨an
27–8.
2 HTC (1958) 151, p. 4030.
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certainty as to which authority was more important, the seated emperor or the
already influential heir apparent.
In the late 1180s, the bureaucracy was headed by Chou Pi-ta (1126–1204)
and Liu Cheng (1129–1206). Chou was born to a family from the north,
but raised in Lu-ling, Chiang-nan West. The son of an erudite at the Impe-
rial University, he earned his chin-shih degree in 1151 and the prestigious
“erudite literatus” (po-hsu¨eh hung-tz’u) credentials six years later. Chou Pi-ta
had served Hsiao-tsung in various capacities, including that of Han-lin aca-
demician, before becoming assistant councilor in 1180 and chief councilor of
the right in 1187.3 Hsiao-tsung appears to have held him in high esteem,
as did his colleagues in the bureaucracy, for the sixty-one-year-old Chou Pi-
ta stood as a successful official with sound scholarly credentials. Liu Cheng
was of comparable stature and influence. A native of Ch’u¨an-chou, Fu-chien,
he was descended from Liu Ts’ung-hsiao, an official who had made a name
for himself two centuries earlier at the court of Sung T’ai-tsu, the dynasty’s
founder. Liu Cheng received his chin-shih in 1160, the last examination held
under Kao-tsung.4 In addition to his extensive service away from the capital,
Liu Cheng accumulated metropolitan experience as master of remonstrance,
vice-minister of war, minister of personnel, and assistant councilor. Like Chou
Pi-ta, Liu Cheng commanded the respect of colleagues and the confidence of
the throne. The two also shared a common sense of urgency in resolving the
current political crisis.
In late 1188, Chou Pi-ta had spoken with Hsiao-tsung about abdication.
The idea reportedly won the endorsement of Kao-tsung’s widow, Dowager
Empress Wu (1115–97), and it may have been under her influence that Hsiao-
tsung signaled his approval to Chou Pi-ta.5 In the interim, Hsiao-tsung ele-
vated Chou Pi-ta to councilor of the left and Liu Cheng to councilor of the
right. On 18 February 1189, less than a month after Chang-tsung had become
emperor of Chin in the north, Chao Tun ascended the throne as the future
Kuang-tsung (r. 1189–94). Hsiao-tsung, now retired, moved into his father’s
former residence, renamed the Ch’ung-hua Palace. There Hsiao-tsung secluded
himself for the remaining five years of his life.
3 On Chou Pi-ta, see Kinugawa Tsuyoshi, “Chou Pi-ta,” in Sung Biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), vol. 2, pp. 675–7; SS 391, pp. 11965–72; Huang Tsung-hsi et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an (1838;
Taipei, 1973) 35, p. 702; Chou Pi-ta, Chou I-kuo Wen-chung kung chi nien-p’u (n.p., 1848), p. 26a; Lou
Yu¨eh [Yao], Kung-k’uei chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (c. early 13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 93,
pp. 19b–32a; 94, pp. 1a–24b; Fu Tseng-hsiang, comp., Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1943; Taipei, 1974)
75, pp. 14a–27b.
4 On Liu Cheng, see Conrad Schirokauer, “Liu Cheng,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), pp. 624–8; SS 391, pp. 11972–7; Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an 97, pp. 1816–17.
5 Chou, Chou I-kuo Wen-chung kung chi nien-p’u, p. 26a; SS 243, pp. 9646–8; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4051;
Sung-shih ch’u¨an-wen Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 27, pp. 51a–b.
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the reign of kuang-tsung (1189–1194)
A court in turmoil
Chao Tun was the third but only surviving son of Hsiao-tsung and his first wife,
Empress Kuo2 (1126–56), who had died when he was a child of nine. Hsiao-
tsung is said to have loved the empress deeply, which may explain his attention
to the child despite the boy’s secondary position in the line of succession.6
Hsiao-tsung’s eldest son and original heir apparent had died in 1167, but
Hsiao-tsung did not rush to name a replacement. Perhaps he feared that too
early a selection might leave the candidate arrogant and complacent; more
likely, his hesitancy reflected doubts about Chao K’ai2 (1146–80), his second
son and next in line of succession. Only under mounting bureaucratic pressure
did Hsiao-tsung overcome these concerns, and bypass Chao K’ai2 to designate
the reputedly more precocious Chao Tun as heir in 1171. Approaching twenty-
four years of age at the time, Chao Tun would be forty-one before taking the
throne in 1189.
Prior to the accession, many had considered Chao Tun ideal as a prospec-
tive ruler. Hsiao-tsung regarded him as most “exquisite” in character and
took a personal interest in his education. The Confucian luminary Chu Hsi
(1130–1200), attributed to Chao Tun the gifts of intelligence and wisdom,
the virtues of filial devotion and quiet reverence, the temperament of extensive
humaneness and universal love, and the majesty of the supernaturally martial
without violence. Palace lecturer P’eng Kuei-nien (1142–1206) characterized
him as pure and dedicated.7 When Kuang-tsung became emperor, he initially
discharged his responsibilities with the same conscientiousness as his prede-
cessor. He held regular audiences and seriously weighed ministerial advice.
But beneath the facade of composure lay an intensely distressed personality,
and it did not take long for his troubles to surface and affect the functioning
of the court.
Kuang-tsung, like most imperial sons, had lived secluded within the palace.
The ideal in previous dynasties had been to appoint imperial sons to some
regional post while they were in their teens, which provided them with admin-
istrative experience and removed the young men from the secure walls of the
6 SS 36, pp. 693–4; 243, pp. 8650–1; 246, pp. 8732–4. For detailed overviews of the reign, see Liang-ch’ao
kang-mu pei-yao [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (1228–33; Taipei, 1970), chu¨an 1–3; Liu Shih-
chu¨, Hsu¨ Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien [1522–66 ed.] (13th–14th c.; Shanghai, 1927),
chu¨an 11.
7 SS 36, p. 694; Chu Hsi, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1245; Taipei, 1979) 12, p. 1a; P’eng Kuei-nien, Chih-t’ang chi [Ssu-k’u
ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (12th c.; Taipei, 1975) 4, p. 12a.
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palace, thereby freeing them from the grip of powerful palace personalities and
exposing them to life outside the capital. With the exception of the first three
emperors, this opportunity was never afforded to Sung emperors. In the case of
Chao Tun, his administrative experience was confined to the capital as nominal
vice-prefect and then prefect of Lin-an.8 His father once contemplated giving
him a regional appointment farther away from court, but for unnamed reasons
did not order it. Throughout his life, Chao Tun remained deeply dependent
on the old palace friends among whom he had grown up.
These personalities around him intensified his insecurity. His father was a
stern, intimidating character with strong opinions and an intolerant streak, and
during his adolescence Chao Tun lacked a maternal figure. After his mother,
Empress Kuo2, died when he was nine, his father delayed taking a second
wife until Chao Tun was sixteen. There is no mention of Chao Tun having had
close ties to his paternal grandfather, the retired Kao-tsung, either, despite the
physical proximity of their palaces. The young prince was under the constant
influence of palace attendants and, beginning in his teens, his wife.
The future Empress Li2 (1145–1200) was the daughter of Li Tao, an accom-
plished military figure of the early Southern Sung.9 Betrothed to Chao Tun
during the last years of Kao-tsung’s reign, when the two were still teenagers,
she gave birth in 1168 to his second son and heir, Prince Chia. By then,
Chao Tun was already in his twenty-second year. Kao-tsung and Empress Wu
were probably responsible for the match, but they lived to regret it. Even
as a princess Lady Li2 proved politically insensitive and selfishly indulgent,
insufferably arrogant and violently jealous. Hsiao-tsung was at one point so
piqued by her that he threatened her with deposition. This would have been
an extreme act, especially for a princess who had already given birth to a male
heir. Hsiao-tsung nevertheless approved her installation as empress in 1189,
no doubt reluctantly. Yet Hsiao-tsung’s threat of deposition had incurred the
undying enmity of his daughter-in-law, who proceeded to poison the rela-
tionship between father and son. Meanwhile, she drove her weak husband to
virtual insanity.
Kuang-tsung was never an altogether healthy man. Even before his acces-
sion, he received medication on a regular basis. The exact nature of his infir-
mity is uncertain; historical records simply allude to some malady of the heart.
Conceivably, this may have been a physical disorder. Contemporary documents
clearly imply the problem was largely a reaction to a domineering wife. There
are numerous incidents of her overbearing and ruthless personality. Toward the
8 SS 36, pp. 693–4; Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng (1979) 12, p. 1a.
9 SS 36, p. 706; 243, pp. 8653–5; 391, p. 11974; 398, p. 12114; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4053; 152, p. 4079;
152, p. 4090.
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close of 1191, Kuang-tsung was reportedly washing his hands in the palace and
noticed the delicate hands of a palace lady. He commented, casually, on their
attractiveness. Presently, while sitting down to a meal he opened a container
of food and found the two hands inside, a reminder from a jealous wife that
she would tolerate no infidelity. Prior to this, Kuang-tsung had coped with his
overbearing wife through the company of consorts. Kao-tsung had reportedly
been concerned about the youth’s noticeable lack of sexual diversion. Consort
Huang, a gift to Kuang-tsung from his grandfather, had met a sudden death.
The emperor’s favor was apparently her undoing.10 It was alleged to have been
the handiwork of Empress Li2, and the death of this favorite forced Kuang-
tsung to avoid other women. After 1191, his mental condition took a turn
for the worse and he withdrew within the palace. There he took to drinking
heavily, adding to his many other problems. He rarely held court and refused
to undertake all but a few imperial responsibilities.11
Kuang-tsung’s emotional isolation and domestic unhappiness were aggra-
vated by growing tension between him and his retired father. In part, this
stemmed from the influence of Empress Li2. Her embitterment had several
apparent sources. First, there were Hsiao-tsung’s earlier threats to divest her
of her rank as princess. Second, even after his son Kuang-tsung’s accession,
Hsiao-tsung refused to endorse the nomination of Empress Li2’s son, Prince
Chia (Chao K’uo, r. as Ning-tsung 1194–1224), as his heir apparent. This
refusal could be interpreted as an act of spite, and perhaps even as a veiled
threat to deny the prince his inheritance. Finally, when Kuang-tsung became
bedridden in 1191, his father and stepmother paid him a courtesy call. Atten-
dants blamed Empress Li2 for Kuang-tsung’s emotional problems, and at
hearing this, Hsiao-tsung harshly reprimanded her.12 In doing this, Hsiao-
tsung compounded private threats with public insults. To protect the position
of the vulnerable Prince Chia, and also to avenge such indignities, Empress
Li2 provoked tension between the two emperors.
Before the ascendency of his wife, Kuang-tsung as a prince had been subject
to the influence of palace eunuchs and attendants. Hsiao-tsung was himself
known to favor certain dutiful attendants, but Hsiao-tsung’s strength of char-
acter precluded dominance by any one favorite. Not so for Kuang-tsung, who
was often blindly loyal and recklessly indulgent to palace friends. Eunuch
Ch’en Yu¨an, for example, was favored by Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung for
10 SS 36, p. 701; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4079.
11 On the emperor’s problem, see Conrad Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack: The condemnation
of wei-hsu¨eh,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz.,1975), pp. 163–98,
especially p. 175; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 1, p. 20a; SS 393, p. 12008; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4053.
12 Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 1b; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4079.
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many years. Yet, when remonstrance official Chao Ju-yu¨ (1140–96) exposed
the eunuch’s illicit intrusion into military affairs, Hsiao-tsung banished Ch’en
Yu¨an to the far south.13 Kuang-tsung, apparently on close personal terms with
Ch’en Yu¨an since boyhood, brooded over the decision and upon taking the
throne, ordered the eunuch’s return. Once back in Lin-an, Ch’en Yu¨an came
to be suspected of intentionally planting the seeds of distrust between the two
emperors as revenge for Hsiao-tsung’s earlier treatment of him. Although the
veracity of the suspicion cannot be determined, many court officials believed
it to be true, and this prompted their demands for the eunuch’s dismissal.
Kuang-tsung chose instead to promote him. Drafting secretary Ch’en Fu-liang
(1137–1203), a representative of bureaucratic opinion, refused to compose the
promotion edict. His protest had no effect. Ch’en Yu¨an remained a palace
fixture for the rest of Kuang-tsung’s reign.
Dominated, voluntarily or involuntarily, by a vengeful Ch’en Yu¨an and by
Empress Li2, Kuang-tsung’s relationship with his father deteriorated rapidly.
Early in his reign, Kuang-tsung reduced audience visits to Hsiao-tsung’s
Ch’ung-hua Palace from six per month to four and then to one. Within a
year, formal audiences were downgraded to official visits, and their frequency
diminished. After two years, visits became so infrequent and tensions so appar-
ent that officials began to denounce inner court influence. In spring 1191, the
capital was hit by strong winds, followed immediately by snow, then sun-
light, and more snow. To officials, such irregularities signaled Heaven’s angry
response to an imbalance on the earth, with the implication of imperial miscon-
duct. Officials such as Assistant in the Palace Library Huang Shang (1146–94),
Investigating Censor Lin Ta-chung (1131–1208), and Imperial Diarist P’eng
Kuei-nien were but a few of the critics who related changes in weather to the
ascendancy of yin over yang.14 Yin, representing petty men and women, was
usurping the dominant position of yang, the emperor. If yang was not restored
to its normal supremacy, if the emperor did not assert control over the palace,
the outcome, it was believed, could be disastrous. With such warnings came
remonstrances that Kuang-tsung curtail his indulgence in feasts and alco-
hol. But nothing changed. The controversial eunuch Ch’en Yu¨an remained.
Empress Li2’s appetite for self-indulgence grew. Toward the close of 1192,
the empress arranged for three recent generations of her own ancestors to be
enfeoffed as princes, and, on the occasion of her visiting her family’s elaborate
ancestral temple, special imperial favors were extended to 26 of her relatives,
13 On Ch’en Yu¨an, see SS 393, p. 11996; 469, p. 13672; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4055; 152, pp. 4089–90;
153, p. 4097; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 4, p. 18a.
14 SS 393, p. 12013; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4071–2; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 1, pp. 7a–21a; Lou, Kung-k’uei
chi (1979) 99, p. 7b.
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and official rank was conferred on another 172. This extravagance of imperial
favor infuriated the bureaucracy. Vice-Minister of Rites Ni Ssu (1147–1220)
would later portray Empress Li2 as a threat to Sung stability comparable to
Empress Lu¨ of the Han dynasty and Empress Wu Tse-t’ien of the T’ang, the
most vilified women in Chinese history.15
bureaucratic leadership
During the final years of Kuang-tsung’s brief reign, the chief councilor, Liu
Cheng, began to be eclipsed by two other men, initially collaborators but later
rivals. The first of these, Han T’o-chou (1152–1207), while identified as a
native of Hsiang-chou2, near K’ai-feng, was born and raised in the south.16
His great grandfather Han Ch’i (1008–75) had served nobly as chief councilor
under both Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung. His father, Han Ch’eng, had an undis-
tinguished political career but an enviable set of marriage relations. Himself a
maternal grandson of Shen-tsung, Han Ch’eng was married to the younger sis-
ter of the influential Dowager Empress Wu, wife of Kao-tsung. Han T’o-chou
was married to a niece of the same empress, a union cut short by the woman’s
premature death, but one that served its purpose nonetheless as a confirmation
of imperial favor.17 Further cementing the ties of Han T’o-chou’s family to the
palace was the betrothal of the daughter of Han T’o-chou’s nephew to Chao
K’uo, heir to Kuang-tsung’s throne, a marriage arranged by Dowager Empress
Wu. In this way, men of the Han clan had been linked by marriage with the
royal family for more than a century, yet at no time did those links yield as
much political power as during the late twelfth century.
Dowager Empress Wu, the lifelong spouse of Kao-tsung, wielded con-
siderable power in her own discreet way even after her husband’s abdica-
tion. It was out of deference to her that Hsiao-tsung had appointed her two
brothers, Wu I (1124–71) and Wu Kai (1125–66), to high-level bureau-
cratic posts and had conferred on them various honorific titles, culminat-
ing in their enfeoffment as princes. Wu I’s son and nephew of the empress,
Wu Chu¨, had similarly received numerous coveted posts under Hsiao-tsung
and Kuang-tsung, among them prefectural vice-administrator of Lin-an and
15 SS 243, p. 8654; 398, p. 12114; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4090.
16 On Han T’o-chou, see Herbert Franke, “Han T’o-chou,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wies-
baden, 1976), pp. 376–84; Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic
success and kinship fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C., 1986), pp. 84–92; SS 474, pp. 13771–
8; Ch’en Teng-yu¨an, “Han P’ing-yu¨an p’ing,” Chin-ling hsu¨eh-pao 4 No. 1 (1934), pp. 89–149; Chiba
Hiroshi, “Kan Takuchu¯ – So¯dai kanshinden sono ni,” in Yamazaki sensei taikan kinen To¯yo¯ shigaku ronso¯,
ed. Yamazaki Sensei Taikan Kinenkai (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 279–89.
17 Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, p. 28b.
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prefect of Ming-chou. For a non–degree holder, these were significant achieve-
ments.18 The Empress Wu’s extraordinary network of family contacts, com-
bined with her status as grand dowager empress since her husband’s death,
virtually ensured that court officials would turn to her during the major cri-
sis for the imperial family when Kuang-tsung became emotionally debili-
tated. This crisis also placed her nephew Han T’o-chou in a highly opportune
position.
Despite a prestigious family background and impressive array of palace
contacts, Han T’o-chou held no great promise as a civil servant. For him, no
less than for his father, the lack of examination credentials meant that access to
the bureaucracy came through the hereditary privilege accorded to kinsmen of
great officials or from favor derived through marriage ties with palace women.
Except for brief stints as regional sheriff and keeper of the imperial insignia and
seals, Han T’o-chou’s own bureaucratic experience was confined to the Office
of Audience Ceremonies (Ko-men ssu), where under Hsiao-tsung he had served
as audience usher, attendant, and commandant. He had also served twice as an
emissary to the Chin, first in 1189, shortly after Kuang-tsung took the throne,
and again in 1195, following Ning-tsung’s accession.19
It was common practice in Southern Sung times to send two chief envoys,
one a ranking civilian official and another representing the military. Ceremony
officials such as Han T’o-chou were responsible for the access through the doors
of the palace and for announcing visitors; they had security duties and were thus
attached to the military bureaucracy, although in function they lay somewhere
between the civilian and military services, with neither the literary skills of
credentialed scholars nor the martial skills of ordinary guardsmen.20
The Office of Audience Ceremonies also included men such as Wu Chieh
(1093–1139), brother of Szechwan military magnate Wu Lin, who became
audience attendant in recognition of his distinguished military record, and
Chiang T’e-li, Han T’o-chou’s predecessor as audience commandant, who had
received the assignment by recommendation after successfully suppressing
pirates off the coast.21 These assignments were often a reward for martial valor,
yet the ceremonies office also contained many individuals with no record of
military service. Often the assignment was a special act of imperial favor. Wang
Pien (d. 1184), for example, had become audience commandant under Hsiao-
tsung as reward for negotiating a favorable treaty with the Jurchen. A doctor
of Kuang-tsung had been assigned to the office in 1190 due to his effective
18 SS 465, pp. 13591–2.
19 T’o-t’o, Chin shih (1344; Peking, 1975) 61, p. 1450; 62, p. 1464.
20 Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 29, p. 9a; 30, p. 12a.
21 SS 366, p. 11414; 470, p. 13695.
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medical treatment.22 Many others made their way to the office through ties
with influential palace women, most often empresses. The appointment of
Chang Yu¨eh (d. 1180) had stemmed from his marriage to Dowager Empress
Wu’s younger sister. Yang Tz’u-shan (1139–1219), brother of Ning-tsung’s
empress, had become commandant following the installation of his sister as
imperial concubine; subsequently, his son inherited the same post. Han Ch’eng,
son of Emperor Shen-tsung’s daughter, and Han T’o-chou, closely related
to two different empresses, similarly owed their appointments to prominent
women.23 There are so many cases of audience officials being linked to palace
women that the office may well have been dominated by the maternal side of
the ruling family, not professional military men. A comment by Chou Pi-ta
in 1189 is quite revealing in this regard. When approached by Chiang T’e-
li, the quasi-military figure with no known blood or marriage ties to palace
consorts, for information about Hsiao-tsung’s forthcoming abdication, Chou
Pi-ta responded, “This is not something the maternal side should dare to
learn.”24 The statement suggests that Chiang T’e-li, merely by serving in the
Office of Audience Ceremonies, was automatically identified with the interests
and power of palace women. The reasons for entrusting consort relatives with
control over palace doors are not entirely clear, although one could speculate
that a brother would guard his sister differently than a stranger might, but the
preference for relatives, as a matter of policy, is undeniable. It was precisely
this policy that facilitated the rise of Han T’o-chou.
Another emerging figure of the Liu Cheng era who would later eclipse
Han T’o-chou was the imperial clansman Chao Ju-yu¨. A descendant seven
generations removed from Emperor T’ai-tsung’s eldest son Chao Yu¨an-tso,
he was born and raised in Jao-chou, Chiang-nan East.25 Like many distant
members of the dynasty’s massive imperial clan, and especially those who
had migrated south in the chaos of the Jurchen takeover, Chao Ju-yu¨ was
no stranger to adversity. His father and grandfather had both held posts of
local, but not national, importance.26 This humble condition made him a
man of simple needs, who was devoted to his family. Chao Ju-yu¨ was filial to
a fault. At the death of his mother, contemporaries report, he wept so bitterly
as to cough blood and later became emaciated by mourning. The account
may be somewhat exaggerated, but it illustrates a widespread perception of
22 SS 470, pp. 13693–4; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4065–6.
23 SS 392, p. 11982; 465, pp. 13595–6; 474, p. 13771.
24 HTC (1958) 151, pp. 4050–1.
25 On Chao Ju-yu¨, see Herbert Franke, “Chao Ju-yu¨,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), pp. 59–63; SS 392, pp. 11981–90; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, pp. 1a–15b.
26 John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999),
p. 189.
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Chao Ju-yu¨ as an exemplar of Confucian virtue. He was no less committed to
classical studies. Passing civil service qualifying examinations with distinction,
he had placed first in the chin-shih examination of 1165. Court policy denied
this honor to imperial clansmen, however, and he was demoted to second place.
A poet in his own right, his literary interests included more than poetry. He
collected books on a wide range of topics, boasting a personal library of fifty
thousand chu¨an.
Chao Ju-yu¨ was an imposing presence at the court of Hsiao-tsung. Col-
leagues in the Palace Library knew him as a man of exceptional integrity who
refused to flatter the influential merely to advance his own career. He confirmed
this in 1171 when the audience commandant Chang Yu¨eh was named notary
official at the Bureau of Military Affairs. Advancement from the disesteemed
Ceremonies Office to the second highest rung of the military bureaucracy was
highly irregular. To Chao Ju-yu¨ and many others, Chang Yu¨eh was unde-
serving. Fully aware of Chang Yu¨eh’s close relationship with the emperor and
cognizant of Chang’s potential value as a political ally, Chao Ju-yu¨ nevertheless
insulted him by refusing to offer traditional courtesies. Later, Chao Ju-yu¨ even
joined others in the campaign against Chang Yu¨eh that culminated in Chang’s
dismissal. Another audience official denounced by Chao Ju-yu¨ was Wang Pien.
As vice-minister of personnel, Chao charged Wang Pien with exploiting polit-
ical divisions to enhance his own standing. No less critical of Hsiao-tsung’s
appointment of the eunuch Ch’en Yu¨an to a high-level military post, Chao
warned of the danger of entrusting eunuchs with such power.27 More than any
other prominent official of the late twelfth century, Chao Ju-yu¨ persistently
denounced the special privileges and influence of palace eunuchs and audience
officials – always aware that his candor might well offend their patron, the
emperor. Yet the risks to Chao’s career never dampened his commitment to
high bureaucratic standards.
Chao Ju-yu¨ held regional posts during Hsiao-tsung’s last decade in power
in the 1180s, and also served in the capital as lecturer-in-waiting and chief
advisor to the heir apparent, the future Kuang-tsung. These posts gave him
considerable exposure to Chao Tun, who in 1191 summoned him from Fu-chou
to head the Ministry of Personnel. In light of Chao Ju-yu¨’s well-established
reputation as a critic of the inner court, the appointment must have easily
won the endorsement of, if it was not originally initiated by, Chief Councilor
Liu Cheng. In office, Chao Ju-yu¨ denounced petty men in high places, and
challenged the emperor’s personal conduct. At the request of colleagues, he
discussed privately with Kuang-tsung the crisis created by the estrangement of
27 On these incidents, see SS 392, p. 11982; 469, p. 13672; 470, p. 13692, p. 13694; HTC (1958) 142,
pp. 3795–6; 148, pp. 3942, 3955–6; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 9a.
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the two palaces. As a member of the imperial clan, his intercession carried spe-
cial weight and contributed to temporarily improved relations between father
and son.28 Kuang-tsung’s visits to his father in early 1193 are attributed chiefly
to Chao Ju-yu¨’s mediation. The ultimate failure of that effort at reconciliation
was a personal setback for Chao Ju-yu¨.
Adding to the intensity of the court crisis during the 1190s was the untimely
death of a notary official at the Bureau of Military Affairs, Hu Chin-ch’en (d.
1193). Hu was a close confidant of Liu Cheng, and his death coincided with
Liu’s 140-day “political strike,” which created a serious leadership vacuum.29
The secondary chief councilor at the time, Ko Pi, proved timid and was vir-
tually paralyzed by the court tensions. Soon after Liu Cheng returned, Ko’s
ten-month tenure came to an end.30 In the interim, Chao Ju-yu¨ had risen to
second spot at the Bureau of Military Affairs, a position from which he would
ultimately overshadow an increasingly demoralized Liu Cheng.
royalty at odds
Officials were ineffective at swaying the emperor, a situation that may have
been exacerbated by Kuang-tsung’s viewing them as annoying extensions of
his retired father’s influence. After all, Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng had each been
named councilors under Hsiao-tsung. Only a few months into Kuang-tsung’s
reign Chou Pi-ta fell victim to an indictment by Ho Tan, a remonstrance officer,
who allegedly acted against Chou Pi-ta out of personal spite. Given that Ho
Tan had been sponsored for office by Liu Cheng, the possibility of collusion is
great. Chou Pi-ta did not resist, having been repeatedly frustrated by the dual
demands of the palace and the bureaucracy.31 Chou’s departure enabled Liu
Cheng to emerge as sole councilor and chief decision maker, a role he retained
for much of Kuang-tsung’s reign. Like Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng had once served
as an advisor to the prince before his accession. This gave Liu Cheng personal
access to the emperor, but the two were hardly close. Liu Cheng had spent
much of the 1180s, the decade directly preceding Kuang-tsung’s accession,
away from the capital. Liu Cheng’s retention of the chief councilorship after
the departure of Chou Pi-ta reflects not so much the emperor’s special favor
as his reservations about alternative candidates. This ambivalence would not
augur well for the Liu Cheng administration.
28 SS 392, p. 11983; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4089–90.
29 HTC (1958) 153, p. 4096; SS 391, p. 11978.
30 SS 385, pp. 11827–9.
31 SS 391, p. 11971; 394, p. 12025; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 75, p. 25b.
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Chief Councilor Liu Cheng’s difficulties are best illustrated by Liu’s inabil-
ity to resolve two troubling political crises: the timely nomination of Prince
Chia as heir apparent, and the mending of relations between the two imperial
palaces. Officials had good reason to press for the speedy designation of an heir.
The education of the heir apparent was very important, and an early appoint-
ment gave tutors valuable time to mold the future emperor’s personality and
inculcate him with Confucian attitudes toward governance and personal con-
duct. Early appointment of the heir apparent also enabled officials to supervise
the transfer of power with minimal input from palace eunuchs and consorts,
avoiding the aggressive political power plays that accompanied an uncertain
succession. From the outset of his councilorship, Liu Cheng pressed for Prince
Chia’s installation as heir. As the emperor’s eldest surviving son and the child
of his primary wife, Prince Chia held a very strong claim to the succession.
Postponement of his appointment seemed senseless. Empress Li2 also lobbied
on her son’s behalf. But it was Hsiao-tsung, not Kuang-tsung, who opposed
the appointment. The former emperor was apparently on good terms with his
grandson, and historical documents do not allude to an alternative heir backed
by Hsiao-tsung. There is no indication that Hsiao-tsung genuinely intended
to deny Prince Chia this privilege. Rather, Hsiao-tsung probably held out
merely to frustrate his ill-tempered daughter-in-law, by retaining some lever-
age to use against her. In any case, Kuang-tsung did not force the issue, which
meant that Liu Cheng could not achieve this major objective of training an
heir apparent during Hsiao-tsung’s lifetime.
Liu Cheng faced an even greater challenge in trying to convince Kuang-
tsung to make amends with his father. Beginning in 1193 and continuing
through the next year, Liu Cheng and many other officials repeatedly requested,
indeed begged, Kuang-tsung to visit the Ch’ung-hua Palace, only a few build-
ings away. But Kuang-tsung paid official visits only four times in 1193, once
in the company of his empress. Three of the four visits occurred in the first
three months of the year, when the influence of court officials enjoyed a brief
rally. In the fall, when the emperor seemed to be capitulating to official prod-
ding, Empress Li2 interceded and had the visit canceled. A visit planned a
month later was similarly canceled, with Kuang-tsung professing illness. Liu
Cheng, his patience stretched to the limit and his resignation having been
refused, abruptly fled the capital in protest. He would stay away a hundred
and forty days, returning only after he had obtained Kuang-tsung’s promise to
visit Hsiao-tsung, which occurred before year’s end, followed by another visit
on the first day of the 1194 lunar new year. This would be their last meet-
ing. In midspring, Hsiao-tsung fell ill, and Liu Cheng, joined by countless
others, pleaded for a visit of compassion. Imperial Diarist P’eng Kuei-nien,
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having recently memorialized the throne on three separate occasions, appeared
at court. He hit his forehead against the floor while performing an unending
series of kowtows, until his blood covered the tiles. He won the emperor’s
attention, but no change of heart.32 To court observers, Kuang-tsung’s persis-
tent refusal to visit his dying father showed a total disregard for filial piety,
which reflected poorly upon him as a ruler. The emperor’s failure to resolve
this affair eroded confidence in Liu Cheng’s authority and statesmanship.
The crisis peaked in June 1194, as Hsiao-tsung’s condition deteriorated and
his death approached. Censors intensified their attacks on petty men who tried
to provoke rifts between the two palaces. Liu Cheng, in the company of other
high officials, assembled at the palace to plead with Kuang-tsung. Attendants
shut the door in their faces as they wept outside. Prince Chia, who was in
regular contact with his dying grandfather throughout this difficult time, is
reported similarly to have shed tears as he tried, in vain, to reunite his family.
The rift between the two emperors had irreparably widened, seemingly the
result of Kuang-tsung’s sensitivity to his father’s meddling and exacerbated
by court officials, eunuchs, and family members who exploited the rift for
personal gain. When death came to him on 28 June 1194, Hsiao-tsung had
not seen his son for six months. Worse yet, Kuang-tsung adamantly refused to
perform the funeral rites for his father. Prince Chia and his great grandmother,
Dowager Empress Wu, were obliged to preside over the wake in Kuang-tsung’s
place.33
Even before the death of Hsiao-tsung, Liu Cheng’s success as councilor was
undermined by precisely the influential palace personalities he was commit-
ted to uprooting. Prominent among these was Chiang T’e-li, a non–degree
holder whose entry into the civil service had come through hereditary priv-
ilege (yin2).34 Chao Ju-yu¨, who had lauded Chiang T’e-li’s suppression of
pirates along coastal Fu-chien, recommended his promotion to the capital.
Once there, Chiang T’e-li had served Hsiao-tsung as audience attendant and
herald of the heir apparent’s palace. Hsiao-tsung even employed him in 1187
as Sung emissary to the Chin court. The posts themselves carried only modest
prestige, but Chiang T’e-li had exploited these offices to establish powerful
political connections. One such connection included Hsiao-tsung’s heir appar-
ent, and soon after his accession in 1189 Kuang-tsung promoted Chiang to
commandant of the Office of Audience Ceremonies.
32 SS 393, p. 11997; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4105. Also see SS 393, pp. 1195–6; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979)
96, pp. 1a–14b.
33 See Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 192, for a description of the funeral. HTC (1958) 153, p. 4108.
34 Additional information is available in SS 470, pp. 13695–6; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 61, p. 1447; HTC (1958)
151, pp. 4050–1; 151, p. 4055; 153, pp. 4096–7; 153, p. 4101; 156, p. 4190.
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Chiang T’e-li, however, was not so favored among the high officials. Chou Pi-
ta complained of his attempted interference in the abdication of 1189, a serious
breach of etiquette for a petty palace attendant. Liu Cheng criticized Chiang’s
excessive influence over Kuang-tsung. Only days after Chou Pi-ta resigned,
an increasingly confident Liu Cheng demanded the dismissal of Chiang T’e-li,
whom he charged with coveting political power and accepting bribes. Kuang-
tsung reluctantly consented but insisted on a respectable reassignment for
Chiang T’e-li to a post nearby and a provision of traveling money for him
totaling two thousand strings of cash. In the summer of 1193 the emperor
reversed his decision and ordered Chiang T’e-li’s recall. In protest against this
reversal, and against Kuang-tsung’s stubborn refusal to visit his father, Liu
Cheng staged his dramatic 140-day absence from the capital. Kuang-tsung
acquiesced by ordering a second reassignment for Chiang T’e-li. This was only a
modest victory for the chief councilor. Under crisis conditions, he could wring
out of Kuang-tsung a few face-saving concessions, but could never thwart
in any lasting way the excessive privileges that Kuang-tsung granted palace
favorites. Chiang T’e-li subsequently received further promotions.
Liu Cheng led an unrelenting, often solitary, struggle against the emperor’s
granting unwarranted appointments in the palace and his disregard for impe-
rial obligations, and this difficult task earned Liu the sympathy of some. How-
ever, these two issues of unwarranted appointments and dereliction of imperial
duty became the foci of an expanding polarization at court, brought about by a
campaign by moralistic statesmen to curtail the ascendancy of the inner court
over the outer court, and of palace favorites over civil officials. The intensity of
the conflict resulted largely from the dramatic rise in stature of the intellectual
movement called “Learning of the Way” (Tao-hsu¨eh). Under Kuang-tsung, a
growing number of its adherents, and their sympathizers came to hold high
offices, from which they influenced court politics in Lin-an as never before.
Leading the late-twelfth-century ascent of Tao-hsu¨eh was Chu Hsi, a native of
Kiangsi. His bureaucratic record may have been unimpressive and his political
exposure limited, but his scholarship and teaching earned him an unmatched
reputation. His fame was so widespread that a Sung emissary on an official visit
to Chin in 1193, in token deference, had been asked about the health of Master
Chu.35 Chou Pi-ta held Chu Hsi in particularly high esteem and had sought
his appointment to a metropolitan post in 1188. Bureaucratic opposition to
35 HTC (1958) 153, p. 4103. Also see Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s political career: A study in ambiva-
lence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962),
pp. 162–88; Brian E. McKnight, “Chu Hsi and his world,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-
tsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 408–36; Hoyt C. Tillman, Confucian discourse and Chu Hsi’s ascendancy
(Honolulu, 1992), pp. 133 and throughout.
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the appointment had forced a retreat, and Liu Cheng chose not to press the
issue, but he demonstrated his goodwill toward the Tao-hsu¨eh movement by
appointing to high office individuals who, if not personally identified with
the movement, at least were sympathetic toward it. These included, to name
but a few of the more prominent members, P’eng Kuei-nien, who rose from
executive aide at the Directorate of Education to imperial diarist; Lou Yu¨eh
(1137–1213), who was advanced from vice-director of education to drafter
in the Secretariat; Ch’en Fu-liang (1137–1203), the judicial commissioner of
Che-hsi, who joined the Secretariat in a similar capacity; Yeh Shih (1150–
1223), a Palace Library executive who moved on to the Ministry of Personnel;
and Chao Ju-yu¨, the former prefect of Fu-chou who became minister of per-
sonnel and eventually chief councilor.36 Through such men, the Tao-hsu¨eh
movement developed an influential presence at court. Liu Cheng facilitated
the movement’s political prominence, and also came under its influence.
Despite the growing stature of Chu Hsi and the generous patronage of
Liu Cheng, the Tao-hsu¨eh movement with its stress on personal conduct held
unique appeal in the early 1190s due to the combustible political climate. The
emperor’s excessive drinking, emotional frailty, disregard for filial devotion,
and irresponsibility toward his imperial duties, compounded by his indulgence
of a brutish spouse and shameless palace attendants, all contributed to the
politicization of personal conduct, especially imperial conduct, at the court
and among intellectual elites. Within this milieu Liu Cheng struck an alliance
with the Tao-hsu¨eh proponents and their sympathizers against the emperor and
his favorites. Liu Cheng does not seem to have been intentionally promoting
factionalism, for the court critics that he allied himself with represented a
community whose boundaries were never clearly defined and whose objectives,
apart from enlightening the throne, were otherwise ambiguous. Liu Cheng
brought together concerned scholars of varied intellectual pedigrees to rally
around a common cause in the hopes of bringing official and moral pressure
to bear upon a recalcitrant ruler.
As Hsiao-tsung’s health deteriorated in early 1194, over a hundred officials
threatened to resign en masse unless the emperor met his filial obligations.
Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yu¨ applied additional pressure by abruptly leaving
the capital. They were soon summoned to return. Yet the catalyst for decisive
action came on the ninth day of the sixth month with the death of Hsiao-tsung.
Previously, officials had hoped that Kuang-tsung would somehow overcome
the evil influences surrounding him and regain his senses. His shockingly
unfilial response to his father’s death proved that this hope was in vain. Court
36 On the intellectual background of Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng, see Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an 35,
p. 702; 97, pp. 1816–17.
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officials felt that Kuang-tsung had gone completely insane and was unfit to
govern. They began to entertain seriously the need for Kuang-tsung’s abdi-
cation. Both Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yu¨, to varying degrees, supported the
move, as did a growing number of their colleagues.37
Abdication in this instance, compared to Hsiao-tsung’s abdication in 1188–
9, was far more complex. Most important, this time there was no heir apparent.
Chao K’uo had yet to be installed. Hsiao-tsung’s death in the summer of 1194
had removed the only serious obstacle to Chao K’uo’s nomination and freed
high officials to act independently. But they were in no position to do so on
their own authority. The palace had to be involved, and Kuang-tsung’s insta-
bility forced them to involve the leading palace women. Dowager Empress
Wu was reportedly reluctant to become involved in so sensitive an affair, espe-
cially when other powerful palace women, such as Empress Hsieh, Kao-tsung’s
stepmother, might be drawn into a bitter conflict over the issue. Only after
lengthy exchanges and much prodding from Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yu¨ did she
agree.38 But a serious rift had developed between the two leading bureaucrats.
The cautious Liu Cheng would have been satisfied with simply elevating Chao
K’uo to heir apparent, for Liu’s immediate concern lay in removing uncer-
tainty about the succession. The less patient and more pessimistic Chao Ju-yu¨
insisted that Chao K’uo be named heir and appointed emperor in a single
stroke; Chao had no delusions about Kuang-tsung’s prospects for recovery.
No official, in advancing a prince to the throne, needed to act with greater
circumspection than Chao Ju-yu¨. Denying imperial clansmen any significant
role in matters of succession was a hallowed Sung tradition, which sought
to avoid the contention among clansmen so common under other dynasties.
Imperial kin, living away from the capital and without autonomous armies,
were intended to be powerless to challenge court policies and actions. Further
weakening royal kin, the Southern Sung government had denied them, as a
matter of policy, access to councilor-level posts, in an attempt to preclude the
manipulation of the succession using the civil service. In 1193, Kuang-tsung
had made an exception with Chao Ju-yu¨’s appointment, reflecting perhaps
Chao’s extraordinary credentials and the high esteem accorded him by many
of his civil service colleagues. This appointment placed the clansman Chao
Ju-yu¨, as a proponent of abdication, in an exceedingly sensitive position, and
it explains the special care he took to muster support from eminent colleagues
37 SS 434, pp. 12890–1; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–11; Lin Jui-han, Sung-tai cheng-chih shih (Taipei,
1989), pp. 353–7; Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the emperor’s eyes: Image and reality in the Ch’ien-lung reign
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 220–5; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 190–5.
38 Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 3, pp. 5a–7b; SS 243, p. 8648; 391, pp. 11975–6; 392, p. 11984; 465,
p. 13592; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–11.
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and senior palace women, despite the rules of meticulous seclusion that left
palace women highly inaccessible.
The complexities of the succession crisis, however, presented a singular
opportunity for Han T’o-chou. Related by marriage to Dowager Empress Wu,
and uncle to Empress Li2’s daughter-in-law, he stood in a unique position
to influence the two women whose cooperation was most critical in the plan
to replace Kuang-tsung as emperor. As audience commandant, Han T’o-chou
controlled the palace doors and gates. Communication between court officials
and palace women required his assistance. At the same time, noncastrated men,
which included Han T’o-chou, were expressly prohibited from direct dealings
with consorts. Eunuchsm, who often had special influence over consorts, being
their only male companions,39 had to assist as intermediaries. By enlisting the
services of the eunuch Kuan Li, Han T’o-chou was able to win the support of a
reluctant Dowager Empress Wu. Although Kuan Li had done most to persuade
her, Han T’o-chou took most of the credit. After Chao Ju-yu¨ had won Dowager
Empress Wu’s support, Liu Cheng again left the capital, Lin-an, intending by
this move to disassociate himself from the potentially controversial actions of
his military commissioner.40 With Dowager Empress Wu personally affixing
the imperial seal to the documents naming Chao K’uo emperor, Kuang-tsung,
powerless to reject the pressure to abdicate, passively stepped down and retired.
This political coup had swiftly resolved an intolerable situation and came
as a triumph for all involved. Han T’o-chou had proven himself a valuable
link between the inner palace and the outer court, considerably enhancing
his reputation and political power. A day after the accession, and at the rec-
ommendation of Dowager Empress Wu, Han T’o-chou’s grandniece became
empress to the new emperor. With the accession, Kuang-tsung’s wife, Empress
Li2, must have sighed in relief, the old cloud of uncertainty gone and her son’s
inheritance secured. Court officials must have taken quiet delight at witness-
ing the end of a reign that, with all the tension and emotion it generated,
proved the least productive in Sung history. Even greater consolation derived
from the retirement of Empress Li2, whose crude antics had created endless
embarrassment.
The succession proceeded smoothly and without challenge for two reasons.
First, it resulted from the close cooperation of the inner and outer courts. Liu
Cheng and Chao Ju-yu¨ insisted on the involvement of the empresses, an impor-
tant source of dynastic legitimacy, and kept their own colleagues well informed
of developments. They publicized the emperor’s private communications, in
which he reportedly affirmed his willingness to abdicate, thereby forestalling
39 SS 469, pp. 13674–5; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4109–10.
40 HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–9.
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charges of acting without imperial consent or of overriding proper authority.
In addition, members on the paternal and maternal sides of the ruling house
joined in supporting the initiative. Historically, these two camps were more
often at odds, with officialdom preferring to deal with neither. Overcoming
these animosities and conflicting suspicions was no mean accomplishment and
was successful largely owing to the contributions of Han T’o-chou and Chao
Ju-yu¨. Despite their vastly different backgrounds and motives, the two had
a single objective in resolving the succession crisis, and they maintained a
degree of cordiality. The cooperation established during the succession crisis
would not, however, last.
autocracy under ning-tsung (1194–1224)
Chao K’uo (1168–1224), posthumously known as Ning-tsung (r. 1194–1224),
the second and only surviving son of Kuang-tsung, was scarcely a man of the
world.41 A pampered child, he had remained at home even after coming of age,
the royal family being unwilling to part with him.42 He had held no bureau-
cratic posts and had no experience of official responsibilities. A life spent in
the palace had denied him exposure to the outside world, and tensions within
his family must have made for a stressful youth. His great grandfather, Kao-
tsung, who had lived to see Chao K’uo reach eighteen years, had spent many
hours with him. His grandfather, Hsiao-tsung, saw him reach twenty-five;
they, too, were close. Yet both emperors represented authority figures who
expected filial submission from Chao K’uo. In light of Hsiao-tsung’s aggres-
sive and stern character, he must have been especially exacting on the grand-
son. Kuang-tsung was surely too preoccupied with his own personal problems
to scrutinize his son’s behavior, but where he proved slack, his overbearing
empress compensated by keeping a tight rein on the young man. Chao K’uo’s
anguish, additionally, in being caught in the crossfire between his mother and
grandparents can well be imagined. Dowager Empress Wu, more compassion-
ate than Empress Li2, was no less meddlesome: the marriage of Chao K’uo,
her great grandson, to Lady Han was her handiwork, proof that she had not
lost her knack for managing the personal lives of family men. Navigating
such tempestuous waters would strain even the strongest of characters, but
Chao K’uo was noticeably short on fortitude and emerged from the experience
deficient in both self-confidence and emotional stability. Passivity, his primary
41 SS 37, p. 713, cites Ning-tsung as the second son; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 192, cites genealogical
sources that place him as a third son.
42 SS 39, p. 713; 391, p. 11974; Chao Hsi-nien, Chao-shih tsu-p’u [Academia Sinica, Fu Ssu-nien Library,
rare edition] (Hong Kong, 1937) 1, pp. 65b–66b.
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means of coping with a conflict-riddled family, became his greatest single fault
once he was on the throne.
Chao K’uo possessed few of the character traits of a great ruler, but his
personal inadequacies were aggravated by the actions of a thoughtless fam-
ily. Prominent personalities acted on his behalf, frequently without bothering
to consult or even inform him, as though he were a mere pawn in a complex
play for power that needed no explanation. Dowager Empress Wu’s decision to
endorse his elevation to the throne reached his ears only as the ceremony began.
His imperial robes were ordered without his knowledge; the accession cere-
mony was kept secret. Chao Ju-yu¨ had expected, according to official sources,
that the timid prince would not countenance any effort to deprive his father of
the throne. Chao Ju-yu¨ had no time to persuade him, and so at the appointed
hour, Chao Ju-yu¨ lured the prince to the palace and announced, before the
coffin of Hsiao-tsung, the impending accession. The prince declined on the
grounds of filial devotion, but the imperial robe was suddenly thrust upon his
shoulders. Civil officials then rushed in to do obeisance as the new emperor
wept in fear and disbelief. Such an account, so incredibly melodramatic, may
well have been embellished by later historians seeking to vindicate Ning-tsung
of complicity in his father’s abdication; it would not be the first time that the
sensitive circumstances surrounding a succession were contorted in the interest
of image building. Yet this particular portrayal probably contains more than a
kernel of truth. Sources other than the official history confirm that Chao K’uo
never coveted the throne.43 After coming to power, he was aloof and easily
manipulated by those around him, appearing almost timid and frightened,
and he deferred decision making to others. Reluctance to make decisions was
a trait he shared with his father. In the case of Kuang-tsung, it resulted from
serious physical and emotional problems. With Ning-tsung it grew out of a
frail, feeble personality.
Politically aloof perhaps, Chao K’uo could also be a highly sensitive individ-
ual, one who developed a genuinely personal commitment to those he worked
closely with. He so revered his former tutor Huang Shang that a high-level
appointment was planned for him soon after the accession. But, Huang Shang
died before the emperor could act. This coincided in 1194 with the death
of another respected tutor, Lo Tien, only recently appointed notary official at
the Bureau of Military Affairs. Ning-tsung’s attachment to the two men was
remarkably personal, for he later spoke quite emotionally about mourning
their loss.44 Their untimely deaths had a significant political impact. Being
43 HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115.
44 Chen Te-hsiu, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi [Ming Cheng-te 1506–21 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 43, p. 12a.
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irreplaceable as the emperor’s most trusted advisors, their departure signaled
the decline of the outer court and Ning-tsung’s increased reliance upon palace
figures. His relationship with aides could be close at least on a personal level, yet
this made a poor basis for administrative policy. Ning-tsung did not inherit
the unique balance that Hsiao-tsung struck between reverence for talented
advisors and autonomy in decision making. Ning-tsung could not separate
political from personal judgments. His humane side became a liability when
it blinded him to the faults of those he trusted and cared for. Consequently, his
ties to the two men he came to trust most, Han T’o-chou and Shih Mi-yu¨an,
were severed only by death.
han t’o-chou against the bureaucracy
Immediately after Ning-tsung’s accession, the emperor summoned Liu Cheng
to resume responsibilities as councilor of the left. The recall reportedly came
at the recommendation of Chao Ju-yu¨, who apparently held no grudge over
Liu Cheng’s untimely desertion. Still, Liu Cheng returned to Lin-an with a
severely impaired reputation.45 In his ten-day absence, a new emperor had
been enthroned and, perhaps more unsettling, a junior colleague had now
come to eclipse him. As a reward for resolving a difficult crisis, Ning-tsung
was fully prepared to name Chao Ju-yu¨ as councilor of the right. However, fear
of bureaucratic resistance to an imperial clansman’s appointment to the post,
combined with Chao’s concern that his motives for interceding in the accession
should not appear selfish, forced Chao to decline. Instead, he accepted the top
position at the Bureau of Military Affairs, rising from associate administrator
to administrator. Chao Ju-yu¨’s new appointment and the eroded stature of Liu
Cheng gave rise to the eventual tensions between the two men, despite their
once cordial ties. The catalyst for their hostility was the selection of the burial
site for Hsiao-tsung.46
Controversy over the emperor’s burial originated with a recommendation
by the eminent Confucian scholar and Tao-hsu¨eh proponent, Chu Hsi. Spon-
sored by Chao Ju-yu¨, Chu Hsi had been summoned recently to Lin-an to serve
as academician and expositor-in-waiting. Chu Hsi apparently visited the pro-
posed grave site in the suburbs of K’uai-chi (modern Shao-hsing). Because of
the shallowness of the soil, which sat on a bed of waterlogged gravel, Chu
45 SS 37, p. 715; 391, p. 11976; 392, p. 11987; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4111–12.
46 On the controversy, see SS 392, p. 11987; 397, p. 12100; 429, pp. 12763–5; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115;
Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu, 1989), p. 120. For Chu Hsi’s broader interest in
divination, see the chapter “Chu Hsi and Divination,” in Kidder Smith, Jr., et al., Sung dynasty uses of
the I Ching (Princeton, N.J., 1990), pp. 169–205.
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concluded that the location was geomantically undesirable and requested a
new divination. Chao Ju-yu¨ concurred, but not the chief councilor, Liu Cheng.
Perhaps not so meticulous about matters of ritual, Liu Cheng considered relo-
cation unnecessary, and he had the support of many colleagues. This created
a deep rift in the bureaucracy, and Ning-tsung, preoccupied with mourning
and funeral-related rites, allowed the divisions to deepen.
A compromise could have been reached relatively easily if indeed the sole
issue had been Hsiao-tsung’s grave site. But much more was at stake. The dis-
pute illustrated the enhanced standing at court of Tao-hsu¨eh proponents such as
Chu Hsi, individuals profoundly sensitive to matters of ritual and increasingly
identified with Chao Ju-yu¨. The group had no personal vendetta against Liu
Cheng, who had long been on cordial terms with them, but Liu’s willingness
to sacrifice ritual probity for political expedience was, in this instance, intol-
erable to them. This dispute was cleverly exploited by the audience officer
Han T’o-chou, who hoped to magnify differences between the two factions
to weaken the outer court. Han harbored a special enmity for Liu Cheng, so
rumor has it, stemming from the councilor’s long-standing campaign against
palace favorites, and took delight in the recent challenges to Liu’s authority.
Eventually, the burial controversy lost steam, and the emperor was buried as
planned, but the political contest ended in a short-term victory for those who
wanted to move the burial site. Only a month after his recall, Liu Cheng was
dismissed and Chao Ju-yu¨ became chief councilor of the right. But this dispute
within the bureaucracy was to prove less threatening to Chao Ju-yu¨ and his
supporters than the political fissure developing between the bureaucracy and
the inner court.
With Liu Cheng’s departure, Chao Ju-yu¨ lost a potent ally in the increasing
struggle against the inner court, a loss made all the more acute by Chao’s special
vulnerability as an imperial clansman. His appointment to the Bureau of Mil-
itary Affairs in 1193 had already attracted censorial attention, the court being
reminded of the long-standing exclusionary policy toward clansmen.47 Kuang-
tsung had ignored the remonstrance, probably out of deference to Liu Cheng,
and Ning-tsung out of gratitude for securing his accession, but not every-
one in the capital shared their indifference to precedent. The scrutiny Chao
Ju-yu¨ received made his attempt to consolidate power exceedingly difficult.
For example, although he utterly despised Han T’o-chou, his own political
insecurity precluded direct confrontation with the well-connected audience
officer. Chao opted to minimize differences and cooperate.48 He had been
warned, even before becoming councilor, of the need to rein in Han T’o-chou
47 SS 36, p. 705; 392, p. 11983, 393, p. 12002; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4094.
48 SS 392, p. 11987; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4113–14.
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and remove his foothold in the palace. However, political expediency forced
Chao to involve Han T’o-chou in the succession talks, even though Chao knew
that such involvement might have undesirable repercussions. Moreover, Chao
Ju-yu¨ erred in refusing to reward Han T’o-chou for assisting in the succes-
sion. In light of Chao’s own promotion to chief councilor, an esteemed if only
nominal promotion for Han T’o-chou was doubtlessly expected. When it did
not come, the audience officer was left understandably bitter. He had been
outmaneuvered.
With methodical caution, Chao Ju-yu¨ sought to undermine Han T’o-chou.
By promoting to top offices individuals who shared his high standard of polit-
ical conduct, Chao hoped eventually to create the political will necessary to
subdue the inner court. For example, Chu Hsi was already in place as Han-lin
expositor-in-waiting, a post that gave him a platform from which to influence
the throne. Chao Ju-yu¨, with the help of Liu Cheng, had won a substantial
increase in the number of Han-lin expositors and readers. Heading the list of
recent appointees were Ch’en Fu-liang, Huang Shang, and P’eng Kuei-nien.
Lin Ta-chung had been recalled from regional service to become drafter at the
Secretariat. Lou Yu¨eh, whose elegant prose had graced Kuang-tsung’s abdi-
cation rescript, was promoted from the Secretariat to master of remonstrance.
Liu Kuang-tsu (1142–1222), summoned from the distant southwest, filled
vacancies in the Censorate and the Imperial Diary Office. Yu¨an Hsieh (1144–
1224) and Huang Tu (1138–1213) also moved from regional to metropoli-
tan posts, the former as instructor at the Imperial University and the latter
as policy monitor.49 Despite their widely disparate regional and intellectual
backgrounds, they all shared two common traits. At some point, each had
asserted the prerogative of the outer court to guide and direct governmental
decision making, thereby challenging the influence of Han T’o-chou and other
prominent members of the inner court. And each had also shown strong con-
victions about how the emperor should conduct himself. These men figured
prominently among those who had criticized the antics of Empress Li2 and
had beseeched Kuang-tsung to visit his dying father.
After five years of imperial dereliction during Kuang-tsung’s reign, Chao
Ju-yu¨ sought to revitalize a demoralized political climate by promoting Con-
fucian standards, especially those promulgated by Tao-hsu¨eh proponents. Han
T’o-chou recognized the impending threat and responded by extending his
49 On these various movements, see SS 393, pp. 11998, 12004, 12010, 12014; 395, pp. 12046–7; 397,
p. 12100; 400, p. 12146; 429, p. 12763; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4121–2; 154, pp. 4124–7; Lou,
Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 30, pp. 11a–13a; 96, p. 2a; 98, pp. 6a–7a; Yeh Shih, Shui-hsin hsien-sheng wen-
chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an 1929 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 16, pp. 4a–7a;
Yu¨an Hsieh, Chieh-chai chi [Ssu-k’u ch’u¨an-shu, Wen-yu¨an ko 1779 ed.] (c. 12th c.; Taipei, 1975) 11,
pp. 17a–20b.
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influence from the palace to the Censorate. Exploiting ties in the bureaucracy,
he won appointment to surveillance agencies for Liu Te-hsiu and Hsu¨ Chi-
chih (d. 1201). The sudden rise of both men from minor to major posts left
them permanently indebted to Han T’o-chou, and they were not alone. One
contemporary insists that already by the end of 1194, Han T’o-chou held the
censorial agencies firmly in his grip.50 This was possible only because Han had
astutely garnered the support of more than minor lackeys; neutral elements
turned to him as well. Ho Tan (chin-shih 1166), who owed his early advance-
ment to Liu Cheng, subsequently had differences with Liu’s supporters and, as
censor, became a severe critic of them. Ching T’ang (1138–1200), a respected
statesman who replaced Lo Tien as notary official at the Bureau of Military
Affairs, similarly joined the Han T’o-chou camp after having a falling-out with
Chao Ju-yu¨. Perhaps most surprising was Han T’o-chou’s successful courting
of Hsieh Shen-fu (chin-shih 1166), an individual once highly critical of eunuch
power and positively disposed toward Chu Hsi.51 The conversion of neutral
elements did not reflect a newfound loyalty to the inner court or affection for
Han T’o-chou; rather, it reflected their contempt for Liu Cheng’s ideological
supporters, who were in the ascendant. Han’s faction was a marriage of con-
venience, one powerful enough to enable him to secure the dismissal of Chao
Ju-yu¨’s supporters and thereby pave the way for Han’s own court dominance.
Han T’o-chou had not initially been regarded favorably by the emperor in
1194. Directly following the accession, Ning-tsung honored Chao Ju-yu¨ and
others with highly esteemed posts and titles, while offering Han T’o-chou only
a minor post in the Bureau of Military Affairs. This slight is attributed to Chao
Ju-yu¨, who insisted that kin of the ruling house deserved no special reward for
assisting their family in time of need.52 Nevertheless, by year’s end, a radical
change had occurred. According to the expositor-in-waiting P’eng Kuei-nien,
the court began to make wide-ranging decisions on the advice of Han T’o-
chou without consulting the chief councilor. Worse yet, an otherwise critical
bureaucracy had been effectively silenced through intimidation.53 P’eng Kuei-
nien, warning of the threat to dynastic stability posed by inner court influence,
demanded Han T’o-chou’s dismissal, to which Ning-tsung responded: “I trust
T’o-chou with the utmost sincerity. There is confidence and no doubt.”54
Clearly, Han T’o-chou’s standing had improved dramatically during the first
crucial months of the Ning-tsung reign, enabling him quickly to overshadow
50 SS 392, p. 11988; 394, p. 12042; 474, p. 13772; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, p. 12a.
51 On such neutral figures, see SS 394, pp. 12024–6, 12036–8, 12038–41; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4116–17.
52 SS 474, p. 13772; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4112.
53 See Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, pp. 1a–14b, especially p. 12a; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 5, pp. 16b–20b,
especially pp. 18a and 19a.
54 SS 393, p. 11998; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4121.
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Chao Ju-yu¨. This meteoric rise, coinciding with one of the largest assaults
on palace influence in Southern Sung history, seems paradoxical. Perhaps the
new Empress Han exploited her intimacy with Ning-tsung to win favor for
her uncle. Yet the character of the empress suggests otherwise. In contrast
to the notorious Empress Li2, she was a woman of considerable reserve who
meticulously shunned political involvement. Her mere presence must have
enhanced the stature of her uncle, but there is no indication that she aggres-
sively advanced his interests. A more likely reason for Han T’o-chou’s ascent is
Ning-tsung’s changing attitude toward Chao Ju-yu¨ and his supporters, whose
demands on his conduct the emperor found unreasonably burdensome. The
new emperor lacked Hsiao-tsung’s admiration of self-discipline and personal
standards. Ning-tsung was skeptical about moralistic judgments and proba-
bly suspicious of the motives of those who made them. Before the accession,
instructor P’eng Kuei-nien had advised Ning-tsung to shun petty men. He
responded: “But in the end, how are we to know? Superior men consider petty
men to be petty men, petty men similarly consider superior men to be petty
men. I fear they will be indistinguishable from each other.”55 Prone to such
skepticism, Ning-tsung probably rejected as utter chicanery Chao Ju-yu¨ and
his cohort’s denigration of Han T’o-chou as a petty man. Indeed, the more
they pressed this seemingly senseless issue, the greater became the emperor’s
disaffection.
Chao Ju-yu¨’s limited exposure to Ning-tsung prior to the accession was
another decisive factor in his ultimate political defeat. Before Kuang-tsung
had ascended the throne Chao had served him as expositor-in-waiting and
chief secretary. In the process, Chao had earned Kuang-tsung’s respect and
confidence. As emperor, Kuang-tsung had bypassed tradition and appointed
his clansman to a councilor-level post. Unfortunately, Chao Ju-yu¨ had never
served Ning-tsung in an official capacity before his accession. Ning-tsung had
named him chief councilor not out of close personal ties, but in recognition
of his role in the succession. This lack of familiarity denied Chao Ju-yu¨ the
additional leverage he needed to displace Han T’o-chou. The only members of
the outer court who could have wielded sufficient personal influence, Huang
Shang and Lo Tien, had both died in 1194. At their deaths, Chao Ju-yu¨
commented: “The misfortune of these two officials is the misfortune of the
entire realm.”56 It was an astonishingly prescient assessment.
In late 1194 and early 1195, Chao’s faction launched a bitter assault against
the inner court, hoping to reverse fortunes that had declined steadily over the
past half year. Triggering the assault was the dismissal of the policy monitor
55 Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, pp. 6b–7a.
56 SS 393, p. 12009; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115.
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Huang Tu, a prominent critic of Han T’o-chou.57 An imperial edict, allegedly
forged by Han, ordered Huang Tu’s transfer to a regional post. An incensed
Chu Hsi denounced the arbitrariness of the dismissal and cautioned against
trusting individuals who seek to encroach upon the imperial sway and jeop-
ardize the empire’s security. The allusion to Han T’o-chou was unmistakable.
In retribution Chu Hsi was then also reassigned to a regional post. Chao Ju-
yu¨ pleaded for recision of the order and threatened to resign. Ning-tsung
rejected both his resignation and his advice. Secretariat official Ch’en Fu-liang
and Imperial Diarist Liu Kuang-tsu, among others, similarly protested Chu
Hsi’s reassignment. They too were demoted. P’eng Kuei-nien, an old foe of
Han T’o-chou, who was also disinclined to sacrifice candor for diplomacy,
soon joined the defense of Chu Hsi, a close friend. P’eng predicted imminent
disaster should Han T’o-chou be retained. When he too received a transfer,
Policy Monitor Lin Ta-chung and Secretariat official Lou Yu¨eh joined the fray,
defending P’eng Kuei-nien’s integrity and genuineness of heart. They pro-
posed either the recall of P’eng Kuei-nien to the capital or the reassignment
of Han T’o-chou to regional service. The compromise was rejected. A succes-
sion of remonstrances and ultimatums followed, gambits intended to pressure
the throne. Few could have imagined that they would backfire and that the
emperor would sacrifice a galaxy of prestigious officials simply to retain one
favorite. Han T’o-chou was commonly equated with the vilified eunuch Ch’en
Yu¨an, prominent during the reigns of Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung; politically,
he proved far more indestructible.58
As the campaign against Han T’o-chou progressed, the court grew ever
more polarized. In theory, this should have united the outer court against
the palace favorites. Regardless of political allegiance, civil officials shared a
common concern for the regular functioning of the bureaucratic machinery
of government, and Han T’o-chou presented a grave threat to its integrity.
The recent rash of dismissals, for example, was highly irregular. The chief
councilor had not approved them, as was customary, and the Secretariat had
not drafted the necessary rescripts. The dismissal notices were special palace
orders that had never passed through regular bureaucratic channels. Even
more curious, Ning-tsung had spent much of late 1194 away from court at
the former palace of Hsiao-tsung, apparently performing funeral rites. This
absence raised serious questions about the origin of the rescripts. In Sung
times, bypassing the bureaucracy to conduct government business by imperial
57 SS 393, pp. 11998, 12010–11, 12015; 395, p. 12047; 429, p. 12766; 434, p. 12888; HTC (1958) 153;
Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 30, pp. 11a–13a; 96, pp. 1a–14b; 98, pp. 6b–7a; Yu¨an, Chieh-chai chi 11,
p. 20b.
58 SS 40, p. 781.
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favorites was unusual; when done with any regularity, it generally presaged
the emergence of autocratic leadership by the emperor or, more commonly,
by some imperial favorite. Tao-hsu¨eh proponents in the bureaucracy, fearing
an institutional crisis, supported Chao Ju-yu¨. Most notably, even Ch’en K’uei
(1128–1203), an executive at the Bureau of Military Affairs, who so hated Chao
Ju-yu¨ that the two refused to attend the same audience, defended the councilor’s
close ally P’eng Kuei-nien in the crisis and was himself banished. However,
other bureaucrats proved less courageous. Censor Hsieh Shen-fu, Assistant
Councilor Ching T’ang, and Bureau of Military Affairs executive Yu¨ Tuan-li
(1135–1201) were among those who abandoned the Tao-hsu¨eh proponents.59
The anticipated consensus against Han T’o-chou never materialized. Not all
bureaucrats could agree on the seriousness of Han T’o-chou’s political threat,
nor were all sympathizers with the Tao-hsu¨eh movement willing to sacrifice
their short-term personal interests for the long-term welfare of bureaucratic
governance.
Soon after the accession of Ning-tsung, Chao Ju-yu¨ was reportedly advised
by Yeh Shih and Chu Hsi to reward Han T’o-chou but keep him at a safe
distance, on the assumption that a petty man can readily be bought but never
trusted. Chao allegedly gave little thought to the advice, confident in his own
ability to prevail.60 But Chao seriously underestimated the wiles of his political
opponent. By January 1195, the most ideological of Chao’s supporters had been
removed from posts of power. For Chao Ju-yu¨, demoralized at having to fight
a lone battle and frustrated by Han T’o-chou’s circumvention of bureaucratic
authority, dismissal must have come as a relief. Li Mu, a policy monitor and
political crony of Han T’o-chou, again brought forward the issue of the long-
standing policy that imperial clansmen were to be excluded from high office
and the throne used this as a pretext for Chao’s dismissal. This dismissal
confirmed again the emperor’s confidence in Han T’o-chou. Yang Chien (1140–
1226), a professor at the Directorate of Education, and Lu¨ Tsu-chien (d. 1196),
an executive aide at the Court of Imperial Treasury, each denounced the decision
and were banished for their audacity. Students at the Imperial University in
Lin-an staged a sizable demonstration of protest. The court, clearly annoyed
at the students’ political action, made an example of six instigators. Rounded
up by the prefect of Lin-an, they were exiled to the remote south.61 Dozens of
others suffered similar punishment for defending Chao Ju-yu¨ and his associates.
The final sweep against the critics of Han T’o-chou came as an anticlimax. By
this time, most of their energy had been spent.
59 SS, 394, pp.12036–8, 12038–41; 398, pp. 12103–6; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4121–2.
60 SS 392, p. 11987; 434, p. 12871; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4112.
61 SS 407, pp. 12289–92; 455, pp. 13368–71, 13373–5; 474, pp. 13772–3; HTC (1958) 154, pp. 4126–
29.
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With the departure of Chao Ju-yu¨ from government in the early part of
1195, Han T’o-chou moved quickly to realign the bureaucracy. The new coun-
cilor of the right was Yu¨ Tuan-li, who would serve for only a year, followed by
Ching T’ang, who held the post from 1196 until his death in 1200. Both men
were established scholars and competent officials. The two have fared poorly at
the hands of later historians, who despised them for their cooperation with Han
T’o-chou; but they were more than mere sycophants. As for Han T’o-chou,
honors came in steady succession. Within two years, he rose from regional
surveillance commissioner (kuan-ch’a shih, 5a) with titular honors to regional
commissioner (chieh-tu shih, 2b) and then to supreme commandant (k’ai-fu i-
t’ung san-ssu, 1b), the highest rank of sinecure posts. Subsequent honorific titles
were granted him, including junior mentor, junior preceptor, grand mentor,
and grand preceptor, and, finally, he received his ennoblement as a prince.
Han’s father, whose career had hardly extended beyond the Office of Audience
Ceremonies, was posthumously honored with the title “loyal and fixed,” a title
normally reserved for only the most accomplished of officials. The emperor
spared little when it came to honors and accolades, yet the highest civil service
post initially given to Han T’o-chou was assistant recipient of edicts in the
Bureau of Military Affairs. This makes him the only statesman in Southern
Sung times to control the bureaucracy, indeed the empire, without holding an
executive post to legitimize that control.
Ning-tsung hesitated to advance Han T’o-chou to a councilor-level post for
the same reason that the outer court resented Han’s intrusion into decision mak-
ing – he lacked civil service credentials. Han T’o chou held no official degree
and had passed no recruitment examination. His bureaucratic experience was
very limited. Men of military background who distinguished themselves at
war were often rewarded with prestigious office, yet the hostilities witnessed by
Han T’o-chou never extended beyond those at the court. He had entered gov-
ernment service through family privilege and had risen through marriage ties.
Prior to the accession of Ning-tsung, his administrative talent was untested.
During the high degree of cooperation between inner and outer courts that
culminated in the 1194 abdication, he had served as liaison, conveying mes-
sages from Chao Ju-yu¨, through the eunuch Kuan Li, to Dowager Empress
Wu. He had provided a vital link in communication, but his own input
appears to have been negligible. Han T’o-chou lacked intellectual achieve-
ments as well. He was identified with no major thinker or school of thought,
save for having received childhood instruction from Ch’en Tzu-ch’iang, an
obscure individual who later became a professor at the Imperial University.62
Neither steeped in classical literature nor immersed in traditional values,
62 SS 394, p. 12034; 474, p. 13774; HTC (1958) 155, p. 4166; 155, p. 4181.
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Han T’o-chou represents the exact antithesis of the Sung civil servant ideal.
For the quintessential scholar and bureaucrat Chao Ju-yu¨, who had faced great
obstacles in his own rise to power, the astonishing success of this mediocre
audience officer must have been galling. Chin-shih credentials had come to be
expected of those holding councilor-level posts. Despite the emperor’s high
regard for Han T’o-chou and special favor for his niece, the Empress Han,
Ning-tsung did not violate bureaucratic precedent and give Han a councilor-
level post. This left Han T’o-chou’s position highly irregular. His policies
were often shaped by a curious combination of arrogance and insecurity, the
arrogance being a function of pedigree, and the insecurity a product of powers
that lacked the authority of office.
the ban on tao-hsu¨eh
After eliminating all serious opposition in the capital and procuring for him-
self an impressive string of court titles, Han T’o-chou sought to justify the
dismissal of his opponents on more substantial grounds, such as disloyalty to
the throne or breach of official conduct. Beyond bolstering his own status as
the individual who rid the empire of a grave menace, this move would addi-
tionally discredit the opposition so as to make their political revival next to
impossible. Han T’o-chou also longed to undertake some courageous exploit,
an opportunity to prove his worth and perhaps justify his appointment as chief
councilor.
In pursuit of the first set of objectives – to discredit the opposition – Han
began a political campaign so disastrous that he would be compelled, in the
end, to undo his own deed. Writing in late 1194, P’eng Kuei-nien, quoting
Ou-yang Hsiu, noted: “Since antiquity, petty men who wish to empty the
empire of [talented] men have always resorted to talk about factions and
parties.”63 It was a forecast of the line of attack that would be chosen by
Han T’o-chou to pummel and humiliate his already weakened critics. His
impatient ambition far exceeding his political craft, Han T’o-chou would not
settle for denunciation of individual critics as factionalists. For him, the Tao-
hsu¨eh movement seemed somehow conspiratorial. With Chu Hsi such a popular
figure within that group, it seemed only logical to identify the movement he
represented as the source of factional strife. Han T’o-chou declared war on the
movement.
But the history of the Tao-hsu¨eh movement was complex. Even a hundred
years earlier, by the mid-eleventh century, a discernible schism had developed
between traditional Confucianism (Ju-hsu¨eh) and the Learning of the Way
63 P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 4, p. 18a. For the original citation, see Ou-yang Hsiu, Historical records of the Five
Dynasties, trans. Richard L. Davis (New York, 2004), p. 294.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.012
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 18:00:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
784 richard l. davis
(Tao-hsu¨eh) (often referred to as Neo-Confucianism). Both groups aspired to
revive antiquity and restore the simplistic beauty of ancient literary styles long
displaced by abstruse new forms; resuscitate ancient rites and institutions long
debased by vulgar conventions; and celebrate proper human relationships in
the face of competition from the otherworldliness of Buddhism. Traditional
Confucianism stressed the spirit or essence of antiquity, while the Tao-hsu¨eh
movement took a more literal approach to the imitation of the old. As James
T. C. Liu has noted, this new Confucian movement insisted on strict adher-
ence to the rituals and lifestyle of the past, an attitude widely criticized by
contemporaries as pretentious and unrealistic.64
In the twelfth century, Tao-hsu¨eh practices continued to irritate fellow
bureaucrats and, increasingly, the throne. The sanctimonious frugality of Tao-
hsu¨eh adherents could often appear excessive. At one point, Palace Library
executive Hu Hung paid a social call upon Chu Hsi at Fu-chou. He received
memorably wretched meals, about which he later commented with indigna-
tion, “There’s not that much shortage in the mountains!”65 His miserly host,
Hu concluded, lacked decorum in treating friends. In a similar vein, Chu Hsi
was once accused of feeding coarse food even to his mother, an accusation that
implied great filial impiety. Such complaints may seem petty minded, but
they reveal in Chu Hsi a distinctive set of values that many contemporaries
did not appreciate and indeed found personally offensive. The liberties taken
by Chu Hsi in criticizing others, and his apparent lack of restraint, also came
at great cost to his career. As a regional official, he denounced corrupt and neg-
ligent bureaucrats with uncommon frequency. His scrutiny often extended
beyond subordinates to include their superiors. This was highly irregular con-
duct for a noncensorial official and raised questions about his motives – were
they professional or political? Later historians may have drawn inspiration
from his dedication to bureaucratic integrity and his moral courage, but his
contemporaries commonly regarded Chu Hsi as self-righteous and excessively
contentious.66 Memorializing the throne in 1180, he astonished all by openly
criticizing the emperor’s unhealthy reliance on a small coterie of men, and pre-
dicting imminent calamity. Quite understandably, an infuriated Hsiao-tsung
64 Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “How did a Neo-Confucian school become the state orthodoxy?”
Philosophy East and West 23 No. 4 (1973), pp. 483–505, especially p. 497; Ch’en, “Han P’ing-yu¨an
p’ing,” pp. 123–8.
65 SS 394, p. 12023; Li Hsin-ch’uan, Tao ming lu (1239; Shanghai, 1937), pp. 58–9, 67–9. For related
information on Chu Hsi’s eccentric lifestyle, see Chan, Chu Hsi, pp. 44–89, and Julia Ching, “Chu
Hsi on personal cultivation,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986),
pp. 273–91.
66 Sung Hsi, “Chu Hsi ti cheng-chih lun,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti shih chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui
(Taipei, 1978), pp. 355–69.
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took this as an evil wish, not constructive advice, and withdrew his former
sympathies for Chu Hsi.67 Chu Hsi also came under fire for ostentatiously
declining public office, especially metropolitan posts, despite repeated offers.
To many, Chu Hsi’s refusals reflected patent arrogance, a ploy to enhance his
reputation by appearing unavailable even to the throne.68 Liu Kuang-tsu, an
imperial diarist and a man sympathetic to Tao-hsu¨eh, summarized the reasons
for the unpopularity of the movement stating: “The superior men of today
do not comprehend the Great Way. They regard themselves too highly while
castigating others as too base.”69
At court, exaggerated stress on moral purity wore thin the welcome for Tao-
hsu¨eh proponents, for their criticism extended even to the emperor. Worse yet,
their criticism often appeared totally unjustified. Tao-hsu¨eh proponents ideal-
ized an austere lifestyle and impugned indulgence in wine or women, especially
by the Son of Heaven, as he should personify the noblest of human virtues. The
Tao-hsu¨eh movement’s animosity toward Han T’o-chou grew in part out of his
indifference to moral standards. Ignoring the custom of taking only one pri-
mary wife, he reportedly had a total of four, all of whom he insisted on calling
“Madame” (fu-jen). In addition, he kept ten secondary wives – a small harem –
plus many other women.70 Alcohol and frivolity inevitably accompanied
female entertainment, and Han T’o-chou was notorious for drinking late into
the night. When Kuang-tsung had developed similar habits, palace favorites,
perhaps eunuchs, were presumed responsible. When Ning-tsung now fell into
the same vices, the influence of Han T’o-chou seemed undeniable.
Both Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung were negatively predisposed against
Tao-hsu¨eh, resenting its intrusion into their personal lives, especially the heavy
ceremonial obligations of filial devotion. Kuang-tsung hated his father with
intense passion, and moralist pressure to visit Hsiao-tsung in the Ch’ung-
hua Palace only incited Kuang-tsung further. Ning-tsung had still greater
reason to be bitter. By the end of 1194, having performed, on his father’s
behalf, the stressful funeral rituals for Hsiao-tsung, the emperor prepared to
observe a shortened and less rigorous period of mourning. The heavy demands
of governing made this a perfectly proper decision; indeed, the same had been
proposed for Hsiao-tsung’s mourning of Kao-tsung, and the father-son rela-
tionship was more formalized than that of grandfather-grandson. Nevertheless,
Chu Hsi pressed for strict adherence to ritual. Given Hsiao-tsung’s precedent
of compliance to the requirements of these rituals, as new emperor Ning-tsung
67 SS 429, p. 12754; Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng (1979) 11, pp. 11a–18a.
68 SS 394, p. 12031; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 47–8.
69 Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 8a.
70 SS 474, p. 13777; Ting Ch’uan-ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1935; Taipei, 1982) 17, p. 886.
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could hardly do otherwise without drawing heavy criticism.71 The death of
the eighty-three-year-old Dowager Empress Wu in 1197 raised the issue of
Ning-tsung and mourning rites once again. Han T’o-chou is said to have pro-
posed that funeral rites be simplified and expenses reduced. This incensed Liu
Kuang-tsu. Memorializing the throne from a regional post, he charged Han
T’o-chou with treating the emperor’s great-grandmother as a petty woman.72
Ning-tsung consented to a full year’s mourning, having only recently con-
cluded observances for his grandfather. In the year 1200, as a cruel fate would
have it, both his mother and father died. There was no question that formal
and full-length observances were in order. In this way, Ning-tsung devoted
much of a decade to the rigors of mourning. The strict demands dictated by
Tao-hsu¨eh proponents made the emperor’s mourning unduly protracted, and
he appears never to have forgotten, or forgiven, them.
Against this background, Han T’o-chou’s proposal to proscribe Tao-hsu¨eh
adherents drew no noticeable objection from the emperor. The idea was hardly
original. Earlier in the century, under Hui-tsung, a ban had been imposed
on antireformists of the Yu¨an-yu era (1086–93). Implemented in 1102 under
Chief Councilor Ts’ai Ching (1047–1126), the ban had sought to discredit
anti–Wang An-shih elements at court. The names of alleged partisans, ini-
tially ninety-eight, but later over three hundred in number, were inscribed
in stone. In punishment, offenders and their descendants were excluded from
metropolitan posts and prohibited from entering the capital; their literary
productions were proscribed, and, in certain cases, printing blocks of their
works were reduced to ashes.73 A second ban had occurred under Councilor
Ch’in Kuei. Beginning in 1136 as an injunction against using the classical
exegesis of Ch’eng I for civil service examinations, the ban was broadened
eight years later to include any “specialized and obscure learning” (chuan-
men ch’u¨-hsu¨eh).74 Ch’in Kuei’s proscription of the 1140s was in many ways
similar to Ts’ai Ching’s, but it differed in one important respect: it focused
on intellectual, not just political, associations. Ts’ai Ching had directed his
ban against political opponents, including men of vastly different intellectual
backgrounds. Ch’in Kuei, by identifying and attacking his political opponents
on the basis of their intellectual association, had established the model that
Han T’o-chou would use sixty years later.
71 SS 429, p. 12766; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4120.
72 SS 397, p. 12101; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4153.
73 On the ban, see Chapter 7 of this volume; SS 472, pp. 13721–8; HTC (1958) 88, pp. 2244–5; 88,
p. 2252; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 15–9; and references to it in Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an, chu¨an 96.
74 SS 473, p. 13760; Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an, chu¨an 96; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 37–9; also see Huang
K’uan-ch’ung, “Ch’in Kuei yu¨ wen-tzu yu¨,” in Sung-shih ts’ung-lun, Huang K’uan-ch’ung (Taipei, 1974),
pp. 41–72.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.012
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 18:00:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung 787
The political influence of the Tao-hsu¨eh adherents had been, for most of
the early twelfth century, appreciated little under Hsiao-tsung. Hsiao-tsung’s
assertive leadership curtailed special favor being given to any one group. In
addition, Hsiao-tsung’s highly eclectic attitude toward ideas, and his belief in
the Three Teachings (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) as being com-
plementary and deserving of equal attention, alienated the more adamant
Tao-hsu¨eh proponents.75 Only under Kuang-tsung did the Tao-hsu¨eh move-
ment’s fortunes improve markedly, a development in which not everyone took
delight.
Competitive examinations were the cornerstone of the Sung civil service,
and a candidate’s understanding and interpretation of the classics affected his
success. Intellectual associations profoundly influenced careers and livelihoods.
Hermeneutics, the interpretation of texts, and one’s intellectual disposition
were not just an academic issue in this competitive environment, and this
partly explains the controversy triggered by the advancement of Tao-hsu¨eh
adherents under Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yu¨. The balance sought
by Hsiao-tsung, where no single teaching was to achieve preeminence, had
begun to shift. This emerging realignment was closely followed by those who
had been taught and supported different intellectual traditions.
Being outside the civil service mainstream, Han T’o-chou would have been
disconnected from the academic dispute, but in this case his political interests
coincided with the political and academic concerns of others. Most likely at his
prompting, censors began, in 1195, to attack Tao-hsu¨eh partisans and denounce
Tao-hsu¨eh ideas as “spurious teachings” (wei-hsu¨eh). Indictments against Chu
Hsi himself and many others soon followed. Had it not been for the inter-
vention of Dowager Empress Wu, the court may well have imposed a general
proscription from the outset. As the oldest living member of the royal fam-
ily, she probably remembered better than others the lasting ill effects of such
intolerance in the past. The alleged partisans were initially excluded only from
the metropolitan bureaucracy.76 After her death in 1197, with no powerful
sponsor to oppose them, the sanctions were extended and formalized. Offi-
cially imposed in 1198, the ban, called the Tao-hsu¨eh chin, directly affected
fifty-nine individuals.77
In scope and severity, the ban of 1198 scarcely compared to the Yu¨an-yu
ban of Ts’ai Ching a hundred and ten years earlier. Apart from affecting far
75 Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi [Shih-yu¨an ts’ung-shu 1914 ed.] (c. 1202 chia volume,
1216 i volume; Taipei, 1967) i 3, pp. 8a–b; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 11,
pp. 37b–38a.
76 HTC (1958) 154, p. 4140.
77 SS 394, p. 12033.
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fewer people, the ban was also far less drastic. Proscribed scholars found it
difficult to publish their scholarship, yet the government appears not to have
burned books or printing blocks. In fact, this limited and short-lived attempt
at political revenge may have deserved no more than a historian’s footnote
were it not for the eminence of its targets. Three former chief councilors, Chou
Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yu¨, headed the list. Also stigmatized were
the philosopher Chu Hsi, the renowned essayist Lou Yu¨eh, the outspoken
professor Ts’ai Yu-hsu¨eh (1154–1217), the accomplished classicist Yeh Shih,
the nonpartisan censor Liu Kuang-tsu, and Tao-hsu¨eh luminaries such as Ch’en
Fu-liang, Lin Ta-chung, Lu¨ Tsu-chien, Liu Yu¨eh2 (1144–1216), Yang Chien,
and Yu¨an Hsieh.78
Those who supported the ban denounced all fifty-nine proscribed scholars
as Tao-hsu¨eh adherents who advanced strictly partisan interests to the detri-
ment of the government. The charge was preposterous. Some of those banned,
including Lou Yu¨eh, Yang Chien, and Yu¨an Hsieh, held close ties to Lu Chiu-
yu¨an, a leading rival of Chu Hsi’s. Others, Ch’en Fu-liang, Ts’ai Yu-hsu¨eh,
and Yeh Shih, identified themselves with the Yung-chia School centered at
Wen-chou.79 Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yu¨ had no discernible ties
to Tao-hsu¨eh partisans either, even though they may have sympathized with
the views of individual adherents. The persecuted were from several regions
of the empire, and there are no indications of their having a regional associa-
tion. The only common ground appears to have been their concern for strict
ethical standards and conduct in government; their only consensus on prac-
tical policy appears to have been on the need to bring palace favorites under
control. The entire suppression effort would seem to have been intellectually
baseless.
The ad hoc political nature of the Tao-hsu¨eh ban is further illustrated by
its poorly defined ideological objectives. Suppression began two years after
the purge and death of Chao Ju-yu¨, by which time Tao-hsu¨eh proponents no
longer posed a serious threat. The ban had lost its political utility. Were ide-
ological conformity its objective, one would expect some effort to destroy the
writings of proponents, as under the Yu¨an-yu ban. This did not occur. Nor
did Han T’o-chou promote some rival school, which would have been another
means of ideologically undermining Tao-hsu¨eh. Even simple revenge cannot
fully explain the ban. The proscription was far from comprehensive, affecting
78 A complete listing is to be found in Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an, chu¨an 97; HTC (1958) 154,
pp. 4153–4; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 81–3; see also Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack.”
79 See Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack,” and Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), The life and thought of
Yeh Shih (Gainsesville, Fla., 1974). For a thorough study of the Yung-chia School and its influence on
the examination curriculum, see Hilde de Weerdt, Competition over content: Negotiating standards for the
civil service examinations in imperial China (1127–1279) (Cambridge, Mass., 2007).
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only prominent critics, not their many teachers, disciples, and associates. Nei-
ther was the ban strictly enforced. Most men remained free to travel; they
retained bureaucratic status and salary; they continued to teach; their writings
continued to be read; and as one historian has demonstrated, they continued
to pass the civil service examinations.80 That Han T’o-chou did not resort to
violent intimidation similarly implies a restrained malice. The chief impetus
behind the ban, it appears, was an anti-intellectualism that went along with
a desire to silence the most moralizing of court critics. Both Ning-tsung and
Han T’o-chou held no special reverence for intellectuals, and the hounding
they received from the Tao-hsu¨eh supporters over the issue of mourning rites
may have spurred them to react, however clumsily.
The entire effort at imposing a ban ended in embarrassing failure. A poorly
defined target group made the ban appear ill considered and irresponsible.81
Guided by emotion and personal animosity, it was neither comprehensive
nor strictly enforced. The restrained support of the bureaucracy, especially
Ching T’ang and Hsieh Shen-fu, also undermined its effect.82 By the end of
1199, less than two years after the ban’s imposition, it was relaxed at the
recommendation of Chief Councilor Ching T’ang. Rumor had it that even
Han T’o-chou had come to regret the action. When Chu Hsi died a few
months later, his well-attended funeral vividly illustrated that the proscription
had neither discredited the teacher nor intimidated his students.83 On the
contrary, by victimizing so many well-respected men, the ban had legitimized
the objectives of Tao-hsu¨eh, winning it a new respectability and a broader
spectrum of sympathetic support.
rapprochement and the k’ai-hsi war (1205–1207)
With the decision to relax the 1198 ban, the court gradually restored offices and
titles to the once-disgraced officials. Liu Cheng, the first to be honored, became
junior guardian. Other restorations were delayed because of the indiscretion
of Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai, a disciple of Chu Hsi, who in late autumn 1200 presented a
memorial to the throne that viciously denounced Han T’o-chou and demanded
his execution.84 Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai was a first cousin of Lu¨ Tsu-chien, also a critic of
Han T’o-chou, who had suffered banishment in 1195 and had died a year
later. In 1200 there had been a string of deaths of notable persons involved in
80 Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack,” p. 193.
81 Chiba, “Kan Takuchu¯,” pp. 283–4.
82 See SS 394, pp. 12036–8; 394, pp. 12038–41; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4144; 155, p. 4172.
83 SS 429, p. 12768; HTC (1958) 155, p. 4176.
84 SS 455, pp. 13371–2; HTC (1958) 155, pp. 4181–2.
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the incident: Chu Hsi in the spring; Chief Councilor Ching T’ang, Emperor
Kuang-tsung, and Empress Li2 in the summer; and Empress Han in early
winter. Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai may have reasoned, erroneously it turns out, that these
events had weakened Han T’o-chou’s political influence, but censors loyal
to Han T’o-chou turned against Lu¨ and called for his execution. The court
decided on flogging with a hundred blows of a heavy stick – an unusually
cruel punishment by Sung standards – and exile to the remote southwest. The
court also chose to suspend the rehabilitation of other officials proscribed in
the Ch’ing-yu¨an ban.
However, rapprochement began in earnest in 1202. Chu Hsi was posthu-
mously restored as academician-in-waiting, Chao Ju-yu¨ was made an aca-
demician of the Tzu-cheng Hall, and the seventy-six-year-old Chou Pi-ta was
reinstated as grand academician of the Kuan-wen Hall. Preproscription rank
was also restored to Liu Kuang-tsu, Ch’en Fu-liang, Yeh Shih, and Ts’ai Yu-
hsu¨eh, among others. A year later, P’eng Kuei-nien was reinstated in the civil
service, and the exiled Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai was given a special pardon.85
Still, the hostilities between Han T’o-chou and the opposition were not
easily forgotten. Most of those who had their rank restored never resumed
office. Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng, both elderly at this point, formally retired.
P’eng Kuei-nien, Lou Yu¨eh, and Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai accepted rank but not office. Ch’en
Fu-liang and Liu Kuang-tsu were offered regional appointments but opted for
sinecures instead. The only prominent critics to accept metropolitan assign-
ments were Ts’ai Yu-hsu¨eh, who became drafting official at the Secretariat,
and Yeh Shih, subsequently vice-director at the Ministry of War, the Ministry
of Works, and the Ministry of Personnel. Most critics preferred to boycott the
administration. Han T’o-chou’s rapprochement was no more successful than
the ban had been. By drawing men of integrity back into participation in the
regime he still controlled, he hoped to restore and enhance his own political
reputation. But he failed, and his critics remained too powerful to ignore.
Unsuccessful in this attempt to bolster his power by ideological restrictions,
he turned to foreign policy as an alternative arena in which to demonstrate his
effectiveness as a political leader.
Sung and Chin had been at peace since the early 1160s and relations were
cordial. In the north, the Chin emperor Chin Shih-tsung (r. 1161–89), known
by admirers as a “second Yao or Shun,” was the most humane of Jurchen
rulers. Much of the same held for the Sung emperor Hsiao-tsung in the south,
whose reign (1162–89) has been dubbed the golden age of the Southern Sung.
While both publicly laid claim to parts of the other’s territory, neither ruler
85 HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4198, 4203, 4205, 4213; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, p. 12b.
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dared risk what they currently controlled in costly and uncertain military
adventures. Hsiao-tsung had expressed a firm commitment to restoration of
the north, whereas Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung appeared indifferent. Thus,
when Ning-tsung chose to resume hostilities against the Chin, responsibility
for this plan was inevitably attributed to the wiles of Han T’o-chou.
Signs of an impending shift in foreign policy had already appeared by the
turn of the century. In the summer of 1201, a minor official had recommended
the elevation of Han T’o-chou to manager of national security (p’ing-chang
chu¨n-kuo shih), an ad hoc post generally awarded only in times of war that had
been conferred upon a total of four men in the dynasty’s past, all during the
Northern Sung. It gave sweeping authority over the civilian, military, and fiscal
bureaucracies. Understandably, appointees had to be impeccably trustworthy.
All previous nominees had been distinguished chief councilors.86 The 1201
recommendation to revive the post must have been prompted by Han T’o-
chou himself; no minor official acting on his own initiative would have dared
to be so bold, especially in a time of peace. Han T’o-chou declined, but the
mere proposal was an indicator that a military venture was in the making.
There were other indicators. In 1202 the court named Su Shih-tan (d. 1207),
a crony of Han T’o-chou, as chief recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military
Affairs. This appointment put control of all military communications into
Han’s hands. In the same year the Szechwan military magnate Wu Hsi became
prefect for strategic Hsing-chou3, in the heart of the northwestern Li-chou
circuit, strengthening the leadership in the west for a possible attack from that
direction. These appointments were soon followed by Han T’o-chou’s titular
promotion to grand preceptor.
That these military-related moves coincided with Han T’o-chou’s rap-
prochement with his court critics was no accident. Given the revanchist orien-
tation of Tao-hsu¨eh thinkers and sympathizers, a militant foreign policy, if not
successful at winning their favor, might at least succeed in stealing their thun-
der. It also made good sense from a military standpoint. As early as 1200, the
Chin court, worried about the growing Mongol menace, had begun to reinforce
military installations along their northern border.87 For the first time since
its seizure of power in 1115, Chin strategic concerns had shifted from south
to north. Worse yet, in Chin the new Mongol pressure and increased military
expenditures had coincided with a period of repeated large-scale natural dis-
asters and a dramatic decline in state revenues. The destitute took to banditry,
and the Chin government faced the dual threats of domestic insurrection and
86 See, Lin T’ien-wei, “Sung-tai ch’u¨an-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih fen-hsi,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti pa
chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1976), pp. 141–70, especially pp. 154–9.
87 HTC (1958) 155, p. 4180.
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foreign invasion. In 1203, as Sung ambassador Teng Yu-lung was making
his way to the Chin capital, he observed the impoverished state of the coun-
tryside and held clandestine meetings with informants. In his report to the
court on his return to Lin-an, he portrayed the north as more vulnerable than
ever before. Two years later in 1205, envoy Li Pi (1159–1222), vice-minister
of rites, filed a similar report. Support for aggression also came from Hsin
Ch’i-chi (1140–1207), the renowned poet serving as military commissioner
in Che-tung. Hsin predicted an imminent demise for Jurchen rule.88 Many
concurred with this assessment of Chin’s new vulnerability. There was less of
a consensus, however, about Sung military strength.
As early as 1203, the Chin began reinforcing their defenses along the Sung
border. The objective was probably to contain bandits and to prevent refugees
from seeking sanctuary in the south, as commonly happened in times of internal
disorder. These border reinforcements were not primarily directed against the
Sung. In 1203, Wan-yen A-lu-tai, the Chin envoy to the Sung, traveling to
Lin-an through the lower Huai and Yangtze regions, observed military drills
being conducted regularly and an abnormally high demand for horses, both
unmistakable signs of preparations for an impending war. When he informed
the Chin court of this on his return, he was flogged because his comments
were considered inflammatory.89 Again, when a Sung spy was captured in
1205 and informed the Chin of troop movements in Sung territory, his captors
were staggered in disbelief.90 The Chin emperor, Chang-tsung (r. 1189–1208),
continued to react with caution, hoping to avert conflict. Natural disasters,
infrequent in the first decade of his reign, had become endemic in the second.
Shantung was especially hard-pressed and had required massive relief.91 There
was also serious domestic unrest in the face of widespread poverty. In this
context, Chang-tsung decided to respond to the potential Sung threat by
further strengthening his own border defenses and by using diplomacy to
dissuade the Sung leaders from attacking. In all previous conflicts with the
Sung, hostilities had been initiated by the Chin. A reversal of roles must have
required Chin to rethink its strategic goals and reassess its defensive tactics.
Apart from troop movements in the Huai region, heightened Sung military
activity took place in the strategic Ching-hsi circuit centered in the northwest
corner of modern Hupei. Military commands were also restructured through-
out the Sung domain. The Sung court entrusted command of the Huai-nan
88 For these various views, see SS 398, p. 12106; HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4214, 4216–17. Also see Ch’en,
“Han P’ing-yu¨an p’ing” p. 108; Kinugawa Tsuyoshi, “Kaiki Yo¯hei o megutte,” To¯yo¯shi kenkyu¯ 36 No. 3
(1977), pp. 128–51.
89 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 11, p. 261; HTC (1958) 156, p. 4214.
90 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 271; 62, p. 1475; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4227.
91 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 272.
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East circuit to Assistant Councilor Chang Yen, command of the Huai-nan West
circuit to Bureau of Military Affairs executive Ch’eng Sung, and command of
Liang-che East circuit to Chief Minister of Justice Hsin Ch’i-chi. Ministry of
Works executive Ch’iu Ch’ung (1135–1208) became custodial prefect of the
strategic port city of Ming-chou.92 Clearly, by 1203 at the latest, the Sung
court had begun to lay the foundation for a major offensive. The court delib-
erately chose to staff its military commands with prominent civilian officials,
thereby ensuring central government control over regional armies, especially
in the east.
Extensive preparations and precautions notwithstanding, the Sung court
was slow to undertake war. Han T’o-chou was determined first to strengthen
his hand at home. To appease his former critics, he arranged high honors for
the recently deceased Chou Pi-ta, another posthumous advancement for one-
time critic Chao Ju-yu¨, and dismissal for Liu Te-hsiu, the censor who had been
directly responsible for the purge of Tao-hsu¨eh partisans, and who now became
a scapegoat for Han T’o-chou. There were posthumous honors for Yu¨eh Fei,
an icon of irredentism in the Kao-tsung reign, and demotion for his nemesis,
the reviled pacifist Ch’in Kuei. The court also ordered the compilation of
several historical works on earlier Sung reigns. These publication projects were
designed to legitimize aggression and encourage revanchist zeal, and all bore
the name of Han T’o-chou as project director.93 Meanwhile, it was essential,
assuming that he would direct the war effort, for Han T’o-chou to hold a
post of appropriate overall authority. This came in 1205 with his appointment
as manager of national security. Even with his new appointment, Han T’o-
chou proved exceedingly cautious. Deciding first to probe enemy strength,
he sponsored bandit raids in which Sung agents harassed towns and villages
along the border to gather information on the size, disposition, and readiness
of enemy forces.94 The Sung court also began underwriting loyalist groups in
Chin territory, mostly northern brigands who declared nominal fealty to the
Sung in exchange for provisions and occasional refuge. Such groups were most
active in Shantung, where a weak government presence and marginal living
conditions resulting from years of natural calamities had badly affected the
region. The Sung risked little by supporting such nominally “loyalist” armies
operating almost entirely within Chin territory. Moreover, the difficulties the
Chin faced in suppressing the rebels provided the Sung with some measure of
its enemy’s military effectiveness. Chin efforts at suppression were feeble, and
the Sung drew the appropriate conclusions but did not act.
92 HTC (1958) 156, p. 4214.
93 SS 38, pp. 735, 738–9; Liu, Hsu¨ Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, pp. 4b, 6a.
94 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, pp. 272–3.
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The policy of aggression aroused substantial criticism. Vice-Minister of
Public Works Yeh Shih, among the most prominent proponents of aggression
at this time, nevertheless concluded that the vulnerability of Sung border
defenses made conflict highly risky. Another staunch irredentist, Liu Kuang-
tsu, drew the same conclusion, prompting him to resign from his high-level
post in Li-chou circuit. Both men, despite persecution under the Ch’ing-yu¨an
ban, had subsequently cooperated with the Han T’o-chou administration.
Mere partisanship cannot explain their newfound caution. Similarly, Ch’iu
Ch’ung, custodial prefect of Ming-chou, another recent recruit once known
for his strident militancy, now voiced his opposition to war against the Chin.
For one enraged student at the Military Academy (Wu-hsu¨eh), the war policy
was so fraught with potential peril that Han T’o-chou, its witless architect,
deserved death; for his temerity, the student was banished. In spring 1206,
the greatest political setback to the plans to attack Chin came when Assistant
Councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu was compelled to resign because of his differences
with Han T’o-chou over border management.95 It seems that throughout the
bureaucracy many questions remained both about Han T’o-chou’s motives and
about his competence to direct the war effort. Once hostilities erupted, these
questions would multiply.
Despite the objections and resignations, in May 1206 the Sung offensive
began in earnest. The commander Pi Tsai-yu¨ was especially impressive in
battle. He quickly captured the Chin prefecture of Ssu-chou, just north of
the Huai River in modern Anhwei province. Soon, Sung forces took several
counties in the southern part of Chin’s Nan-ching circuit, in modern Honan.
Although neither of these attacks had received official sanction by the court,
which still sought to fully test enemy strength before committing Sung armies,
the aggressive commanders had clearly been urged on by the court. Events to
the west unfolded less impressively for the Sung. An offensive centered on
Ts’ai-chou (Honan), ended in resounding defeat, as did another in Szechwan
led by the pacification commissioner Ch’eng Sung. This somewhat weak initial
showing did not dampen the enthusiasm of Han T’o-chou, and an official
declaration of war soon followed within weeks. Already, the bureaucracy began
to resist the war policy. Academician Yeh Shih, given the dubious honor of
drafting the declaration of war, refused. This came as a considerable political
embarrassment, but no more so than the military developments along the
border. Following the brief capture of Ssu-chou in the east, the Sung scored
only one other notable victory in 1206: local militia in the west seized control
95 For these several opinions, see SS 243, p. 8657; 398, p. 12111; 434, pp. 12892–3; Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an
hsu¨eh-an 54, pp. 985–8; HTC (1958) 157, pp. 4228, 4231–2, 4236, 4239; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng
Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 14b; Yeh, Shui-hsin hsien-sheng wen-chi 1, pp. 19b–21a.
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of the Ho-shang Plain, a hotly contested area in the Li-chou circuit. Offensives
against Su-chou2 and Hsu¨-chou in the east, and T’ang-chou, Shou-chou, and
Ts’ai-chou in the central border region, all ended in defeat. The Sung drive
lasted a mere three months, the time required for Chin forces to launch a
counterattack.
Not only did the Chin succeed in promptly repulsing Sung armies, by late
fall it was responding with an offensive of its own. A reputed seventy thousand
Chin troops led by Ho-she-li Chih-chung (d. 1213) descended on the border
town of Ch’u-chou, in modern Anhwei province. Chin troops outnumbered
Sung defenders ten to one and were staved off only through the extraordinary
resourcefulness of Pi Tsai-yu¨, now prefect of nearby Hsu¨-i. Apart from deliver-
ing desperately needed reinforcements to Ch’u-chou, Pi also cleverly managed,
under the guise of darkness, to penetrate enemy lines and set fire to the Chin’s
provisions. The mere presence of Pi Tsai-yu¨, who was known for his ferocity in
battle, did much to strengthen the resolve of Sung troops. The siege of Ch’u-
chou continued for three months before the weary Chin forces retreated.96
The encirclement of Ch’u-chou was only one leg of a massive nine-pronged
Chin offensive that reputedly involved hundreds of thousands of troops and
affected most of the twelve hundred–mile border separating the two empires.
In addition to the campaign to the east, which resulted in penetrations deep
into the eastern and western Huai-nan circuits, Chin forces also attacked com-
manderies along the central border. The Chin military leader Wan-yen K’uang
led assaults on Tsao-yang, Kuang-hua, Te-an, and Hsiang-yang. The first two
of these commanderies readily knuckled under, but Te-an and Hsiang-yang
doggedly resisted massive three-month encirclements before the Chin forces
withdrew.97 To the west, Chin armies commanded by Fu-ch’a-chen delivered
a severe blow to Sung defenders at T’ien-shui, Hsi-ho-chou, Mien-chou, and
the Ho-shang Plain, all in northwest Li-chou circuit. Within less than a half
year, Chin forces, by seizing the initiative, had managed to expose Sung vul-
nerability. The speed with which the tide had turned demonstrated that the
Sung effort had been based on a serious underestimation of Chin capability.
By year’s end, the Sung court was prepared to try to restore peace.
insurrection in szechwan
In its war with Chin, Sung setbacks in the east were overshadowed by the
calamity that struck the Sung forces in their defeats in Szechwan in 1207.
96 SS 402, pp. 12186–7; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4247.
97 See HTC (1958), chu¨an 157–8; Herbert Franke, “Siege and defense of towns in medieval China,” in
Chinese ways in warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass., 1974),
especially pp. 179–88.
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The Sung battle plan seems to have rested upon two major simultaneous
offensives, an eastern thrust from Huai-nan East circuit into Shantung and
a western thrust from Li-chou circuit into Ching-chao and Feng-hsiang in
the Wei valley. A strong showing in the west could have pressured the Chin
into transferring troops currently fighting in the east to the western front. This
transfer was imperative if the Sung were to defend the Huai region successfully.
Unfortunately, the Sung offensive in the west relied too heavily on a single
commander.
That commander, Wu Hsi (d. 1207), hailed from a long line of eminent
military leaders. Two generations earlier, the orphaned brothers Wu Chieh
(1093–1139) and Wu Lin (1102–67), natives of Te-hsu¨n, modern Kansu, had
served in the armies of the late Northern Sung at the height of the Tangut
and Jurchen invasions. With the loss of the northern part of the Sung empire
the brothers had fled south. Wu Chieh became pacification commissioner of
Szechwan and eventually military governor of Li-chou circuit. The younger
brother, Wu Lin, had inherited that post, and groomed his own son, Wu T’ing
(d. 1193), as his successor. Wu Lin and Wu T’ing were not altogether unde-
serving of the rewards they had been given. During the Chin invasion of 1161,
father and son had performed impressively in frustrating the enemy’s sixty-day
siege of the Ta-san Pass, winning for Wu T’ing the military commissionership
for western Li-chou circuit.98
Sung control over the military establishment in the west had always been
tenuous. Maintaining long-distance control of the western regions by the
Sung government in Lin-an had entailed a careful distribution of military
authority to prevent any one commander in Szechwan from becoming too
powerful. Regular transfers, a hallmark of the civilian bureaucracy, were less
common in the military, so regional political autonomy was held in check by
summoning commanders to the capital for regular audiences and by assigning
civilian commissioners to supervise their activities at home. Additionally, the
Sung sometimes housed a commander’s family in the capital, the equivalent
to holding them as hostages. In this way, the younger son of Wu T’ing, Wu
Hsi, had spent much of his youth in Lin-an.99
By the late twelfth century, Wu Hsi had held an array of military titles; he
had even served, in 1186, as an ambassador to the Chin. He had held posts
with important responsibilities, including militia commander for Hao-chou
98 On the Wu family, see SS 366, pp. 11408–14, 11421–4; 475, pp. 13811–14; Ihara Hiroshi, “Nan-So¯
Shisen ni okeru Go Shi no seiryoku – Go Ki no ran zenshi,” in Aoyama Hakushi koki kinen So¯dai shi
ronso¯, ed. Aoyama Hakushi Koki Kinen So¯dai-shi Ronso¯ Kankokai (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 1–33; Yamauchi
Seibaku, “Nan-So¯ no Shisen ni okeru Cho¯ Shun to Go Kai – sono seiryoku ko¯tai no katei o chu¯shin to
shite,” Shirin 44 No. 1 (1961), pp. 98–124.
99 HTC (1958) 156, p. 4192.
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and commander of Chien-k’ang. It is no coincidence that both these assign-
ments were in the east. Even in the later years of Hsiao-tsung’s reign, officials
had expressed concern about the Wu family’s growing might in Szechwan and
urged the court to assert itself. Chao Ju-yu¨ had warned that continued tolerance
of such autonomy threatened to undermine the dynasty. Hsiao-tsung appar-
ently had shared this apprehension, despite his usual inclination to indulge
the military, and named Chao Ju-yu¨ military commissioner in chief of Szech-
wan and prefect of the circuit capital, Ch’eng-tu. Similarly, Vice-Minister of
Finance Ch’iu Ch’ung, a man with extensive experience in the region, had later
cautioned Kuang-tsung against permitting the sons of Wu T’ing to inherit
their father’s military machine. Investigating Censor Huang Tu also argued
that further indulgence of the Wu family would spell imminent disaster.
These reservations were reiterated by Liu Cheng, who had preceded Chao Ju-
yu¨ as commissioner in chief of Szechwan. “Of the three generals of the west,”
he noted, “only the Wu house has inherited power for generations. Theirs is
known as the ‘Army of the Wu House’ and they are oblivious to the commands
of the court.”100 When Wu T’ing died in 1193, Liu Cheng intentionally named
an outsider as military commissioner for Li-chou. As Wu Hsi assumed his own
post at a distant Hao-chou in Huai-nan, the prospect of his returning to his
home region must have seemed dim.
Later historians, with the advantage of hindsight, are quick to portray
Wu Hsi as a typical renegade, arrogant and insubordinate from the outset.
The views of contemporaries were initially not so damning. Sung officials,
in warning the government against tolerating one-family military dominance
in Szechwan, were not accusing a particular Wu kinsman, Wu T’ing or Wu
Hsi, of treasonous intent. They were concerned with preventing hereditary
control over regional armies, a practice that ran against the Sung tradition
of centralized, civilian control. Strong personal links between generals and
their armies undermined the authority of the central government, and regional
control weakened the empire’s ideal of fiscal interdependence. In the vicinity of
Ta-san Pass, half of the revenues generated by government-leased landholdings
(ying-t’ien) were siphoned off by Wu T’ing and Kuo Kao (d. 1200), the two
leading military magnates in the region. Their economic clout was backed
by their broad popular support. The people of Szechwan, finding security
in continuity of leadership, reportedly “looked with necks outstretched” at
learning of Wu Hsi’s imminent return.101 Chao Ju-yu¨ and Liu Cheng were
sensitive to the problem of Szechwan regionalism owing to their many years of
100 On these views, see SS 391, pp. 11974–5; 392, pp. 11982–3; 383, p. 12010; 398, pp. 12110–11; HTC
(1958) 152, p. 4083; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 10a.
101 HTC (1958) 155, pp. 4186–7; 156, p. 4193.
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experience in the west. Lack of such experience partly explains why Han T’o-
chou in mobilizing men and mate´riel for a major military initiative took the
risk in the summer of 1201 of naming Wu Hsi prefect and general commander
of the strategically important Hsing-chou2.102 Some of Han’s closest associates
criticized the decision, including executives at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Official historians suggest that Wu Hsi received the appointment only by
bribing high-level bureaucrats, but this may well be malicious gossip, without
merit.103
Wu Hsi’s vanity and ambition, if not previously apparent, became so upon
his return to Szechwan. He immediately constructed a temple in honor of his
grandfather, Wu Lin, spending a hundred thousand strings of cash on the main
hall alone, probably using government funds. He then engineered the dismissal
of Wang Ta-chieh, second in command at Hsing-chou2, whose considerable
influence threatened his own autonomy.104 The Sung court responded in 1205
by transferring Ch’eng Sung from Huai-nan West to Szechwan as military
commissioner in chief, and thus Wu Hsi’s superior. The presence of a trusted
leader from the outside was to provide an important check on Wu Hsi, but
unfamiliarity with the region placed Ch’eng Sung at a serious disadvantage.
Troop levels presented an even greater problem. As assistant pacification com-
missioner for Szechwan, Wu Hsi directed an army of roughly sixty thousand;
Ch’eng Sung commanded only half that number.105 This disparity left the
Sung court with little leverage to use against the Szechwan general. Much
rested on simple good faith and mutual benefit.
In their 145,000-man counterattack in the winter of 1206, the Chin
assigned over 100,000 troops for the campaign in the east and central bor-
der regions, committing only a small force to the western front. The Sung
court worked from an opposite strategy. Its armies at Ch’u-chou, Te-an, and
Hsiang-yang often contained no more than 10,000 men, and were some-
times outnumbered by the enemy ten to one, whereas in the west Ch’eng
Sung and Wu Hsi commanded over 90,000 trained soldiers plus countless
militia. The decision to invest troop strength heavily in Szechwan was strate-
gically justifiable. By confining early combat to faraway Szechwan, the Sung
court minimized the chance of retaliatory threats to its political and eco-
nomic center in the east. And with Chin forces concentrated in the east,
the center of previous wars, Chin’s western flank was potentially vulnera-
ble. But war had broken out in the Huai region, where the fighting had not
102 HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4192–3.
103 SS 394, pp. 12026, 12035; HTC (1958) 156, p. 4192.
104 SS 475, p. 13812; HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4192–3.
105 HTC (1958) 157, p. 4236.
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gone well for the Sung. This prompted Han T’o-chou to embrace new battle
plans.
Despite their considerable military forces in the west, the Sung scored no
notable victories there. A sizable offensive commanded by Wu Hsi, his only
offensive, was launched in the summer of 1206. It was an ill-timed assault on
the Yen-ch’uan garrison, and Wu’s forces were ultimately routed by Wan-yen
Wang-hsi. After regrouping, Wu Hsi led fifty thousand men against the strate-
gically vital Ch’in-chou (on the south bank of the Wei River, about 150 miles
west of Chin-held Ch’ang-an [Hsi-an]). Although the Chin were probably out-
numbered, the Sung forces made a poor showing and were forced to retreat.106
Later that summer, the Sung commissioner Ch’eng Sung personally directed an
offensive to capture the Fang-shan Plain, a hotly contested area subordinate to
Feng-hsiang. Chin forces prevailed here too, and they followed up their victory
by capturing the Ho-shang Plain. This Chin victory opened the Sung’s west-
ern flank to enemy attack; before long, the prefecture of Hsi-ho-chou, scarcely
sixty miles from Wu Hsi’s base at Hsing-chou2, was being attacked. The Sung
response was inexplicably weak. Even the Chin strike against T’ung-ch’ing,
a scant thirty miles from Hsing-chou2, did not provoke a counterattack. By
fall 1206, Wu Hsi had clearly withdrawn active support for the war effort and
meticulously tried to avoid any serious engagement with the enemy, allowing
Chin forces to overrun much of Li-chou circuit. Wu’s reluctance to fight, in
turn, immobilized his superior, Ch’eng Sung, who relied heavily upon him to
provide both manpower and arms.
The reason for Wu Hsi’s reluctance to fight the Chin cannot be easily
assessed; official accounts are uniformly unsympathetic to him. Yet to assume,
as do traditional historians, that he had always harbored seditious aims ignores
his contribution to the midsummer offensive. The investment of fifty thousand
men, the backbone of his army, in one assault at Ch’in-chou can hardly be
dismissed as a token gesture, even if it was repulsed. At some point during
or before the war, circumstances had forced Wu Hsi to reassess his role in the
geopolitical struggle between the Sung and the Chin. Perhaps, after initially
engaging Chin armies, he simply realized that he could not defeat them.
Perhaps he wanted to avoid high-risk conflict and preserve his army and his
command by taking a low-risk defensive posture in the mountainous terrain of
northern Szechwan. Maybe tensions emerged between him and either his local
superior, Ch’eng Sung, or the remote Sung court, leaving Wu Hsi disillusioned.
By the end of 1206, Chin forces had defeated Sung armies from Ch’in-chou
in the west to Ch’u-chou in the east. The greatest blow to the Sung came on
106 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, pp. 276–7.
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the lunar new year in 1207, when Wu Hsi renounced his fealty to the Sung and
accepted Chin ennoblement as Prince of Shu. He adopted his own reign title
and elevated his palace at Hsing-chou2 to an imperial residence. According
to Chin records, the astonishing coup was brought about through simple
bribery.107 Yet Wu Hsi may have switched sides to stem the further advance
of Chin forces into his area of control. The Chin had already seized Ho-shang
Pass and were beginning assaults on Ch’eng-chou to the northwest of Hsing-
chou2 and Feng-chou to the northeast. Chin forces had also begun to besiege
Chieh-chou, Hsi-ho-chou, T’ung-ch’ing, and Feng-chou. These prefectures,
surrendered to the Chin by Wu Hsi, provided an important foothold in Sung
territory in the northwest. Chin control over these four prefectures also formed
a convenient cluster around Hsing-chou2 and made it easy for Chin to contain
Wu Hsi, should he, through inflated ambition or recklessness, choose to turn
on his new patrons. The Chin had good reason for concern about the ambitions
of Szechwan’s overlord. Soon after betraying the Sung, Wu Hsi had promised
to join forces with the Chin in a major offensive against the Sung, one that
would focus on the strategically important Hsiang-yang (in Hupei) on the Han
River.108 Already under siege for over a month and vastly outnumbered by
the enemy, Hsiang-yang looked certain to crumble under such heavy pressure.
Fortunately for the Sung, the crisis caused by Wu Hsi’s defection and the loss
of the court’s control over Szechwan would soon be resolved by further regional
political upheavals in Szechwan, which would result in new pressures on Chin
in the west.
Wu Hsi’s extended absence from Szechwan prior to 1201 had limited his
ability to quickly create strong bonds with subordinates and keep these men in
line. During the crisis, Wu Hsi had to contend with several regional military
leaders, including An Ping (d. 1221), a former prote´ge´ of Wu T’ing and the
military intendant of Ta-an commandery, about thirty miles south of Hsing-
chou2. After his break with the Sung, Wu Hsi invited An Ping to serve
as his senior chief councilor. Whether An Ping accepted is not known. The
reward of office does not seem to have swayed him, and he was to prove
thoroughly duplicitous in his later dealings both with Wu Hsi and with the
Sung court.109 Another potential foe whom Wu Hsi needed to win over was his
erstwhile superior Ch’eng Sung. Wu Hsi had betrayed him at the close of 1206
by reneging on a promise to join in the defense of Feng-chou. Nevertheless,
Ch’eng Sung had accepted a post under Wu Hsi in his new Szechwan regime,
but he did so only under duress, trapped between the Jurchen to the north and
107 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 279.
108 SS 475, p. 13813; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4257.
109 SS 38, p. 744; 402, pp. 12189, 12195, 12198.
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Wu Hsi to the south. He was a prisoner, unable to flee to Sung-held territory.
Wu Hsi could not be sure of Ch’eng’s loyalty, especially in light of Ch’eng’s
close ties to the Sung court as one-time executive at the Bureau of Military
Affairs. Wu Hsi’s arrangement with Ch’eng did not endure, and he impatiently
ordered Ch’eng Sung’s assassination. Unwittingly, Wu Hsi’s actions triggered
a coup that would lead to his own death.110
Before the order to kill Ch’eng Sung had been given, a conspiracy against Wu
Hsi had been hatched by two men, Yang Chu¨-yu¨an (d. 1207), a minor inspector
of military supplies at Hsing-chou2, and Li Hao-i (d. 1207), a commander
there. It seems that both were motivated by loyalty to the Sung, but Wu Hsi’s
stinginess in sharing the spoils may also have alienated them.111 Whatever
their motives, Yang Chu¨-yu¨an and Li Hao-i moved quickly to mobilize military
support. They established a liaison with the intended assassin of Ch’eng Sung,
Li Kuei, from early on. Having additionally won the assent of An Ping, the two
mutineers led a small contingent of seventy men under the cover of darkness
to Wu Hsi’s “imperial residence” at Hsing-chou2. A thousand guards were
reportedly assigned to the palace, but they were neutralized by instructions
from An Ping. Trapped in his bedchamber, Wu Hsi was seized and decapitated;
as a further humiliation his corpse was cut in half at the waist. Only forty-one
days after its official inauguration, the “Shu government” ceased to exist. Upon
learning of Wu Hsi’s death, the people of Hsing-chou2 are said to have rejoiced
to the point of “shaking Heaven and Earth.” The head of Wu Hsi was hung in
the marketplace as a grim reminder of the risks of duplicity. Wu Hsi’s wife,
close relatives, and supporters were all put to the sword.
The assassination of Wu Hsi was planned and carried out by members
of the military establishment in northern Szechwan, apparently without any
involvement by the Sung court. In fact, Han T’o-chou had only recently written
to Wu Hsi with offers of Sung ennoblement, in an effort to outbid the Chin for
Wu’s loyalty.112 Yet Wu’s attempt to gain full autonomy and his subsequent
assassination underscored, if nothing else, the inability of the Sung court to
control men and events in distant Szechwan. Over the next months, the Sung
court would handle the Szechwan situation with extreme care, seeking to
strengthen its own hand without inciting the regional power brokers who
could easily undo everything. The court dismissed Ch’eng Sung for failing to
control Wu Hsi and replaced him with Yang Fu, the prefect of Ch’eng-tu. Yang
110 On the coup against Wu Hsi, see SS 402, pp. 12189, 12194–6, 12198–9; 475, pp. 13813–14; HTC
(1958) 158, pp. 4260–1.
111 SS 402, p. 12194.
112 SS 402, p. 12189; 475, p. 13813; Liu, Hsu¨ Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, p. 10b;
Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, pp. 4b–5b.
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Fu had years of service in the west and possessed an uncompromised loyalty to
the Sung court. He seemed the ideal choice as pacification commissioner.113
For additional control, the court named a special imperial commissioner for
Szechwan and appointed the impeccably credentialed Hsu¨ I (1170–1219).
Hsu¨, first in the chin-shih list of 1199, was also, by no coincidence, a native
of Chien-chou2, near Ch’eng-tu. More than a reliable civilian official, he was
familiar with the region and commanded local respect as a distinguished degree
holder.114 After dismissing Ch’eng Sung, the court might have moved against
another prominent Szechwan leader, An Ping. Instead, the court promoted him
from military intendant to assistant pacification commissioner of Szechwan.
An Ping had been given Wu Hsi’s old post. This controversial decision may
well have been in reward for An Ping’s collaboration in Wu Hsi’s overthrow.
It seems the Sung court had very few options. Having inherited much of Wu
Hsi’s military machine, An Ping was too powerful to challenge outright.
An Ping’s elevation to assistant pacification commissioner was no guarantee
of his loyalty; neither would the appointments of Yang Fu and Hsu¨ I provide
fail-proof checks. Developments after the coup only underscored how danger-
ously autonomous the west had become. In April 1207, Li Hao-i, a former
conspirator in the overthrow of Wu Hsi, retook Hsi-ho-chou, followed by
Ch’eng-chou, Chieh-chou, Feng-chou, and the Ta-san Pass. All territory ceded
to the Chin by Wu Hsi had been regained and was now nominally controlled
by the Sung. Chin forces, caught off guard, retreated north with unexpected
haste. The success so intoxicated Szechwan leaders that Li Hao-i went on
the offensive, attacking Ch’in-chou, the Chin border town that Wu Hsi had
attacked the previous summer in 1206. The campaign helped to invigorate
Sung armies and won Li Hao-i an appointment as assistant commandant of
Hsing-chou2 and later as prefect of Hsi-ho-chou. Yet at the moment of these
successes, the military leaders in Szechwan began to turn on one another.
Within months, mutiny erupted. Coalitions formed within the Hsing-
chou2 military establishment following the demise of Wu Hsi began to break
apart. After the overthrow of Wu Hsi, some factions within the Szechwan
leadership had acquiesced to a tenuous cooperation under An Ping, but Li
Hao-i’s prominent role in the overthrow, and his recent military victories,
fostered dangerous rivalries. Commanders Wang Hsi and Liu Ch’ang-kuo
turned against the increasingly powerful Li Hao-i. Wang Hsi had never been
on good terms with Li Hao-i, and the enmity between them was now so
strong that Wang Hsi had Li Hao-i poisoned by Liu Ch’ang-kuo. To the Sung
court this revenge killing was a senseless act, depriving them of a prized
113 HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4258–9, 4262.
114 SS 406, pp. 12267–71; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4262.
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commander at a difficult time. The execution of Wang Hsi would have been
appropriate punishment; instead, the Sung court only transferred Wang Hsi to
be commandant for eastern Ching-hu North.115 Apparently too intimidated
by Wang’s military power to act more decisively, the court had to be content
with simply removing him from Szechwan.
Within two weeks of Li Hao-i’s death, another prominent commander met a
violent end. Yang Chu¨-yu¨an, as a minor supplies inspector, had masterminded
and carried out the coup against Wu Hsi, yet court honors seem not to have
adequately recognized his contributions. While An Ping, Li Hao-i, and even
the treacherous Wang Hsi had won prestigious appointments, Yang Chu¨-yu¨an
was only promoted to military consultant to the pacification commissioner, a
paltry reward for a leading rebel suppressor. Yang Chu¨-yu¨an may well have
attributed such parsimony to An Ping, for tensions between the two had
heightened soon after Wu Hsi’s assassination, prompting An Ping to question
Yang’s loyalty. In a clever move to discredit Yang Chu¨-yu¨an, An Ping secretly
ordered him to execute a disfavored commander charged with cowardice in
the defense of the Ta-san Pass. This order seemed to be a test of Yang Chu¨-
yu¨an’s loyalty and Yang had to act, yet in so doing his reputation suffered.
Yang’s dissatisfaction with Szechwan’s military leadership was well known,
and his participation in a second notable execution gave an impression of
uncontrolled ambition. An Ping quickly had Yang Chu¨-yu¨an arrested and
then informed the Sung court of Yang’s suicide. Despite An Ping’s efforts to
cast the dead man as a rebel, Commissioner in Chief Yang Fu and others were
not easily deceived.116 The Sung court was warned by Yang Fu and others
against further indulging An Ping’s lawlessness, but Han T’o-chou turned a
deaf ear. He could not risk the dangerous vacuum certain to accompany any
further significant restructuring of the Szechwan leadership. Instead, An Ping
was promoted to grand military commissioner in chief.
Admittedly, An Ping had played a critical role in eliminating Wu Hsi and
restoring Sung authority in the west. Although he never betrayed the court’s
trust, he still acted out of arrogance and self-interest. Many died at his hands
or those of his agents. Yang Chu¨-yu¨an was the victim of his superior’s jealousy
and suspicion; like Li Hao-i, a rival to An Ping, Yang was too successful
for his own good. His elimination served An Ping’s personal interests, and
perhaps even the short-term interests of a distant Sung court concerned with
survival and stability, rather than with the long-term interests of the dynasty.
Loyalist soldiers in Szechwan reportedly broke into tears at learning of the
death of Yang Chu¨-yu¨an. His and Li Hao-i’s valor had inspired countless
115 SS 402, pp. 12200–1; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4264–6.
116 SS 402, pp. 12190, 12196–8; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4264–5.
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troops. The intrigue and turmoil surrounding their deaths must have taken
its toll on morale. The consolidation of military power under An Ping did
not strengthen the western front, as might be expected, for the emerging
atmosphere of suspicion, treachery, intimidation, and alienation left Szechwan
divided within and vulnerable from outside.
the coup in lin-an
Within a month of its official launch in the summer of 1206, the Sung offensive
against the Chin in the east had degenerated into a humiliating retreat. The
Chin had begun their own advance in late autumn, in some places pushing
ninety miles into Sung territory. Still, the Chin were unable to establish a firm
foothold in the south. Sung armies, under the command of Pi Tsai-yu¨ along
the coast and Commissioner Chao Fang (d. 1221) in the central border regions,
defended their territory with a dogged determination absent earlier when they
had fought on unfamiliar terrain. In the west, Chin forces all too easily sur-
rendered territory acquired through the Wu Hsi defection. Having unwisely
committed up to three hundred thousand men in the protracted sieges of
Ch’u-chou, Hsiang-yang, and Te-an, the Chin had precious few reserves for
deployment in the west, and Wu Hsi was assassinated before the Chin could
consolidate their new holdings in northern Szechwan.117 At the same time,
Sung-affiliated armies in Szechwan, aggressive in recovering lost territory,
seemed powerless to expand their limited defensive success into a more gen-
eral offensive. Sung and Chin forces continued to clash throughout much of
1207, yet neither side could claim the upper hand. Fighting gave way to
negotiation.
Already in late 1206, the Sung court had initiated peace overtures, autho-
rizing the general commander for the eastern flank, Ch’iu Ch’ung, to approach
Pu-sa K’uei (var. P’u-san K’uei, d. 1207), Chin commander for the central Huai
region.118 The proposed Chin terms were harsh: reducing the diplomatic sta-
tus of Sung to vassal state of Chin, increasing the annual tribute paid to Chin,
and surrendering the culprit responsible for starting the fighting.119 The Chin
were negotiating from a position of strength, and their initial demands were
excessive. The Sung broke off negotiations. Toward year’s end, with Wu Hsi’s
defection to the Chin already certain, Pu-sa K’uei had dispatched his own
envoy, Han Yu¨an-ching, to the camp of Ch’iu Ch’ung. The envoy, reputedly
a descendant of Han Ch’i and thus a distant younger cousin of Han T’o-chou,
117 HTC (1958) 158, p. 4261.
118 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 278. Only Chin shih attributes the initiative to the Sung court.
119 HTC (1958) 157, p. 4249.
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pleaded for a peace pact with the Sung on the personal grounds that the
current conflict had made protection of their common Han family ancestral
tombs at Hsiang-chou2 exceedingly difficult.120 Han Yu¨an-ching never met
his cousin in person, but the Sung court ordered Ch’iu Ch’ung to conduct
negotiations at the border. These efforts proved inconclusive. The Chin were
insistent upon imposing some sort of punitive ransom, and the Sung were
adamant in refusing.
Negotiations resumed in late spring 1207, when the Sung dispatched Fang
Hsin-ju (1177–1222) to K’ai-feng, where he met with Councilor of the Left
Wan-yen Ch’ung-ho (d. 1207). The Chin, sensing that the Sung court was
desperate for a pact, toughened their demands: new territorial concessions and
an unacceptably large increase in annual tribute. They also demanded, for the
first time quite specifically, the head of Han T’o-chou. In summer and early
fall, Fang Hsin-ju made three trips north. Ch’iu Ch’ung had, by this time, been
replaced as chief commander of the eastern flank by Chang Yen, a concurrent
assistant councilor and Bureau of Military Affairs executive.121 It was Chang
Yen who advised Fang Hsin-ju, and the two appear intentionally to have kept
Han T’o-chou uninformed about specific Chin demands. These were divulged
to Han T’o-chou only when Fang Hsin-ju returned in defeat to Lin-an, in late
September. A furious Han T’o-chou not only dismissed the envoy but also had
Chang Yen removed from his border command.
By this time, Han T’o-chou had become isolated at court. This isolation had
its roots in dismissals made in summer 1206, when he had begun impulsively
to replace military leaders who had failed to achieve victories. Teng Yu-lung
(chin-shih 1172), a former censor serving as special commissioner for the Huai
region, was dismissed after only three months, his defeats being too numerous.
A similar reason had been given for the dismissal of the chief commander of
Chien-k’ang, Li Shuang, and the assistant commander for the Ching-hsi North
circuit, Huang-fu Pin. The records show that both had fought valiantly and
won praise from their fellow commanders, but Han T’o-chou it seems was
more concerned with the final outcome than with the special circumstances
of particular battles.122 Wang Ta-chieh’s offensive against Ts’ai-chou (also in
Ching-hsi North) had also been courageously fought, yet defeat resulted in his
banishment to Ling-nan (in modern Kwangtung province), on the southern
fringes of Sung civilization. For the same reason, Li Ju-i, chief commander for
Huai-nan West, was also banished. Thus, early on in the war, Han T’o-chou had
120 SS 398, p. 12112; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 93, pp. 2067–71; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4253.
121 On these negotiations, see SS 395, pp. 12059–62; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 93, pp. 2072–80; HTC (1958)
158, pp. 4262, 4266–9.
122 HTC (1958) 157, pp. 4251–64.
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brought about a sweeping reorganization of military commands. By abruptly
entrusting military leadership to inexperienced officials, Han T’o-chou came
to appear impulsive and unpredictable.
Han T’o-chou’s increasing isolation also resulted from his calculated removal
of once trusted supporters. He had assisted Su Shih-tan, a longtime associate,
in rising to the post of general recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military
Affairs in 1201 and subsequently an audience commandant.123 Yet the prote´ge´
was not popular within the bureaucracy, and he was denounced as blatantly
corrupt. As war fortunes began to dip, Han T’o-chou distanced himself from
Su Shih-tan and appeared to be blaming the entire policy on Su, a once vocal
advocate of aggression. To appease critics while absolving himself of respon-
sibility, Han T’o-chou permitted Su Shih-tan to be stripped of official status,
banished to distant Shao-chou2, and further humiliated by official confiscation
of his family property.124 Such scapegoating must have left other of his asso-
ciates apprehensive. Equally unsettling was Fang Hsin-ju’s return to Lin-an.
The emissary to Chin had been unsuccessful in negotiations, and speculation
arose that an angry Han T’o-chou planned to break the diplomatic impasse
by escalating the fighting. This brought one-time supporters and neutral ele-
ments at court into an alliance that spelled doom for Han T’o-chou. Central
to this alliance was Shih Mi-yu¨an (1164–1233).
A native of Ming-chou, modern Ning-po, Shih Mi-yu¨an was the third son of
Shih Hao, Hsiao-tsung’s trusted tutor and chief minister.125 During Han T’o-
chou’s twelve years of dominance, Shih Mi-yu¨an had risen from legal examiner
at the High Court of Justice to vice-minister of rites. His ascent to power,
uncommonly smooth for the time, stems partly from the goodwill of Chief
Councilor Ching T’ang; yet Ching’s death in 1200 had no noticeable effect
upon Shih Mi-yu¨an’s further advancement. Shih was apparently quite skillful
at avoiding confrontation by steering a clear path through politically troubled
waters. His attitude toward the Tao-hsu¨eh movement, much like his father’s,
was conveniently ambiguous, and this probably explains his political survival
during the purges of the early Ning-tsung era. In 1205, by which time he
was already well entrenched in the bureaucracy, he offered his first known
criticism of Han T’o-chou.126 In a carefully worded memorial, he labeled the
war policy venturesome. Shih Mi-yu¨an stressed the importance of defending
123 On Su Shih-tan, see SS 38, p. 741; 398, pp. 12107–8, 12115; 474, pp. 13774–7; HTC (1958) 156,
pp. 4197, 4210; 157, pp. 4229, 4243–4; 158, p. 4271.
124 SS 398, p. 12107–8.
125 On Shih Mi-yu¨an, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 81–117; SS 414, pp. 12415–18; Yu¨an
Chu¨eh, Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih (1320; Taipei, 1978) 5, pp. 10b–12a; Tai Mei et al., Hsin-hsiu Yin-hsien
chih [Academia Sinica, Fu Ssu-nien ed.] (n.p., 1877) 14, pp. 26b–34a.
126 Yang Shih-ch’i, Li-tai ming-ch’en tsou-i (1416; Taipei, 1964) 235, p. 6a.
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the south and protecting the lives of its tens of millions. He never mentioned
Han T’o-chou by name, never exploited this policy difference to denounce the
chief policy maker, and never protested government actions by withdrawing
from office. Han T’o-chou apparently appreciated the courtesy, for Shih Mi-
yu¨an was subsequently enfeoffed as Baron of Yin county. Policy differences
notwithstanding, there is no evidence of personal animosity or political tension
between Shih Mi-yu¨an and Han T’o-chou. The former typified the neutral
element at court, namely, individuals who had long cooperated with Han’s
administration, but now, under new and unbearable pressures, felt compelled
to act against its leader.
In 1206, Assistant Councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu resigned. He had never
been enthusiastic about the war policy and resigned as the policy’s disastrous
outcome became increasingly apparent. Resuming responsibilities in spring
1207, Ch’ien did so with no confidence in Han T’o-chou. Li Pi, a fellow
assistant councilor, had from the outset proposed inciting the Chin to war
and responding in full force instead of initiating hostilities on foreign soil,
as the court planned. This would have lent greater legitimacy to the Sung
court’s cause and augmented popular support.127 Li’s counsel was rejected;
nevertheless, he supported the war cause, until Han T’o-chou threatened an
escalation of the fighting.
Action by the disaffected officials came on the morning of the twenty-fourth
day of the eleventh month in 1207. En route to court and reportedly frazzled
after a long night of drink and merriment, Han T’o-chou was intercepted at
the Sixth Platoon Bridge, within the walls of the imperial city and near an
audience chamber. Palace Guard commander Hsia Chen, in the company of
several hundred elite guardsmen, informed him of an imperial rescript order-
ing his dismissal. Permitting no more than a brief curse from their victim,
Hsia Chen’s men dragged Han T’o-chou outside the wall of the imperial city
to the Yu¨-chin Garden, where they bludgeoned him to death.128 The assas-
sination was unprecedented. Civility had been the hallmark of Sung politics,
and contemporaries took pride in the unique Sung tradition of venerating
scholar-officials. Chief ministers might suffer banishment for improper con-
duct or misguided policies, but never had a chief minister been assassinated
while in office. Worse yet, enacting this brutal scenario in the emperor’s own
precincts suggested complicity at the highest levels.
127 On their views, see SS 398, pp. 12107–8; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4236.
128 For a more thorough treatment, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 84–92. Also see Liu, Hsu¨
Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, pp. 11a–12a; Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967)
i 10, pp. 6b–10a; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1291; Peking, 1983) 3, pp. 45–52; SS 243, pp. 8656–7;
HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4269–71.
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It is difficult given the plethora of contradictory sources to understand the
major events surrounding Han T’o-chou’s assassination. Shih Mi-yu¨an undeni-
ably played an important role in the conspiracy, and he certainly reaped great
political benefit from Han T’o-chou’s demise. Many sources have portrayed
him as chief conspirator.129 But these sources ignore the issue of motive. Shih
Mi-yu¨an’s only grievance against Han T’o-chou related to war policy. In the
absence of evidence to suggest personal or even professional conflict between
the two, it is doubtful that he was powerful enough to inspire such a dangerous
act. A far more likely suspect is Empress Yang2 (Yang Mei-tzu, 1162–1232).
Tensions between Han T’o-chou and Ning-tsung’s second empress can be
traced to Empress Yang2’s installation. Han T’o-chou’s niece, Empress Han,
had died in 1200, three years after the death of his influential aunt, Dowager
Empress Wu. These deaths must have gravely troubled Han T’o-chou, for so
much of his own influence had rested upon the standing of these two women
within the palace. The only empress still alive by late 1200 was Hsiao-tsung’s
third wife, Dowager Empress Hsieh2, an exceedingly servile and politically
detached personality. In the absence of a strong dowager empress to arrange
a marriage, Ning-tsung had the rare privilege of personally selecting a new
spouse. This opportunity did not augur well for Han T’o-chou. Ning-tsung,
at the time, had become enamored with Consort Yang, a woman of humble
birth but many talents, and he elevated her to imperial concubine shortly
before the death of Empress Han. Han T’o-chou must have appreciated that
the native intelligence and self-assertiveness of this commoner-turned-consort
could jeopardize his own dominance, and this prompted him to recommend
a more pliant woman, Lady Ts’ao, to succeed his niece. Two full years passed
before the emperor acted, suggesting tensions over the nomination, but he
ultimately installed his favorite, Empress Yang2, in 1203. Empress Yang2
is said never to have forgiven Han T’o-chou for his interference. Relations
between the two had started off poorly and never improved.130
The Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), while not altogether consistent, does at
times identify Empress Yang2 as a prime mover in the assassination conspiracy.
Empress Yang2 had prompted her twelve-year-old stepson, Chao Hsu¨n (1192–
1220), to appeal to the emperor to end the war. In the summer of 1207 she
offered her own criticisms, a vituperative assessment of court policy and a
personal excoriation of Han T’o-chou.131 She exploited the occasion, so rumor
129 SS 394, p. 12035; 398, p. 12108; 474, pp. 13776–7; Liu, Hsu¨ Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-
chien 16, pp. 6b–7a; Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, p. 28b; Yu¨an, Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih 5, pp. 10b–11a.
130 On conflict between the two, see SS 243, pp. 8656–7; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 3, p. 47; HTC
(1958) 156, p. 4204.
131 Shih Mi-yu¨an may have prodded the child as well, see SS 246, pp. 8734–5.
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has it, to rally bureaucratic support. Through her adopted brother, Yang Tz’u-
shan, she established links with sympathetic officials that drew Shih Mi-yu¨an
and others into the conspiracy. The imperial rescript ordering dismissal for
Han T’o-chou is considered by some to have been her handiwork.132 Later,
Empress Yang2 ordered the public flogging of one of Han T’o-chou’s four
widows, undeniable proof of a deep animosity and of the empress’s contempt
for Han T’o-chou.133
However, other sections of the Sung dynastic history ascribe to the empress
a passive role in the conspiracy and portray Shih Mi-yu¨an as the chief villain.
This conflicting emphasis probably reflects the bias of Yu¨an historians, the
compilers of the Sung shih, who had no great esteem for Shih Mi-yu¨an. Yet
Shih Mi-yu¨an had neither sufficient motive nor the political clout to carry out
this shocking coup alone. Empress Yang2 would continue to prove herself the
most politically astute empress of the Southern Sung, more daring than most
men around her. She would also be remembered as a great patron of the arts and
an accomplished calligrapher.134 Active involvement by an empress in affairs
of state ordinarily evoked official censure, but in this case it did not, perhaps
because she camouflaged her actions with consummate skill and allowed praise
and blame to fall on the men who did her bidding.
A still thornier issue in Han T’o-chou’s assassination is Ning-tsung’s role. By
some accounts, Empress Yang2 and Shih Mi-yu¨an, whether alone or together,
acted entirely on their own and presented an astonished Ning-tsung with a
fait accompli. By other accounts, the emperor ordered the dismissal of Han
T’o-chou, but was uninvolved in his murder. A third position charges that the
emperor issued a secret directive ordering the execution of Han T’o-chou. All
three versions appear in different sections of the Sung dynastic history,135 imply-
ing that historians in the Yu¨an dynasty with access to a wide range of court
documents were unable or unwilling to discern the emperor’s role in the coup.
Near contemporaries of the event tended also to be inconsistent. Historian Li
Hsin-ch’uan (1167–1244) places responsibility for the assassination squarely
upon the shoulders of Ning-tsung. Anecdotist Chou Mi (1232–1308) insists
that the emperor learned of the coup only after the fact.136 But most writers
agree on one point: Ning-tsung, not an original party to the conspiracy, was
taken into confidence only when it was in the process of being carried out.
132 Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 876.
133 Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 877.
134 Wen C. Fong, Beyond representation: Chinese painting and calligraphy, 8th–14th century (New York, 1992),
pp. 234–7.
135 Compare accounts in SS 38, p. 746; 243, p. 8657; 414, p. 12416; 474, pp. 13776–7; also see Davis,
Court and family in Sung China, pp. 89–92.
136 Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 10, pp. 6b–10a; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 3, pp. 45–52.
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Being kept in the dark, if Ning-tsung was, appears not to have troubled the
emperor, for he immediately responded with a generous round of promotions.
Assistant councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu was promoted at the Bureau of Military
Affairs and eventually named chief councilor of the right; Li Pi was advanced
at the same bureau; Vice-Minister of Rites Shih Mi-yu¨an became minister of
rites; Yang Tz’u-shan, advanced from grand marshal to junior guardian, was
enfeoffed as a prince; even the emperor’s adopted son, Chao Hsu¨n, was rewarded
for his precocious advice with installation as heir apparent. Conversely, those
who had been closely associated with Han T’o-chou’s irredentist policies were
uniformly punished. Heading the list was Han’s former instructor, the reviled
Ch’en Tzu-ch’iang, who was exiled to Kuang-chou (Canton). Dismissals also
awaited many lesser officials, but only one other official shared with Han T’o-
chou the ultimate humiliation. Su Shih-tan, a crony who was under banishment
in Kuang-chou, was executed at court order. As for the family of Han T’o-chou,
the court banished his son Han Kung to a distant offshore island.
With new political leadership, the Sung court revived the deadlocked peace
talks with Chin. Their chief envoy was a scholar at the Directorate of Educa-
tion, Wang Nan (1158–1213), grandson of Wang Lun (1084–1144), a former
emissary killed sixty-three years earlier on a mission for Kao-tsung.137 Wang
Nan had initially been dispatched by Han T’o-chou, and the new administra-
tion ordered a second envoy to join him, no doubt with new instructions. The
second envoy was Hsu¨ I, commissioner for Szechwan. Under pressure to strike a
speedy accord, Wang Nan made concessions that his predecessor Fang Hsin-ju
had rejected outright. Wang agreed to increase the Sung court’s annual subsidy
from 250,000 to 300,000 units of account calculated in ounces of silver and
bolts of silk, an unhealthy precedent according to Fang Hsin-ju.138 Wang Nan
and Hsu¨ I also offered the heads of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan, whom the
Chin had previously alleged were the Sung court’s chief instigators of war.139
The Chin dropped their demand for territorial concessions and adjustments in
diplomatic status, but the Sung still had to endure the indignity of the corpse
of its high minister being publicly defiled by the “foreign occupiers” of their
lost northern lands.
The unusual demand for the heads of Han and Su by the Chin seems to
have been less intended to humiliate the Sung than to obtain retribution for
humiliation the Chin themselves had suffered when, following the mutiny by
pro-Sung elements in Szechwan, the head of the Chin confederate Wu Hsi
had been hung on display in the marketplaces of Hsing-chou2 and Lin-an.
137 SS 395, p. 12062; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4268, 4275–8.
138 SS 395, p. 12061.
139 SS 395, p. 12062; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4275.
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The Chin had taken this as a personal insult, and Sung officials interpreted the
Chin request as a matter of injured pride. Before complying, however, the Sung
court ordered the bodies of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan exhumed and their
heads placed on public display. Thoroughly repudiating them at home would
presumably diminish the symbolic impact of shipping their remains north.
Many endorsed the concession. Minister of Personnel Lou Yu¨eh represented
perhaps the majority at court in stating, “The peace negotiations represent
an important matter which awaits only this to be resolved. Why should the
already putrefied heads of treacherous traitors merit our concern?” But others
demurred. Responding to Lou Yu¨eh, the envoy, Wang Nan, retorted, “The
head of Han T’o-chou may not be worthy of our concern, but the empire’s sta-
tus is of concern!”140 Minister of War Ni Ssu decried the act for similar reasons.
Vice-Minister of Imperial Sacrifices Huang Tu portrayed the accommodation
as tantamount to insulting the Sung state. Chen Te-hsiu (1178–1235), a pro-
fessor at the Imperial University, was joined by students in denouncing the
concession as an unprecedented shame.141 Interestingly, Huang Tu and Chen
Te-hsiu, although they had been persecuted under the Tao-hsu¨eh ban, opposed
the posthumous humiliation of their persecutor. They did so in defense of the
empire’s dignity, not on humanitarian grounds nor out of compassion for the
dead individual.
shih mi-yu¨an in power
Compromise and conflict
Although the new peace treaty was crafted by Wang Nan and other on-site
negotiators, responsibility for accepting its controversial terms lay with two
men: Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu, chief councilor and concurrent head of the Bureau of
Military Affairs, and his counterpart as administrator at the Bureau of Military
Affairs, Shih Mi-yu¨an. Whatever their personal feelings about the agreement,
the two wasted no time before implementing it. Three months after exhuming
the bodies of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan, they forwarded the two heads
to the Chin under the escort of Wang Nan. By some accounts, the remains
were hung in a public thoroughfare, then embalmed and stored in a military
warehouse. Others allege that the Chin, considering Han T’o-chou to have
been a loyal official, provided an honorable burial alongside his ancestor Han
140 SS 395, pp. 12047, 12062; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4275.
141 On their views, see Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 878; SS 398, p. 12115; 393, p. 12011;
437, pp. 12957–8; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4281.
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Ch’i.142 Control over Ta-san Pass in the west and Hao-chou in the east, two
areas still in Chin hands in mid-1208, was restored to the Sung.
A new era in Southern Sung politics
The end of war also marked the beginning of a distinctive era in Southern Sung
politics. Under Kuang-tsung, statesmen with ties to the Tao-hsu¨eh movement
and access to influential posts had touched off an impassioned campaign to
promote their political agenda in government, a campaign that ultimately
backfired and facilitated the ascendency of the inner court. The inner court,
led by Han T’o-chou, subsequently launched its own campaigns: first, the inner
court tried to cow Tao-hsu¨eh proponents through proscription and intimida-
tion, and when this failed, they tried to win glory through an ambitious
recovery of the north. Various defeats awaited the more extremist elements
of both groups, for some of the Tao-hsu¨eh supporters were too dogmatic, and
some of the inner palace group too self-serving to create lasting coalitions.
With the restoration of peace in 1208, philosophical hauteur and political
bravado gave way to moderation and compromise as new leaders emerged to
reconcile political divisions.
Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu remained chief councilor through 1208, yet his time
in favor was on the wane. The emperor increasingly placed his confidence
in Shih Mi-yu¨an. This transfer owed something to the special relationship
Shih had developed with Empress Yang2. The coup against Han T’o-chou had
demonstrated the effectiveness of their collaboration. In time, Shih Mi-yu¨an
proved sufficiently assertive to keep the forces of hostile opinion in line, yet he
was sufficiently diplomatic to avoid dangerous confrontation. Such a balance,
a very difficult one to achieve, had completely eluded Han T’o-chou. Also
unlike Han, Shih Mi-yu¨an did not take Empress Yang2’s political astuteness
as a personal threat. She on her side deferred daily administration to him. In
this way, under Shih Mi-yu¨an’s leadership the combination of a weak emperor
and a strong inner court did not create the sort of political tension that had
been so pronounced in the two preceding decades. Further enhancing Shih
Mi-yu¨an’s political stature was his close relationship with the heir apparent.
In his capacities as instructor and, later, as lecturer at the several schools for
imperial princes, Shih Mi-yu¨an came to know Chao Hsu¨n when Chou was a
small child. Upon Chao Hsu¨n’s nomination as heir apparent in 1208, Shih
Mi-yu¨an became his chief advisor and the general supervisor of his household.
142 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 284; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4278; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yu¨ (1983) 3, pp. 45–52;
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 7, p. 10a.
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The throne also honored Shih Mi-yu¨an as junior mentor to the heir, additional
confirmation of its confidence in him. With Ning-tsung long accustomed to
relying heavily upon Han T’o-chou and lesser palace favorites, Shih Mi-yu¨an’s
close ties with the two most powerful palace personalities served him well.
In summer 1208, Shih Mi-yu¨an rose to be assistant councilor and soon
became chief councilor of the right with concurrent authority over the Bureau
of Military Affairs. Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu served briefly as councilor of the left,
but was dismissed by year’s end. Reasons were not given, but the dismissal
appears to have been part of a much broader policy of eliminating holdovers
from the Han T’o-chou administration. Li Pi, another holdover, had already
been dismissed the previous year in 1207. The military commissioner in chief
Yeh Shih similarly was demoted, his irredentist views being fundamentally
at odds with current pacifist policies. Within a year’s time, the purge that
began with Han T’o-chou’s death ended in the elimination of all serious rivals
to Shih Mi-yu¨an, who emerged as the key link between the throne and the
bureaucracy. However, Shih was sufficiently astute not to rely exclusively on
imperial favor. He aggressively courted Tao-hsu¨eh proponents in and away from
the capital, men who had been alienated under the preceding administration,
in the hope of enhancing his image and support within the civil service.
Lin Ta-chung, a former censor persecuted under the Ch’ing-yu¨an ban, was
restored to metropolitan service in 1208 as notary official at the Bureau of Mil-
itary Affairs. Another persecuted censor, Liu Kuang-tsu, returned to Lin-an
as court compiler, his first metropolitan post since 1194. Lu¨ Tsu-t’ai, another
alleged partisan, ended his exile with a prestigious sinecure. Lu¨ unfortunately
soon after died of pneumonia, and an image-conscious Shih Mi-yu¨an com-
missioned the distinguished envoy Wang Nan to accompany the coffin to its
burial place. Two others also persecuted under the old ban, Lou Yu¨eh and
Yang Chien, accepted metropolitan assignments for the first time in a decade.
Yang Chien became vice-minister of war and Lou Yu¨eh assistant councilor.
Posthumous honors were given to many of the deceased. P’eng Kuei-nien,
Chu Hsi, and Chao Ju-yu¨, only partially rehabilitated under Han T’o-chou’s
limited amnesty, received full honors under the new councilor.143
In his long career, Shih Mi-yu¨an’s father, Shih Hao, had recommended many
men for office who later appeared on the list of banned Tao-hsu¨eh partisans,
including Chu Hsi, Yeh Shih, Yang Chien, and Yu¨an Hsieh. Although Shih
Hao had shown respect for Tao-hsu¨eh thinkers and sympathizers, he was not
himself involved in the movement. Shih Mi-yu¨an had inherited from his father
143 On these actions, see SS 393, p. 12016; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43,
p. 15a; SS 455, p. 13372; 395, p. 12047; 407, p. 12290; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4277; SS 429, p. 12758;
392, pp. 11989–90, respectively.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.012
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 18:00:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung 815
a political tradition of nonpartisanship, although the younger Shih had also
developed his own brand of political skills. Shih Mi-yu¨an had matured dur-
ing the time when the Confucian teachings of Lu Chiu-yu¨an (1139–93) (also
known as Lu Hsiang-shan), Chu Hsi’s most compelling rival, had dominated
the intellectual landscape of Shih’s native Ming-chou. Differences between the
two sets of teachings, which originally had seemed uncontentious, became so
sharply articulated and tendentious that the loose, accommodating stance of
Shih Hao and others during the Hsiao-tsung era was not easily sustained in
succeeding reigns. The intellectual pedigree of Shih Mi-yu¨an himself may be
difficult to establish, but it is common knowledge that he and his kinsmen fre-
quently associated with proponents of Lu Chiu-yu¨an’s teachings.144 Although
he lacked any identifiable links to Tao-hsu¨eh, his extension of court honors to
these proponents was apparently intended to create a reputation for himself as
a sponsor of talent, no less than his father, and to symbolically break with the
parochialism and intolerance of the recent past. Shih also appointed men from
his native Ming-chou to several important posts: Lou Yu¨eh, Lin Ta-chung,
Yang Chien, and Yu¨an Hsieh. These men were not simply fellow provincials
sharing common interests, but were also respected thinkers sympathetic to, but
strictly speaking not adherents of, Tao-hsu¨eh. They were men who enhanced
the intellectual diversity of the metropolitan bureaucracy and helped Shih
deny any one group unchallenged supremacy. Shih Mi-yu¨an’s refusal, in the
face of considerable pressure, to officially endorse Chu Hsi’s commentaries on
the Four Books (Analects, Mencius, Chung-yung, and Ta-hsu¨eh) or to honor the
founders of the Tao-hsu¨eh movement in the Temple of Confucius, demonstrates
his initial commitment to maintaining intellectual diversity.145
Restoration of peace and the veneration of learning, the hallmarks of Shih
Mi-yu¨an’s early years in power, rapidly earned him the confidence of the throne.
When Shih’s mother died within a month of his elevation to councilor, this
event should have entailed Shih’s resignation from office and three years of
mourning. Yet although Shih did return home, he stayed for only five months
before the emperor interceded, in early 1209, waiving the mourning obligation
and recalling Shih Mi-yu¨an to office.146 In his absence, Ning-tsung had refused
to appoint an interim councilor and probably relied heavily upon Assistant
Councilor Lou Yu¨eh, a man with close ties to Shih Mi-yu¨an. Upon returning
to Lin-an, Shih received a handsome official residence, a sign that the emperor
intended him to stay awhile. Shih Mi-yu¨an held onto the councilorship for
nearly twenty-five years, the longest uninterrupted tenure in Sung history.
144 Huang et al., Sung Yu¨an hsu¨eh-an 74.
145 HTC (1958) 159, p. 4309.
146 HTC (1958) 158, p. 4288.
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Although he began as a popular executive, Shih Mi-yu¨an quickly acquired a
growing chorus of critics. Minister of War Ni Ssu was among the more acrid of
these early detractors. A precocious scholar who had gained the chin-shih when
he was only nineteen and the prestigious Erudite Literatus degree at thirty-two,
Ni Ssu was a prolific writer and one-time professor at the Imperial University.
Dismissed during Han T’o-chou’s administration for his criticism of policies,
Ni Ssu had returned to the capital after Han’s death only to find the one-man
dominance he had denounced was now revived under a new favorite, Shih Mi-
yu¨an. Ni Ssu was alarmed at Shih Mi-yu¨an’s growing authority; even before
Shih’s advancement to chief councilor, Shih would replace key officials without
consulting or even informing the senior councilor, Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu – a tactic
formerly employed by Han T’o-chou to undermine the bureaucratic chain of
command. Signs of nepotism by Shih in appointing close associates or relatives
to prominent posts all pointed to political realignment and consolidation, and
provided yet another bone of contention.147 Ni Ssu also complained about
the government’s humiliating concessions to Chin. Differences between the
two men were so great that Ni Ssu requested a reassignment away from the
capital. Ni Ssu’s conflicts with bureaucratic chiefs dated back to Chou Pi-ta and
Chao Ju-yu¨, reflecting his unusually testy character. Were he alone in casting
aspersions on Shih Mi-yu¨an, he might have been dismissed as pugnacious and
eccentric. He was not alone.
Less acidic but equally ruffled by Shih Mi-yu¨an were Wei Liao-weng and
Chen Te-hsiu. Wei and Chen, who had both passed the chin-shih examination of
1199 at the height of Han T’o-chou’s persecution of Tao-hsu¨eh partisans, served
together as editors at the Palace Library, subordinates of the then vice-director
Shih Mi-yu¨an. The two had differed sharply with Han T’o-chou over policy,
but nevertheless at first served under him. Wei Liao-weng, a native of Szech-
wan, appears to have been more negatively disposed toward Shih Mi-yu¨an,
which prompted him to decline metropolitan appointments for some seventeen
years.148 Chen Te-hsiu tended to be more accommodating, although he was no
less disillusioned with Shih Mi-yu¨an, especially regarding foreign policy. The
peace concessions of 1208, in Chen’s view, had only increased the possibility
of future conflict, since implicit signs of Sung weakness would invite more
enemy exploitation. Chen Te-hsiu also opposed the emerging trend of military
retrenchment, which undermined the empire’s preparedness for war. Over-
all, Chen believed that Shih Mi-yu¨an’s foreign policy was excessively naive,
and that in handling civil officials, Shih was disrespectful and manipulative
147 SS 398, pp. 12113–16; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4274–5, 4280–1; Wei Liao-weng, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta
ch’u¨an-chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1249; Taipei, 1979) 85, pp. 1a–12b.
148 SS 437, pp. 12965–71.
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by controlling bureaucrats through strict apportionment of their rank and
salary.149 This manipulation implied political intolerance, and an unwilling-
ness to acknowledge the contributions of his colleagues. More personally, Chen
Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-weng, both Tao-hsu¨eh sympathizers, resented Shih Mi-
yu¨an’s resistance to officially endorsing the movement’s teachings. These fun-
damentally different views of governing prompted Chen Te-hsiu from time to
time to withdraw from metropolitan service, yet he generally stayed on, opti-
mistically hoping to have some influence, however modest, on border policy
and other decision making.
Other prominent statesmen who expressed similar concerns left the capital
voluntarily or involuntarily. Hsu¨ I, who had assisted Wang Nan in negotiating
the recent peace treaty with Chin, criticized the emperor’s special treatment
toward Yang Tz’u-shan and Shih Mi-yu¨an, a protest that resulted in Hsu¨’s
reassignment away from the capital. Regional transfer also awaited Ts’ai Yu-
hsu¨eh, a once-persecuted Tao-hsu¨eh proponent whose reservations about the
new administration closely resembled those of Chen Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-
weng. Yu¨an Hsieh presents a parallel case: a victim of the Tao-hsu¨eh ban and
politically rehabilitated under Shih Mi-yu¨an, he subsequently was pressured
to leave the capital. He too had denounced the controversial peace pact.150
Some such critics were demoted or retired by censorial indictment, and others
left of their own volition. Most officials, however, were like Chen Te-hsiu,
who remained in Lin-an, despite the challenges of swaying someone who often
seemed indifferent. For his part, Shih Mi-yu¨an was for most of his tenure toler-
ant of his critics, not vindictive or arbitrary like Han T’o-chou. Although there
were some important resignations, no mass exodus from government service
occurred. By monopolizing imperial favor and administrative authority, Shih
did not silence so much as frustrate his critics, ushering in an era characterized
by administrative efficiency yet lacking innovation and adaptability.
Foreign policy
The extraordinary duration of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s tenure does not imply uneventful
tranquility. On the contrary, these years from 1208 to 1233 represent some
of the most tumultuous of the Southern Sung, a time of profound political,
economic, and social change. Nowhere is this upheaval more apparent than
in foreign affairs. Previously, the only menace to the Sung had come from the
149 SS 437, pp. 12957–65; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4281; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung
wen-chi 2, pp. 1a–7b.
150 On these criticisms, see SS 406, p. 12269; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4276; Wei, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta
ch’u¨an-chi 69, p. 14b.
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Jurchen Chin. The Tangut–Hsi Hsia kingdom in the northwest shared no
common border with the Southern Sung and had not engaged Chin armies in
over eighty years. As for the Chin, it maintained friendly tributary relations
with the Hsi Hsia and with Koryo˘. Although Chin occasionally came into
conflict with the Sung, their two recent wars had lasted scarcely two years and
had no significant effect upon the balance of power. For several generations,
the two sides had known mostly peace, a situation that did little to enhance
the preparedness of their armies. With no one state able to impose its military
will upon the others, the three states came to accept the political division while
enjoying general stability. This accommodation, revived somewhat after the
Sung-Chin conflict in 1208, was now shattered by the Mongols. Sweeping
across central and northern Asia, they began pillaging the Hsi Hsia border
in spring 1209. Hsi Hsia, a Chin tributary state, turned to the Jurchen for
assistance. The Chin refused, fearing Mongol retaliation, but in the process
incited the embittered Hsi Hsia to open hostilities against Chin, a war that
benefited no one more than the Mongols.
The Chin, having already provoked Chinggis khan (Temu¨jin) by supporting
rival tribes in Mongolia against him, desperately sought neutrality in the
expanding Tangut-Mongol contest. They had only recently concluded war
with the Sung, and Emperor Chang-tsung, who died at the close of 1208,
bequeathed his throne to the half-witted seventh son of Shih-tsung, Prince
Wei (r. 1208–13). Bandits in Shantung continued to make mischief with
local authorities, while severe drought and continued famine in 1210 strained
the resources of the government. The Chin simply could not risk war with
the Mongols. Yet if they considered neutrality a means of preserving peace,
they were tragically mistaken. The Mongols moved with unanticipated speed
and, within a year, began raiding the northern Chin border. With the formal
commencement of hostilities in 1211, the Chin found themselves fending
off two enemies, the Tanguts and the Mongols. Over the next two years, the
Mongol inroads into Chin territory were such that the Mongols were able to
lay siege to the Chin capital at Chung-tu (modern Peking), a grave political as
well as economic challenge. The initial Mongol thrust had concentrated on the
Chin Western Capital Hsi-ching (Ta-t’ung, in northern Shansi province), and
it soon extended east as far as central Pei-ching circuit (Peking) and south into
Ho-tung North (central Shansi) and Ho-pei West (central Hopei province).151
Chin armies, despite their numerical superiority, were outmatched. In addition
151 On these developments, see T’o-t’o, Chin shih 13; SS 39; HTC (1958) 159; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung
Meng (Yu¨an) kuan-hsi shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 1–17; H. Desmond Martin, The rise of Chingis Khan
and his conquest of north China (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 113–54; Thomas J. Barfield, The perilous frontier:
Nomadic empires and China (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 197–202.
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to the extraordinary martial prowess of their horsemen, the Mongols had an
unbeatable strategy. In wars against the Sung, the Chin armies had proven most
effective when they overwhelmed the Sung with massive attacks against a few
strategic areas, creating a shock that often paralyzed the defenders. In contrast,
the Mongols preferred to scatter their armies and conduct a large number of
smaller campaigns. This diminished the risk of large, decisive battles, while
helping to identify and exploit the enemy’s vulnerable points. The Chin could
not develop a suitable defense.
The defeats inflicted by invading cavalry were made more painful by the
increasing instability of Chin internal politics. Incompetent as he was unpop-
ular, the Chin ruler Prince Wei, Wei Chao Wang (r. 1209–13), responded
to the ever closer Mongol assaults with self-imposed isolation, which in turn
sparked mass hysteria in the capital. In the summer of 1213, Prince Wei was
assassinated in a coup led by a highly decorated veteran of the K’ai-hsi war and
now assistant supreme commander, Ho-she-li Chih-chung. Ho-she-li installed
the elder brother of Chang-tsung as the emperor, Chin Hsu¨an-tsung (r. 1213–
23). Many military and civilian leaders resented the domination of Ho-she-li
Chih-chung, and some even suspected him of conspiring to usurp the throne
himself; within months, Ho-she-li Chih-chung was assassinated. This assas-
sination coincided precisely with the Mongol encirclement of Chung-tu. The
summer assault on Chung-tu was so frightful that to forestall a mass exo-
dus the Chin government prohibited all males from leaving the city. A Sung
embassy within thirty miles of the capital was ordered to return south, without
delivering its precious tribute. The siege lasted three months and effectively
made Chin Hsu¨an-tsung a prisoner in his own capital. When the Mongols
withdrew at the beginning of 1214, the Chin paid them with offerings of
servants, horses, gold, and silk.152 This withdrawal gave Chin Hsu¨an-tsung
an opportunity to flee his vulnerable capital. When he did this in the summer
of 1214, he angered the Mongols, who resumed hostilities. Chung-tu fell to
them the next spring.
Developments in the north moved with such astounding speed that the
Sung court and Shih Mi-yu¨an in particular were unable to develop a coherent
response. Despite widespread chaos in the north, the Sung remained unrelent-
ingly loyal to its commitment to pay biannual tribute to Chin. No mission had
reached its destination since 1210–11, yet Shih Mi-yu¨an chose not to risk war
by interrupting the tribute payments, so embassies set out punctually for the
next three years only to be turned back before reaching Chung-tu in the north.
Shih Mi-yu¨an was insistent that tribute items be kept in storage, rather than
152 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 14, p. 304; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4334.
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returned to the government exchequer for government use. This implied that
the tribute payments would be resumed later. The image of timidity that this
unseemly accommodation presented disturbed no small number of Sung offi-
cials. As with this diplomatic crisis, Shih Mi-yu¨an’s response to the impending
military crisis was frustratingly indecisive. He ordered the reinforcement of
border defense installations, but no general mobilization for war. As early as
1211, Chen Te-hsiu, the most articulate and perhaps best-informed critic of
court policy, a former ambassador with firsthand knowledge of conditions in
the north, predicted the imminent demise of the Chin and urged his gov-
ernment to prepare for an inevitable showdown with the Mongols.153 After
the Chin court had moved its capital to K’ai-feng in 1214, it demanded the
immediate delivery of the three years of outstanding peace payments. Chen
Te-hsiu pleaded for the tribute’s formal termination. Convinced that the Sung
would at some point be drawn into the conflict between the Chin and the Mon-
gols, Chen thought it senseless to cling to an outdated policy of restraint and
maintain the illusion of cordial relations. Chen Te-hsiu’s stand on the tribute
controversy was pragmatic, for a large sum of back payments was involved, but
it was also emotional. Now that the Chin court had moved to K’ai-feng, the
Sung envoys would have to present themselves before alien rulers in the palace
where earlier Sung emperors had once sat enthroned. This was a deep humil-
iation for them, and an unpardonable indignity to the dynasty’s illustrious
ancestors.154
Many others shared Chen Te-hsiu’s views. Yu¨an Hsieh, a somewhat militant
statesman from Ming-chou, joined in calling for the termination of the peace
payments.155 The much less militant Liu Kuang-tsu, prefect of T’ung-ch’uan,
agreed. In addition to the issue of the Chin court’s receiving Sung envoys in
former Sung palaces, Liu was livid at the short-sightedness of current policies.
Writing in 1215, he stated: “We and the Jurchen have an enmity that cannot
permit coexistence under Heaven. Heaven [wishes to] eliminate these bandits
and has sent them to die at Pien-liang [K’ai-feng]. Your Majesty, although
Son of Heaven, does not comprehend the plan which it has devised. Not
to take what Heaven offers is known as abandoning Heaven. Never can one
abandon Heaven without Heaven becoming angry.”156 Coinciding as it did
with widespread natural disasters, Liu’s warning packed a powerful punch.
Liu Kuang-tsu, like Chen Te-hsiu, hoped to accelerate the demise of the Chin,
153 SS 437, p. 12959; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 2, pp. 19b–22a; Wei, Ho-shan
hsien-sheng ta ch’u¨an-chi 69, p. 14a.
154 SS 437, p. 12959; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4338–9; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi
3, p. 17b.
155 Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 47, p. 13a.
156 Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 16b; SS 397, p. 12101.
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and terminating the peace payments was an important first step. One of the
few opposing views on record came from Ch’iao Hsing-chien (1156–1241),
an official with extensive regional experience then serving as fiscal overseer
in Huai-nan West. Ch’iao preferred deferring any policy response until the
outcome of the conflict in the north was more certain. He urged Shih Mi-yu¨an
to resume the gift offerings, thereby assisting the Chin in their fight against
the far greater threat to stability in the region, the Mongols. The proposal,
novel for the time and eminently pragmatic, was so poorly received in Lin-an
that irate students at the Imperial University demanded Ch’iao Hsing-chien’s
execution.157
Shih Mi-yu¨an, although sensitive to official opinion, was too cautious to
abandon the current policies and provoke the Chin. Twice in 1214 the Chin,
desperately in need of funds, sent missions to Lin-an to expedite the delivery
of peace payments. They even recalled an envoy to protest against the Sung’s
procrastination.158 To ignore the Chin protest would have threatened to esca-
late into a military response. Our sources make no mention of payment being
made, but the exchange of envoys was resumed by year’s end, which suggests
that Shih Mi-yu¨an may have quietly done so. By ignoring the opinion of influ-
ential colleagues and trying to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the
Chin by appeasement, Shih Mi-yu¨an was endangering his support at home.
The Sung was the only major power of the time to maintain its tributary rela-
tions with the beleaguered Chin. The Hsi Hsia and Koryo˘ (Korea) had both
severed their tributary ties with the Chin over the preceding five years.
The peace payment controversy was not the only source of dissatisfac-
tion with Shih Mi-yu¨an’s foreign policy. As early as 1214, the Hsi Hsia had
approached the Sung to discuss a possible alliance against the Chin. A cau-
tious Shih Mi-yu¨an ignored the overtures and lost, in consequence, a unique
opportunity to expand his empire’s influence in the northwest. A year later
in 1215, the Sung requested a reduction in its tribute offering. The Chin
court in Pien-liang (K’ai-feng) balked, and the Sung court gave in. In 1216,
when an army of reportedly a hundred thousand Ch’in-chou “loyalists” from
the west of Chin sought asylum in Sung territory, they were turned away, the
Sung being still unwilling to jeopardize relations with the Chin.159 Ironically,
such extraordinary accommodations coincided with the further decline of Chin
power. The Mongols, having seized Chung-tu in spring 1215, led their armies
to within seven miles of K’ai-feng. The Chin were demoralized, beset with
defections throughout the north and conspiracies directed at the throne. But
157 SS 417, p. 12489; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4339, 4341.
158 SS 39, p. 760; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4333, 4339.
159 See SS 39, p. 760; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 62, p. 1483; SS 39, p. 763.
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although the situation within Chin had deteriorated, Shih Mi-yu¨an remained
committed to neutrality. Ultimately, only a hostile initiative from the Chin
would force a change in policy.
In the spring of 1217, the Chin declared war against the Sung. Chin assaults
on targets in the central border region – Kuang-chou2, Tsao-yang, Kuang-
hua, and Hsin-yang – were accompanied by a sizable drive in the west against
Ta-san Pass, Hsi-ho-chou, Chieh-chou, and Ch’eng-chou. Ostensibly, the Chin
attacks were in response to the Sung’s alleged incitement of bandit activity
along the Huai River border in the east. The charge was not entirely baseless.
The Sung-Chin border had witnessed various incidents of provocation for
some time, responsibility for which partly lay with the Sung. In early 1214,
a small force of irregulars from Szechwan had crossed the border and attacked
Ch’in-chou, spurred on by the military commissioner An Ping.160 The action,
perhaps a test of Chin strength, had not been sanctioned by the Sung court,
and when the band returned south, its members were rounded up and executed
by the Sung commander at Hsing-chou2. An Ping was then summoned to the
capital and named associate commissioner at the Bureau of Military Affairs, in
effect, being reprimanded with a promotion. Subsequent regional assignments
in the central or southwest part of the empire, away from northern Szechwan,
further demonstrated Shih Mi-yu¨an’s disavowal of the venture at Ch’in-chou.
The Chin certainly understood this, for they took no immediate retaliation.
On the eastern front, however, where the Sung court theoretically exercised far
better control, frequent skirmishes along the border and the proliferation of
bandit groups were much more suspect. Instability in Chin territory gave rise to
banditry and insurrection. Many of the insurgents, by identifying themselves
culturally with Han Chinese rule in the south, appeared to be agents of the
Sung, even if many, perhaps most, had no such backing. At other times, Sung
border officials had surreptitiously aided rebels and refugees, violating court
policy and treaty commitments. The Sung court never condoned the practice,
and occasionally as an act of good faith it punished officials found guilty, but
the Chin held the Sung accountable all the same.
More important than Sung provocation, the motive for the Chin attacks
against the south was their need to prepare an escape from further defeat by the
Mongols in the north. Since 1215, the emperor, Chin Hsu¨an-tsung, had come
under the influence of Chu-ho-lo Kuo-le-ch’i (d. 1219), the privy councilor and
later chief minister.161 Chu-ho-lo, with every justification, feared the Mongols,
and desired a twofold strategy for dealing with them. First, he proposed the
160 SS 402, pp. 12191–2; Sung-shih ch’u¨an-wen Hsu¨ Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 30, p. 16a; HTC (1958) 160,
p. 4332.
161 HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4345, 4350–1, 4356–7, 4359–61; 161, pp. 4378, 4383–4.
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concentrated defense of strategic cities, lest scarce military resources be spread
too thin. This left lesser cities to fend for themselves. Second, rather than
risk direct, probably suicidal, confrontation, he preferred to protect the court
through higher and stronger walls and, of course, distance. By attacking the
Sung, the Chin could avoid confrontation with the Mongols while expanding
its influence south of the Huai in preparation for further retreat. The insecure
Chin Hsu¨an-tsung initially rejected this counsel. It appeared foolhardy to open
another front, in light of declining revenues and the current heavy fighting
in the north.162 A brief rally against the Mongols in 1216, combined with
considerable pressure from Chu-ho-lo, finally swayed Chin Hsu¨an-tsung.
The Sung response to the Chin attacks was intentionally weak. Hoping
to contain the conflict, the Sung court instructed border officials to confine
themselves to defensive actions. Shih Mi-yu¨an waited two months to declare
war. He did so then only after much prodding by Chao Fang, the distinguished
military commissioner of Ching-hu.163 Shih’s indecision hardly endeared him
to military commanders, but they had further reason to be irritated. Unlike
Han T’o-chou, and perhaps learning from his negative example, Shih Mi-yu¨an
had permitted individual commanders to exercise substantial independence in
conducting the war effort in their respective theaters. Interference from Lin-an
was minimal. The approach certainly had its merits: commanders in the field
were better able to assess a region’s strengths and mobilize its resources rapidly
in response to attack than were officials in the distant capital. By delegating
greater discretionary authority to regional leaders, Shih Mi-yu¨an could relieve
himself of personal responsibility for the outcome of any specific battle or
campaign.
loyalists of shantung
Another telling sign of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s inadequacies as a decision maker is his
treatment of “loyalist armies.” In many parts of Chin territory ever since the
Chin conquest of the north, rebels, often claiming loyalty to the Sung, had
attempted to overthrow the Jurchen. In some cases, these insurrections had
coalesced around a desire on the part of Han Chinese to restore Sung rule as
an expression of their cultural self-awareness and their wish for political self-
determination. In other cases, rebels sought to advance their personal interests,
and swore allegiance to the Sung simply to attract material support from Lin-
an or to lend a veneer of legitimacy to what otherwise was simple banditry.
Commonly known in the south as “loyal and righteous armies” (chung-i-chu¨n),
162 Lin Jui-han, “Wan Chin kuo-ch’ing chih yen-chiu,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 16 No. 7 (1958), pp. 22–6.
163 SS 403, pp. 12203–7; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4362.
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such bands were most active in the Shantung circuits.164 Geographically iso-
lated, impoverished, and with a long tradition of insurgency, the region had
suffered heavily from frequent natural disasters, the most common stimulus for
outbreaks of banditry. These loyalists – or rebels, from the Chin perspective –
were most active and threatening to authorities in times of military conflict.
Treaty commitments prohibited the Sung court from supporting such groups,
but in wartime there were no such restrictions. If these domestic upheavals
did not win the Sung a foothold in the north, at least they forced the Chin to
divert some attention from their external to their internal enemy. Moreover,
the Sung risked little by supporting loyalists, for loyalist armies lived and
operated almost entirely in Chin territory.
Among the more prominent of Shantung loyalists had been Yang An-erh
(var. Yang An-kuo, d. 1214), a former saddle maker from I-tu, the capital
of Shantung East circuit. During the K’ai-hsi war of 1206 to 1208 he had
joined other marauders in pillaging the countryside, where they acquired the
sobriquet “Red-jacket bandits” (Hung-ao tsei). Chin authorities were unable to
suppress the rebels by force, and after the war they had offered titular posts
to Yang An-erh and his confederates in exchange for their promises of fealty.
However, once the Mongols had begun their invasion, the Red-jackets returned
to brigandry. About fifty miles east of I-tu, at Wei-chou5, there emerged
another brigand leader, Li Ch’u¨an (d. 1231).165 Of peasant stock, he and his
brother reportedly turned to banditry after their mother and eldest brother
were killed by Mongol invaders.166 The war had led to increased taxation, and
natural disasters had so strained the regional economy that Li Ch’u¨an had little
problem attracting recruits; his band soon grew to be several thousand strong.
Yang An-erh had died in 1214, killed by greedy boatmen who sought the
bounty of one thousand ounces of gold that the Chin government had offered
for his head. His younger sister, Yang Miao-chen, herself a skilled rider and
archer, assumed command of the rebel remnants. Before long, she married Li
Ch’u¨an, and their two bands merged to create a force of some fifteen thousand
to twenty thousand.
During the K’ai-hsi era (1205–7), Yang An-erh had assisted the Sung in
temporarily controlling parts of Shantung, but his own dynastic ambitions
164 See Huang K’uan-ch’ung’s series of two articles, “Lu¨eh-lun Nan Sung shih-tai ti kuei-cheng-jen
(shang),” Shih-huo yu¨eh-k’an 7 No. 3 (1977), pp. 111–20; and “Lu¨eh-lun Nan Sung shih-tai ti kuei-
cheng-jen (hsia),” Shih-huo yu¨eh-k’an 7 No. 4 (1977), pp. 172–83, and Huang’s Nan Sung shih-tai k’ang
Chin ti i-chu¨n (Taipei, 1988), pp. 1–30, 171–223.
165 SS 476–7; HTC (1958) 159, p. 4307; 160, pp. 4336–7, 4341, 4343; 161, pp. 4364–5; also see the
chapter “Nan Sung Chin Yu¨an chien ti Shan-tung chung-i-chu¨n yu¨ Li Ch’u¨an,” in Sun K’o-k’uan,
Meng-ku Han-chu¨n chi Han wen-hua yen-chiu (Taipei, 1958), pp. 11–43.
166 SS 476, p. 13817; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4336.
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later proved far stronger than any professed fealty to the Sung. Li Ch’u¨an, in
contrast, apparently began with few personal ambitions and maintained close
ties to the south. When the Chin attacked the Sung in 1217, Li’s increased
stature in Shantung and his commitment to the Sung cause made him attractive
to border officials, who saw Li’s disruptive activities as a valuable counter to
Chin influence in the Huai region. Ying Ch’un-chih, the prefect of Ch’u-chou,
was one such optimist. He believed that with the Chin pressed by the Mongols
to the north, a thrust from the east by Shantung loyalists might lead to Sung
recovery of the entire north. Another border official, Chia She (d. 1223), evinced
similar enthusiasm and helped Ying Ch’un-chih in supporting and organizing
loyalist armies in Chin territory. The insightful Chen Te-hsiu worded his
support for these plans somewhat differently. He thought assistance to such
groups was morally obligatory and, should the Sung court fail to provide aid,
the consequent ill will might ultimately end in disaster, and provoke anti-Sung
hostility.167 Shih Mi-yu¨an shared neither the optimism of regional officers nor
the sense of obligation to the loyalist rebels of Chen Te-hsiu, but he did not
entirely ignore bureaucratic opinion. When Sung-Chin hostilities resumed,
Ying Ch’un-chih extended massive aid to Shantung, apparently without court
authorization, but without its opposition either. Shih Mi-yu¨an later approved
the action, but only in secret correspondence, thereby distancing himself from
what must have seemed a risky venture.168
In the absence of an empirewide policy toward loyalist armies, regional
civilian and military leaders formulated their own. Support for insurrections
had been relatively modest in central and western regions of Chin-held terri-
tory, where northern rebels were less organized and Sung border officials more
cautious in backing them. In the east, not only did rebel bands have strong,
competent leadership, but the Sung regional officials who dealt with the rebels
wielded more influence at court and came, in time, to affect its attitude. Toward
the close of 1217 and with substantial assistance from the south, Li Ch’u¨an and
his brother Li Fu2 laid claim to Chu¨-chou and I-tu, two strategic prefectures
in the central and northern parts of the Shan-tung circuits. For the first time,
Shih Mi-yu¨an publicly acknowledged his endorsement of loyalist activity by
honoring Li Ch’u¨an with the title commander in chief of Shantung.
In the coming years, Li Ch’u¨an became a valued Sung ally. In addition to
gradually acquiring additional territory in Shantung, he occasionally assisted
Sung regular armies in campaigns in central China. He also helped recruit
other rebels to the Sung cause. The 1219 defection of the Chin commander
167 On their views, see HTC (1958) 161, p. 4364; SS 403, pp. 12207–10; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen
Wen-chung kung wen-chi 34, pp. 18a–20a, respectively.
168 SS 403, pp. 12207; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4363–4.
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Chang Lin2 is a prominent example; with this one stroke, the Chin lost twelve
prefectures.169 Defections and defeats in the Shantung region were so pervasive
that by 1221 Chin authority was confined to only a few pockets. The Sung
court subsequently committed itself to strengthening ties with loyalists in the
hope of annexing the entire region. To Shih Mi-yu¨an, cautious and suspicious
of loyalists’ motives, the goodwill and loyal service that were so critical to the
plan’s success could best be won through generously conferring official rank
and material wealth on the successful loyalist leaders, essentially the same
policy he applied at court in Lin-an to harness the bureaucracy. Shih named Li
Ch’u¨an first as regional supervisor and then regional commander, two sinecures
of considerable prestige, and by 1224 Sung subsidies for this single Shantung
army rose to three hundred thousand strings of cash.170
Officials, many of whom had once criticized Shih Mi-yu¨an for inadequate
support for “loyalists,” found his new enthusiasm for Li Ch’u¨an even more
unsettling. Greater status and wealth, they feared, might turn the head of
the loyalist leader by stoking his personal ambitions. Chia She reportedly
commented in 1222: “The court knows only that office and rank can be used
to obtain one’s heart. Does it not also know that arrogant commanders, in the
end, cannot be controlled?” Chia later resigned in frustration over Li Ch’u¨an’s
insubordinate arrogance. Chia She’s replacement as prefect of Ch’u-chou, Hsu¨
Kuo (d. 1225), quickly became even more incensed, and accused Li of seditious
intentions.171 There was good reason for their suspicions. To tighten his grip on
the Shantung region, Li Ch’u¨an had begun as early as 1220 to conspire against
rival leaders, a move that alienated both fellow loyalists and Sung border
officials. Among Li Ch’u¨an’s first notable victims was an assistant commander
for militias in southern Shantung, the influential Chi Hsien (d. 1220). A
jealous Li Ch’u¨an convinced Chia She of Chi Hsien’s duplicity and brought
about Chi’s execution in the summer of 1220. Later that year, Li engineered the
purge of Chi Hsien’s court-appointed successor, Shih Kuei (d. 1220), another
individual whose popularity among rival leaders presented a personal threat
to Li. Similarly charged with duplicity, Shih was assassinated.172 Li Ch’u¨an
also bore indirect responsibility for the 1221 defection to the Mongols of
Chang Lin2 whom he had himself won over to the Sung side only two years
earlier. Chang Lin2 publicly indicted Li Ch’u¨an for forcing his defection to the
Mongols. But he was most likely motivated by opportunism, since he returned
169 SS 476, p. 13820; HTC (1958) 161, p. 4382.
170 HTC (1958) 162, p. 4421.
171 SS 403, p. 12209; HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4412, 4418.
172 SS 476, pp. 13821–2; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4386–7, 4391.
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to the Sung cause only a year later.173 The incident confirmed the wisdom
of Chia She’s counsel and the injudiciousness of Shih Mi-yu¨an’s indulgence
of Shantung rebel agents. But once the policy had been set, Shih Mi-yu¨an
refused to acknowledge his mistake and continued to indulge Li Ch’u¨an until
Li himself forced a change.
sung-chin conflict
However hesitant decision making at the Sung court may have appeared, the
Sung military leadership at the border offered a clear contrast. In the first
year of the war, 1217, the Chin twice attempted to capture strategic Tsao-
yang and Sui-chou2, access to which would expose Hsiang-yang, the capital of
Ching-hsi2 circuit, to a westward attack. Hsiang-yang was the strategic pivot
of Sung defenses in its central territory, and Chin forces had to be stopped.
Under the general direction of Chao Fang, commanders Meng Tsung-cheng
and Hu Tsai-hsing inflicted heavy casualties upon the advancing Chin, forcing
their retreat from both Tsao-yang and Sui-chou2. The second Chin campaign
in early 1218, chiefly targeting Sui-chou2, involved an estimated one hundred
thousand Chin troops and represented a crucial test of strength for the two
powers. Some seventy battles and three months later, the encirclement of Sui-
chou2 had been broken and the Chin troops again withdrew. Undaunted, Chin
forces resumed their attack a year later. This time the blockade lasted eighty
days and cost the north thirty thousand men.174
The Chin also did not make significant inroads farther east, in the Huai
River region. Chin offensives in 1219 were launched against Ch’u-chou, Hao-
chou, and Kuang-chou2, where again they committed a huge force, said to
number one hundred thousand troops; each offensive failed to yield a lasting
foothold in Sung territory. During these attacks, loyalist armies had been
deployed by Chia She with remarkable success. The Shantung loyalists Chi
Hsien, Shih Kuei, Li Ch’u¨an, and Li Fu2 all cooperated in defense operations
and proved that loyalists could be deployed on the Huai frontier as well as
in the interior of Shantung.175 In the west, the Chin managed to temporarily
capture the Ta-san Pass and Hsi-ho-chou, but these were their only noteworthy
victories.
The performance of the Sung troops decidedly outclassed and frightened
the Chin. Not only did the Sung succeed in repulsing repeated massive
173 SS 476, pp. 13823–4; HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4401–2, 4415.
174 SS 403, pp. 12205, 12210, 12211–12; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4361; 161, pp. 4369, 4375, 4380–1.
175 SS 403, p. 12208; 476, pp. 13819–20; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4376–7.
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enemy invasions, but they launched some retaliatory strikes that permanently
shattered the old myth of Jurchen invincibility. Outside the Shantung theater,
southern armies joined by loyalists attacked the strategically vital Ssu-chou,
just north of the Huai River, in the spring of 1218. Another Sung offensive
followed three years later. Neither ended in lasting success, but Sung casualties
appear to have been modest. In the central border region of the Sung, where
they faced heavy and sustained Chin onslaughts, Sung armies still mustered the
strength to turn from defense to mounting a counteroffensive. In the summer
of 1219, troops directed by Chao Fang crossed the border to raid T’ang-chou
and Teng-chou2 in modern Honan, subsequently turning back to attack from
the rear Chin encampments threatening Hsiang-yang and Tsao-yang. Hav-
ing masterfully executed the campaign, Chao Fang felt sufficiently confident
to order another assault on T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2 toward year’s end,
this time reputedly employing sixty thousand men. Chin losses, again heavy,
were compounded by the deaths of several valued commanders. The Sung had
no intention of holding the two cities, merely to destroy stores of provisions
and exert pressure on the Chin. Having achieved these objectives, Sung forces
withdrew from T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2.
In the west, Sung armies fought with similar confidence and determination.
An Ping had probed enemy strength at Ch’in-chou as early as 1214 and paid for
this unauthorized initiative with losing his command and reassignment in the
east. He subsequently returned to Szechwan in an unofficial capacity, forming
a secret liaison in 1218 with the Hsi Hsia for a joint campaign against the
Chin. The bold plan fell through, however, when Tangut armies failed to reach
the target cities of Ch’in-chou and Kung-chou2. The Sung invaders, unable
to hold out on their own, lost tens of thousands in the retreat. A few months
later, the Sung conducted another offensive against Ch’in-chou, employing an
estimated one hundred thousand men, both regulars and loyalists. Ta-san Pass,
then in Chin hands, was retaken en route to Ch’in-chou, but the campaign
was aborted on instructions from the capital. Sung casualties again mounted
as troops retreated under enemy pressure. In both offensives, optimistic Sung
generals considered victory had been within their grasp and many blamed
the failure to back them up on Tung Chu¨-i, the military commissioner for
Szechwan since An Ping’s dismissal in 1214. In consequence, back at the Sung
court a movement developed to restore An Ping to leadership of the western
front, a move that was supported by impartial statesmen such as Wei Liao-
weng, a Szechwan native, and Chao Fang, a commander with experience in
the region. Both of these men viewed An Ping as the only leader capable of
harnessing the forces in the west. But given An Ping’s checkered past, it may
have been the need to quell the growing problems of rebellion in Szechwan,
rather than the need for a more offensive-minded commander, that led to An
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Ping’s return and appointment as pacification commissioner of Szechwan. In
the end, regional problems, specifically rebellion, prevented An Ping from
reviving the offensive, but at a time of acute vulnerability he succeeded in
stabilizing the Sung position and frustrating enemy advances.176
These Sung victories do not mean that the Chin had suddenly become an
inept fighting force. Their initial attacks in the west may have foundered
disastrously, yet they launched an awesome second western offensive in late
1217. This enabled them to capture, if only temporarily, several strategic
outposts and towns south of the border, including Ta-san Pass. Repeated raids
in the west in late 1217 and early 1218 reportedly furnished the Chin with
ninety thousand bushels of grain, tens of millions in strings of cash, and
unknown quantities of military supplies.177 Clearly, plunder was the chief
motive for the aggression here. But this appears not to have been the case with
the raids in the spring of 1219, which culminated in victories as far south
as Ta-an commandery, in the heart of Li-chou circuit ninety miles from the
border. Northern armies also overwhelmed Sung defenders at nearby Hsi-ho-
chou, Hsing-yu¨an, and Yang-chou2. Fortunately for the Sung, these enemy
gains were not permanent. Moreover, Chin’s victories in the west were largely
offset by its defeats to the east.
The third and final Chin offensive during Ning-tsung’s reign occurred in
the spring of 1221. Focusing on the central border region, the Chin shocked
the Sung by penetrating over one hundred and twenty miles into its heartland
and overcoming the defenders of Ch’i-chou2, north of the Yangtze, in Huai-
nan West. The Sung, through the daring leadership of Hu Tsai-hsing and Li
Ch’u¨an, nonetheless battled back and repelled them.
The overall failure of the Chin military campaign stemmed, in part, from
an exceptional Sung defense. Perhaps more crucial, however, was the dimin-
ishment of Chin morale. From the outset, the Chin emperor had opposed the
plan to take the offensive against the Sung. Only under mounting pressure did
Chin Hsu¨an-tsung reluctantly agree, and the tally after a year’s effort proved
it to have been a disastrous decision. At the close of 1218, Chin Hsu¨an-tsung
dispatched a peace envoy to the south. Public opinion in Lin-an, however, was
now vehemently opposed to an accommodation with the Chin. Indeed, one
minister was cruelly humiliated by angry students at the Imperial University
for airing what the students considered pacifist views.178 Public sentiment
was unmistakable; Shih Mi-yu¨an unceremoniously rebuffed the Chin envoy.
176 See SS 40; 402, pp. 12192–4; 403, pp. 12204–13, 12207; 476, p. 13818; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 15; HTC
(1958), chu¨an 160–2.
177 T’o-t’o, Chin shih 15, p. 336; HTC (1958) 161, p. 4370.
178 HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4378.
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Defeated in their initiatives at war and at peace, the Chin were beset with
other problems, including court intrigue and defections abroad.
In 1218 in northern Shantung, Assistant Fiscal Supervisor Ch’eng Chien
planned to defect to the Sung, but did not succeed. However, the plans of
commanders Chang T’ien-i and Chang Lin2 went ahead a year later. Slightly
to the west, regional leader Yen Shih and others defected in 1220, giving the
Sung nominal control over a cluster of prefectures north and east of the Chin
capital, K’ai-feng. Leaders in Ta-ming fu renounced the Chin in 1224. These
are but a few of many such incidents. Defections to the Mongols were even more
numerous. There were also plots and high-level intrigues at the capital. Chin’s
chief councilor Kao Ch’i (d. 1220) was imprisoned in 1219 and subsequently
executed, the victim of intrigue. Military affairs executive Pu-sa An-chen
(d. 1221) suffered a similar fate, charged with rebellious intentions by political
rivals. The loss of distinguished statesmen and the political infighting behind
it signaled and exacerbated the rapid weakening of the Chin dynasty.
domestic concerns
As a whole, the Sung period commonly inspires images of extraordinary mate-
rial wealth and domestic tranquility, images that reflect some measure of the
historical record, even though the dynasty was hardly immune to natural dis-
asters and human crises. Scholar-official discontent with political leadership
notwithstanding, the Kuang-tsung and early Ning-tsung years represent the
last era of genuine prosperity during the Southern Sung; natural disasters were
comparatively infrequent, and domestic order largely prevailed. With the rise
of Shih Mi-yu¨an, and to the fault of no one individual or policy, the prolonged
good fortune of the dynasty began to languish.
One major area of concern for officials was the economy. In the aftermath
of the K’ai-hsi war, rampant inflation had reduced many affluent families to
bankruptcy, prompting the court to take responsibility in compensating for
losses incurred.179 At the same time, natural disasters impeded the restora-
tion of economic stability. The Che-hsi and Che-tung circuits were especially
hard-hit. Severe droughts had parched that area in 1208, 1214, and 1215;
floodwaters had hit in 1210, 1212, 1213, and 1217; invasions by plagues
of locusts had come in 1208, 1209, 1210, and 1215; and massive fires had
erupted in the crowded Sung capital in 1208, 1211, and 1220, destroying
tens of thousands of private homes and large sections of the imperial city. In
179 HTC (1958) 158, p . 4286. Also see Ch’u¨an Han-sheng, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i
tui-yu¨ wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei,
1964), pp. 283–325.
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the west, earthquakes had struck Szechwan in early, middle, and late 1216.
The tremors, extending from the eastern to western extremities of the region,
must have inflicted much human suffering, not to mention material loss. Luck-
ily, the worst of these natural disturbances occurred before the Chin resumed
hostilities.
The Kuang-tsung and early Ning-tsung years also were largely free of insur-
rection, except for two insignificant and readily suppressed army mutinies and
a few minor raids on the southwest border by neighboring tribes. However,
the first major outbreak had begun in 1208 in Ch’en-chou2, an important
mining center in southern Ching-hu South circuit. The insurgency was led
by Lo Shih-ch’uan (d. 1211),180 a man of Yao2 extraction, who was proba-
bly reacting to long-standing tensions between an expanding Han Chinese
population and local ethnic groups who were being displaced. Suppression of
Lo’s forces did not take long. The insurgents were few in number and poorly
organized. Armies from northern Ching-hu South and neighboring Chiang-
nan West, commanded in part by Shih Mi-chien (1164–1232), the prefect of
T’an-chou (modern Ch’ang-sha) and brother of the chief councilor, pressed Lo
Shih-ch’uan to capitulate in exchange for government stipends and provisions.
Another insurgent, Li Yu¨an-li (d. 1210), who had perhaps been encouraged
by the precedent of compromise and unsteady government resolve, led an
uprising in the same region in early 1210. This uprising was far more serious
than that of Lo Shih-ch’uan. The outlaws numbered several tens of thousands
and raided east into Chiang-nan West. Whether Li represented a specific group
is not clear, but the discontent that Li Yu¨an-li tapped into extended beyond
ethnic tensions as the uprising took on rebellious dimensions. In response,
Sung reinforcements from as far north as Ch’ih-chou, in central Chiang-nan
East, were ordered to assist in the suppression. Still, the outlaws multiplied
with unexpected speed and dealt some devastating blows to government forces.
The Sung proved incapable of halting the eastern thrust of Li Yu¨an-li, and its
great fear was an alliance between Li and Lo Shih-ch’uan. This never materi-
alized, their differences being too numerous. Meanwhile, the Sung court had
appointed Wang Chu¨-an (chin-shih 1187), prefect of Lung-hsing2, to lead the
suppression. By recruiting local militia, a resourceful Wang Chu¨-an managed
to stem the tide. He was also successful at undermining the enemy through
intrigue. Wang had carefully planted the seeds of mistrust among the rebels,
which culminated in the execution of Li Yu¨an-li by Lo Shih-ch’uan toward
the close of 1210. This intensive feuding eliminated the government’s most
180 On these rebellions, see SS 405, pp. 12253–4; 493, pp. 14195–6; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4275, 4289–90;
159, pp. 4296–4300, 4304; Li Jung-ts’un, “Hei-feng-tung pien-luan shih-mo,” Chung-yang yen-chiu-
yu¨an li-shih yu¨-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an 41 No. 3 (1969), pp. 497–533.
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serious threat, Li Yu¨an-li. Shih Mi-yu¨an then intervened, extending to Lo
Shih-ch’uan various titles and ranks in a bid for his loyalty, but Lo Shih-ch’uan
himself fell victim to an assassin in 1211, most probably also at the instigation
of Wang Chu¨-an. Still, Councilor Shih insisted on having the last word: the
rank awarded to Lo Shih-ch’uan would pass to his assassin.
The mutiny in 1219 led by Chang Fu (d. 1219) and Mo Chien (d. 1219) was
smaller in scope and duration. Chang Fu and Mo Chien, both military men
from Hsing-yu¨an prefecture, northern Szechwan, commanded supposedly over
ten thousand men in a self-proclaimed Red Turban (Hung-chin) uprising.181
Although it lasted only from spring to summer, this rebellion presented a far
greater challenge to the Sung court than those in the southwest nine years
earlier. Erupting during wartime, the proximity of the rebels to the Chin
border must have heightened fears of a possible alliance with the north, in
effect, a repeat of the Wu Hsi fiasco twelve years earlier. The insurgents moved
with astounding speed and precision. They appear not to have captured Hsing-
yu¨an, the capital of Li-chou circuit, but the prefecture Li-chou2 did fall, forcing
a hasty retreat by the military commissioner of Szechwan. Rebels executed
Szechwan’s fiscal supervisor and pillaged Lang-chou and Kao-chou. Within
a month they had advanced a hundred and eighty miles from Hsing-yu¨an.
The shock reverberated throughout Szechwan, reportedly exceeding in impact
the earlier Wu Hsi defection, and prompted the Sung court to reappoint An
Ping as pacification commissioner. Chang Fu soon captured Sui-ning and, after
destroying much of the city, moved on to P’u-chou2, in the central part of
T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Surrounded there by Sung forces led by An Ping, the
rebels, Chang Fu, Mo Chien, and over a thousand confederates were captured
and put to death. An Ping emerged from the suppression a hero, his reputation
restored after having been severely tarnished by his unauthorized raids against
the north in 1214. He was appointed prefect of Hsing-yu¨an and regional
commander. Although army mutinies and bandit activities continued to erupt
at intervals, most were confined to Szechwan and speedily suppressed.
Other signs of instability, less imposing in scale perhaps, nonetheless proved
unsettling, for they directly threatened Shih Mi-yu¨an. In 1209 a commander
of loyalist armies who had been closely associated with Han T’o-chou, Lo
Jih-yu¨an (d. 1209), hatched an elaborate conspiracy against Shih Mi-yu¨an,
apparently out of dissatisfaction with the harsh terms of amnesty granted him
following Han T’o-chou’s death.182 Lo’s plan involved the assassination of
Shih Mi-yu¨an and his retinue of high officials during their procession toward
181 SS 40, pp. 772–3; 402, pp. 12192–3; 403, p. 12215; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4376–80.
182 SS 39, p. 752; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4288.
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Lin-an in the sixth month of 1209, and the seizure of power at court, no
doubt to purge it of remaining Shih Mi-yu¨an elements. Shih was returning
to the capital after briefly mourning his mother’s death, and Ning-tsung, as
a sign of special favor, had arranged an elaborate ceremony to welcome him.
The occasion probably drew most government notables, with the crowds and
festivities providing a convenient cover for the perpetrators. However, the
wildly ambitious plan was never put into action. A fellow conspirator had
turned government informer, and Lo Jih-yu¨an was executed. Another attempt
against Shih Mi-yu¨an was reported soon thereafter, this time concocted by a
self-righteous, if not insane, student at Lin-an’s military academy. It too was
exposed and the man executed.183 This was the last known conspiracy against
the controversial councilor.
Not so easy to suppress was the uprising of the Man ethnic groups. Living
in the region of southwest Szechwan, the Man had raided Li-chou3 in 1195
and Ya-chou in 1206, but the uprising led by Hsu¨ Pu in 1208 easily dwarfed
the others. The inaccessibility of the southern part of the Li-chou circuit
inhibited the deployment of government troops from the north, which left
the court dependent on informal local militia to restore order. In practice,
when a militia failed to do its job, political and monetary concessions often
provided the right incentive for the insurgents to disband. The first strategy,
coercion, had failed disastrously in the case of Hsu¨ Pu, whose lawlessness
continued sporadically for the next six years, but in the end he surrendered in
exchange for a handsome government stipend. While he was active, Hsu¨ Pu’s
defiance encouraged others in the region to rebel. An uprising in 1211 had
struck nearby Hsu¨-chou, and another had hit Chia-ting in 1213, and there
were outbreaks at Ya-chou in 1217 and 1220.184 The relatively small scale and
geographic remoteness of Man and Yao2 insurgencies limited their impact on
the political fortunes of Shih Mi-yu¨an, yet when viewed within the broader
contexts of Sung domestic instability and foreign invasion, they were surely
interpreted as signs of Heaven’s dissatisfaction with the court at Lin-an.
an uncertain succession
After a decade in power, Shih Mi-yu¨an had alienated many inside and out-
side the capital. His prominent role in controversial court decisions, his
183 Wang Chien-ch’iu, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsu¨eh yu¨ t’ai-hsu¨eh-sheng” (M.A. thesis, Fu-jen T’a-hsu¨eh, 1965),
p. 305.
184 On these various outbreaks, see SS 37–40; 494, pp. 14195–6; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4124; 157, p. 4236;
158, pp. 4285, 4290–1; 159, pp. 4304, 4311–12; 160, p. 4329.
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manipulative approach to dealing with colleagues, his caution in conducting
foreign affairs all detracted from his original appeal and left him increasingly
isolated from the bureaucracy. Still, the emperor maintained an unwavering
confidence in him. The chief councilor’s policies, although widely assailed,
were hardly unsound. They maintained a high level of order while holding at
bay the empire’s various enemies, domestic and foreign, in difficult circum-
stances. Moreover, those bureaucrats who disapproved of Shih Mi-yu¨an had no
single issue around which to rally, that is, until the emperor’s death.
Before assuming the throne in 1194, Ning-tsung had fathered two sons,
both of whom died young. At least seven other sons would follow, but they too
would all die within months of birth. The emperor’s sole daughter suffered a
similar fate. In none of these cases is the maternity recorded, for all the mothers
were apparently lesser consorts. No reasons for their deaths are given, and there
is no suggestion of foul play. Lacking an heir, in 1197 the emperor adopted
the four-year-old Chao Hsu¨n (1193–1220), a descendant of Sung founder T’ai-
tsu’s second son, Chao Te-chao.185 The youth became heir apparent at sixteen
and spent the next decade in training for the throne. As a mark of his favor,
the emperor permitted Chao Hsu¨n occasionally to join in court audiences.
The heir was no less favored by Empress Yang2 and Shih Mi-yu¨an, especially
the latter, who served the prince in various capacities, including lecturer and
chief advisor. When the twenty-eight-year-old Chao Hsu¨n died in the early
autumn of 1220, the loss to Shih Mi-yu¨an was personal no less than political.
The death raised the difficult problem of the succession. Three generations
earlier, an heirless Kao-tsung had adopted two sons from the imperial clan
and eventually selected the more promising one as heir. Ning-tsung did not
follow this farsighted precedent. By adopting only one child in 1197, he had
no alternative heir when Chao Hsu¨n died in 1220, and the highly charged
process of identifying a suitable candidate had to begin anew. At fifty-two,
the emperor’s age seemed to preclude adoption of a young child, although this
was the normal ideal, to avoid the succession of a child emperor and a regency
after his own death. The nominee also had to be closely related to the royal
family. In the context of such limitations, Ning-tsung selected Chao Hung
185 On the succession, see Richard L. Davis, “Evolution of an historical stereotype for the Southern Sung
– the case against Shih Mi-yu¨an,” in Ryu¯ Shiken hakuse sho¯ju kinen: So¯-shi kenkyu¯ ronshu¯, ed. Kinugawa
Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 357–86; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 202–5; SS 41, pp. 783–4; 243,
pp. 8656–7; 246, pp. 8733–8; 419, pp. 12551–2; 465, p. 13596; Sung-shih ch’u¨an-wen Hsu¨ Tzu-chih
t’ung-chien 31, pp. 1a–2a; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4269, 4271; 161, p. 4387; 162, pp. 4395–7, 4399,
4406–7, 4422–4; Liu K’o-chuang, Hou-ts’un hsien-sheng ta ch’u¨an-chi [Ssu-yen t’ang 1304 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1270; Taipei, 1979) 170, p. 2b; Chao I, Nien-erh shih cha-chi, ed. and
ann. Tu Wei-yu¨n (1799; Taipei, 1975) 23, pp. 496–7.
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(d. 1225), the adopted son of the deceased Chao Kai,186 himself the son of
Chao K’ai2 (1146–80), at one time heir to Hsiao-tsung.187
In view of his preeminence at court, Shih Mi-yu¨an certainly played some
role in choosing Chao Hung, yet problems emerged from early on. The selec-
tion required nearly a year’s consideration, suggesting both the complexity of
the process and the existence of serious reservations about the candidate. More-
over, Chao Hung proved, as prince, to be exceedingly abrasive and rebellious.
Making no secret of his enmity for Shih Mi-yu¨an, he threatened him with
future banishment to the remote south. The councilor is said to have learned
of Chao Hung’s animosity through a young beauty surreptitiously planted in
the palace, but Shih hardly needed an informant, for Chao Hung was not in
the least discreet and his feelings became common knowledge in the capi-
tal. Empress Yang2 found the youth equally offensive. Having arranged his
marriage to Princess Wu, her grand-niece, she was allegedly infuriated by the
prince’s neglect of his wife and devotion to several favored concubines, and
concluded that he was undeserving of the throne.188 The alienation of both
the empress and chief councilor is evidenced by Chen Te-hsiu’s admonition
to the prince in the summer of 1222, which warned him: “If Your Highness,
the emperor’s son, can be filial to Your beneficent mother and reverent to high
officials, then Heaven’s mandate will be vested in You. If not, You can imagine
the serious consequences!”189 The force of the statement, the warning about
“serious consequences,” suggests a conflict of considerable intensity soon after
Chao Hung’s adoption. Chen Te-hsiu’s admonition also alludes to the prince’s
association with persons of ill-repute and the notoriety of various unnamed
indiscretions.190 Understandably, the emperor did not rush to install him as
heir apparent.
186 Chao Hung’s birth father was Chao Hsi-ch’u¨. See SS 246, p. 8735.
187 It is noteworthy that Chao Hsu¨n and Chao Hung both descended from the line of Chao Te-chao,
second son of T’ai-tsu. All Northern Sung emperors descended from T’ai-tsung, brother of T’ai-tsu,
as did Kao-tsung of the Southern Sung. But the next three emperors – Hsiao-tsung, Kuang-tsung,
and Ning-tsung – descended from T’ai-tsu’s fourth son, Chao Te-fang, effectively restoring the throne
to the line of T’ai-tsu, the dynasty’s founder. Chao Hsu¨n and all subsequent heirs to the Sung throne
descended from the same line, but, as just noted, from a different son, the second son of T’ai-tsu,
not the fourth. Reasons for the shift are obscure, owing as much to adoption patterns established
two generations earlier as to contemporary policy. Still, the decision would prove politically sensi-
tive in time. See Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 41a, 66a–67b; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 25–
30.
188 Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih [Hsu¨eh-chin t’ao-yu¨an 1806 ed.; 1922 ed.] (c. 1298; Taipei, 1965) hou,
pp. 28b–29a.
189 HTC (1958) 162, p. 4406.
190 Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 37, pp. 6a–12a.
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Only months after the adoption, Ning-tsung had named Chao Yu¨n (1205–
64), an obscure scion of the imperial clan, who like Chao Hung was a descendant
of T’ai-tsu’s second son Chao Te-chao, to replace Chao Hung as heir to the line of
Chao Te-chao. Chao Yu¨n was a native of Shao-hsing. The youth reportedly came
at the recommendation of Yu¨ T’ien-hsi, a one-time teacher of Shih Mi-yu¨an
who considered Chao Yu¨n promising.191 The nomination was significant, for
the line of Chao Te-chao had already produced one heir to the throne and might
be called upon for a second, should the need arise. The nomination also gave
Chao Yu¨n exposure to influential court and palace figures. He struck a hand-
some image, it is said. He was regarded as a serious youth of few words, pure and
refined, fond of learning. He immediately appealed to Shih Mi-yu¨an, whose
disappointment with Chao Hung had already prompted thought of a switch.
In the interim, the education of Chao Yu¨n was entrusted to Cheng Ch’ing-
chih (1176–1251), Shih’s prote´ge´ and fellow Ming-chou provincial. For the
next three years, the court took no further action concerning any change in
succession.
Ning-tsung fell ill in the summer of 1224, and died on 17 September at age
fifty-six. An edict, dated only days before, elevated Chao Yu¨n to imperial son,
a status equal to that of Chao Hung. On the night of the death, in accordance
with the emperor’s will, Chao Yu¨n succeeded as heir to the throne. At the
last minute, Chao Hung had been passed over. Both the final edict and the
dying testament of Ning-tsung were drafted by Shih Mi-yu¨an, as was standard
practice in Sung times, yet whether the change represented the dying wish of
the emperor or was the illicit deed of his councilor is controversial. By official
accounts, Empress Yang2 learned of the impending switch only upon her
husband’s death and initially demurred; only under Shih Mi-yu¨an’s sustained
pressure did she consent. Shih Mi-yu¨an then summoned Chao Yu¨n to the
palace late that night and supervised, under heavy guard, the nineteen-year-
old’s accession as the new emperor. With assistance from the Palace Guard
commander Hsia Chen, who had been the assassin of Han T’o-chou seventeen
years earlier, Shih Mi-yu¨an disarmed Chao Hung’s guards and read out the
imperial testament (i-shu) that disinherited Chao. Shih Mi-yu¨an then made
Chao Hung make obeisance to the new emperor. There was no violence, and no
resistance from the empress or from the divested prince, who was immediately
exiled to Hu-chou, some sixty miles from the capital. Shih Mi-yu¨an’s tight
grip on the court had precluded open confrontation.
Shih Mi-yu¨an has been widely assailed for Chao Hung’s last-minute disin-
heritance. Many contemporaries and later historians charge that Shih Mi-yu¨an
191 HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4396.
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had imposed his will upon the emperor and empress – in effect usurping
imperial authority.192 However, the charge is not supported by substantial
evidence, and it disregards the special position of Empress Yang2 at court,
including her involvement in the earlier conspiracy against Han T’o-chou, her
consequent close ties with Shih Mi-yu¨an, and her continued prominence over
the next seventeen years of Li-tsung’s reign. She was hardly one to be easily
cowed, and the chief councilor, knowing her better than most, surely recog-
nized her importance as arbiter of palace matters involving the imperial family.
She must have been at least consulted, if indeed she did not join Shih Mi-yu¨an
in initiating the switch. That she should be called upon, after the accession,
to govern from “behind the bamboo screen” as regent confirms her political
stature at the time, although it was an honor she declined. In addition, Shih
Mi-yu¨an had built his reputation upon caution and prudence, and this did not
change after Ning-tsung’s death.
Had the succession’s legitimacy been seriously questioned, the Sung bureau-
cratic leadership would certainly have inundated the court with memorials of
protest, vehemently attacking Shih Mi-yu¨an for his arrogation of authority.
This did not occur in the months directly following the incident. It seems
most likely that all concerned knew that Chao Hung would be a disaster as
emperor and willingly accepted the fait accompli. It is noteworthy that Chao
Hung’s highly regarded tutor, Chen Te-hsiu, returned to Lin-an soon after the
accession and was appointed as vice-minister of rites. In light of his history
of tension with Shih Mi-yu¨an and his close association with Chao Hung, he
would never have accepted the post had the succession of Chao Yu¨n appeared
to him in any way improper. However, the transition of power, which went so
smoothly at first, would create difficulties with lasting consequence for Shih
Mi-yu¨an, and for the dynastic line.
During the thirty-five years of Kuang-tsung’s and Ning-tsung’s reigns the
Southern Sung was confronted with some of its greatest challenges. The Sung
endured periods of intense factionalism at court and two major border wars
with the Chin. It suffered through a succession of natural disasters and con-
tended with several large uprisings. It endured imperial leadership that was
at best inattentive and at worst mentally incompetent. Although people of
the time may have looked back nostalgically to the reign of Hsiao-tsung,
the possibility of the imminent demise of the Chin presented unforeseen and
unpredictable opportunities. These included regaining territory lost a century
before, the possible termination of peace payments, and a prospective end to
192 For a fuller analysis, see Davis, “Evolution of an historical stereotype,” and Davis, Court and family in
Sung China, pp. 95–105.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008use, available at https:/www.cambri ge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521812481.012
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 18:00:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
838 richard l. davis
the diplomacy of humiliation. The Mongols, at this point, were openly deter-
mined to annihilate the Chin, and they seemed to have had no quarrel with
the Sung. Decisions made over the next few years would profoundly affect
whether the Mongols and the Sung emerged after the elimination of Chin as
friends or foes.
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